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They walked on, thinking of This and That, and by-and-by they came to an
enchanted place on the top of the Forest called Galleons Lap… It was the only
place in the Forest that you could sit down carelessly without getting up again
almost at once and looking for somewhere else. Sitting there they could see the
whole world spread out until it reached the sky and whatever there was all over
the world was with them…
- A. A. Milne, The House at Pooh Corner
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ABSTRACT

Gregory Joseph Blair

PLACE-PRODUCED THOUGHT:
THE AGENCY OF PLACE AND THE CO-PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE
IN HEIDEGGER, BAUDRILLARD, AND OTHERS

Place has been a central consideration in much philosophical discourse
since at least the ancient Greeks. This dissertation will argue, however, that in
certain instances in the history of thinking, place has played a significant and
unique role, one beyond typical considerations.
In these specific intellectual projects, place is a method for situating and
focusing the development of thought. This relationship with place produces a
particular type of thought, one that ontologically fuses place and thinker together.
I regard this merger as a topographical convergence of situated contemplation that
creates a localized episteme, or in other words, “place-produced thought.” Within
this reciprocal relationship between place, thinker, and thought, I argue that the
agency of place plays a far more significant role than it is routinely ascribed.
Throughout this thesis, I also argue for the distinctive possibilities of
indigenous knowledge. Much of this argument is built upon certain instances of
thinking with/in place, in which the place itself asserts its agency and influence
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into the actual production of thought. My argument is constructed in a manner
that illustrates how this relationship between thinker and place is much different
than other approaches of creating a relationship with one’s surroundings. Finally,
I have tried to elucidate the innovative and irruptive possibilities for placeproduced thought—important sources of new identities, thoughts, boundaries, and
modes of being. In an increasingly globalized and technological world, the
potential value and efficacy of such thought needs to be considered.
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INTRODUCTION

Place is something most people don’t think about on a regular basis, yet most
would agree that place is profoundly important in their lives. It is deeply woven
into the nature of our being. Place is often a source of identity, position, security,
clarity, and a sense of our own subjectivity. And while place is not a principal
preoccupation for most people, it has long been a central consideration for
philosophers. From Plato to Heidegger, philosophers have incorporated the
concept of place into their own discourse. While place has been a staple in much
philosophical discourse, this dissertation will argue that in certain intellectual
projects, place has played a unique role, one in excess of typical considerations. In
these instances, place is a method for situating and focusing thinking. This
engagement with place engenders a particular type of thought, one that
ontologically fuses place, thinker, and thought together. I regard this merger as a
topographical convergence of situated contemplation that produces a localized
episteme, or in other words, “place-produced thought.”
In order to articulate a typology for “place-produced thought,” I consider
several specific projects to reveal how thinking can have a vital interconnectivity
with place. The hyphenation of “place” and “produced” in this phrasing is meant
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to emphasize the imbrication of location and activity, echoing Heidegger’s
attempt to diminish the chasm between being and the phenomena of objects by
expressing the constitution of being as “being-in-the-world.”1 In a similar
fashion, the connectivity between the place and production in place-produced
thought is conveyed through a shared ontological status. Within this reciprocal
relationship between place, thinker, and thought, I argue that the agency of place
plays a significant role. Part of this argument, set forth here, considers ways in
which places have much greater agency than most people ascribe to them. This
assertion attempts to reassess human centrality and privilege in many of our
encounters with place in exchange for greater recognition of the power of place.

DEFINING TERMS
Throughout this analysis of place-produced thought, the word “place” is
repeatedly used as a central term. Therefore, it is useful to note at the outset why
“place” has been adopted, instead of another similar term such as “space” or
“region.” Both “place” and “space” carry a plethora of meanings. The Oxford
English Dictionary lists nineteen different definitions for the word “place,” an
abundance which poses its own set of problems. Because of its ambiguous
plurality, the constitution of a “place” is not easily defined. Moreover, along with
“space,” “place” has been an ongoing source of dispute and conjecture in
differing strains of philosophy, social science, and geography. It should be noted
that this investigation of place is focused on the modern conception of place; the
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case studies that comprise most of the remaining chapters occur between the 19th
and 21st centuries.
Despite the multiplicity if the term “place,” philosophers of place do share
some conceptualizations about their central term and what it denotes. In his book
Place: A Short Introduction, Tim Cresswell provides a distinction between
“space” and “place,” devoting a chapter to “work that uses place as an analytical
concept that involves the process of shaping meaning and practice in material
space.”2 For Cresswell, space is more abstract than place, serving as the stuff from
which places with particular meaning emerge. The environmental writer
Lawrence Buell provides a similar differentiation between space and place: “Place
entails spatial location, entails a spatial container of some sort. But space as
against place connotes geometrical or topographical abstraction, whereas place is
‘space to which meaning has been ascribed.’”3 This is a significant point because
it denotes an ontological shift – from abstract “space” to meaningful “place.”
Another less explicit, yet parallel, conceptualization of place is evident in Miwon
Kwon’s genealogy of site-specificity and locational identity in artistic practices.
In describing contemporary “site-orientated” practices, she claims that “site [what
we are calling place] is now structured (inter)textually rather than spatially… a
fragmentary sequence of events and actions through spaces, that is, a nomadic
narrative whose path is articulated by the passage of the artist (Kwon’s italics).”4
For Kwon, site (or place) implies meaning and narrative that is more than a basic
spatial form. Each of these writers seem to share the sense that place is different
from space. While space is often considered more abstract, describing a relative
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position, place is considered something like “space to which human meaning is
ascribed and value is felt.”5 Marc Augé calls this “anthropological place” in the
recognition that it is “established and symbolized.”6 An understanding of place as
a location for intertextual meaning and value is of the sort that will be put into
action throughout this typology of place-produced thought.7 At the same time, the
anthropocentrism inherent in many of the claims about place will be challenged
by returning to place itself—by examining the importance of materiality and the
agency of place within place-produced thought.

CONCEPTS OF PLACE
One especially noteworthy philosophical effort to articulate the constitution of
place is Phenomenology. Many of the key thinkers of place have a
Phenomenological bent, including Martin Heidegger, Gaston Bachelard, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, Edward S. Casey, and Jeff Malpas. In general terms,
Phenomenologists have proposed that it is the direct relation to the phenomena of
place constitutes that place. “The world is not what I think,” writes MerleauPonty, “but what I live through.”8 This relationship is ontological, as Heidegger
strives to make clear by hyphenating da-sein, or being-there. By directly
conjoining “being” with “there,” Heidegger implies that being necessarily
involves presence in a place.
A similar relationship between being and place is evident in Gaston
Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space, in which he describes his own
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Phenomenological concept of place: “A house that has been experienced is not an
inert box,” states Bachelard, “Inhabited space transcends geometrical space.”9 In
describing a Phenomenological place, Bachelard illustrates how geometrical or
abstract space can become intimate, precious, fetishized, or even “areas of being”
through engagement or experience.10 For Bachelard, the place of the house is very
much akin to the “there” of Heidegger’s da-sein. The lived experience of the
house gives being its Being. “The house remodels man,” claims Bachelard.11 His
critical contention, and that of many other Phenomenologists, is that place is
constructed through the experience of phenomena and space. This relation
between the constitution of place and the necessity of experience identifies a
direct connection to the shift from space to place. As Jeff Malpas, another
Phenomenologist, asserts, the “starting point for philosophical reflection is not a
world of empty space… but is a world given in relation to activity.”12 Bachelard
calls this activity the inhabitation of space. What all of these articulations share is
the sense that embodied apprehension of phenomena is key to defining place.
At times, my analysis of place-produced thought draws upon aspects of
Phenomenology that accentuate the vital and significant role of place phenomena
in the development of place-produced thought. However, this analysis is not
purely Phenomenological. Instead, it also incorporates other theories that explore
how places are constituted. In addition to Phenomenologists, Poststructuralist and
Marxist thinkers, in particular, others have expressed important ideas about place
that will be utilized to develop a more pluralistic notion of place as it operates
within place-produced thought.
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Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey and Edward Soja are some of the major
Marxist thinkers who consider place. In his opus, The Production of Space,
Lefebvre proposes that the constitution, or production, of space [what we are
calling place] occurs through economic spatial relations. “Absolute space,” he
argues, is consumed by the spatial relations of capitalism (spaces are structured
and arranged according to the dispersion and flows of capital) as a means to
reproduce its dominance, and is transformed into “abstract space.” Lefebvre calls
for a “differential space,” as a dialectic of the two others, which serves as a
resistance to the homogenization of “abstract space.” For Lefebvre, space is not a
blank neutral canvas, but is rather the stage of an ongoing production, reflecting
the spatial relations of social/economic hegemony. For Lefebvre and other
Marxists, the main constituting force of place lies at the heart of these relations
and exchanges. In place-produced thought, economic exchanges are recognized as
important determinants of the constitution of place, but are viewed as only one of
the many layers of exchanges/relations that accumulate and converge into the
constitution of place.
An alternative position concerning the constitution of place has been
articulated within the Poststructuralisms of Foucault, Derrida, and Baudrillard.
For the Poststructuralists, the constitution of place occurs through language and
semiotics. For these thinkers, the reading of cultural signs within individual
spaces initiates the shift from an abstract “space” into a “place” saturated with
meaning and value. In an oft-cited essay, Des Espace Autres (Of Other Spaces),
Michel Foucault discusses his notion of “heterotopias,” spaces rendered disparate
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from other spaces by the ways that they are utilized, and via the ordering of space
by discursive structures of language and knowledge. The semiotic markings in
these spaces become seemingly naturalized significations, where space is no
longer abstract, nor an object to be merely seen, but a place marked by a litany of
active ideological signs. Because of their naturalization within place, these signs
often become unnoticed. For poststructuralists, even in their invisibility, these
cultural signs serve to frame the understanding and meaning of place. For
instance, the space of a national park, often thought of as one of the last truly
“natural” places, can be understood as a delineated heterotopia wrought with
impositions of power.13 Like Bachelard, Foucault maintains that places are not
empty. However, in distinction from Bachelard, Foucault sees place as constituted
not only by lived experience, but also through culturally “superimposed
meaning[s]” and their “precise and determined function[s].”14

ZONES OF ACTIVE EXCHANGE
In order to understand what occurs through the development of place-produced
thought, and how place itself operates as an active agent, we need to think
differently than has been suggested in the theories mentioned above. Clearly,
these divergent philosophical considerations offer varying accounts of both what
place is and how it is constituted. However, in the context of this argument about
place-produced thought, I propose that none of them provides a sufficient
understanding of the processes and forces that converge to constitute a place.
Because of this inadequacy, I begin with two separate, but mutually effecting,

7

claims about the constitution of place in place-produced thought. First, in the
instances of place-produced thought surveyed in the following chapters, the
manifestation of place is best understood by incorporating a hybridized notion of
place that draws upon various components of Phenomenology, Poststructuralism,
Postmodernism, Marxism, environmentalism, ethnography, object-orientated
philosophy, and thing theory. By not adhering solely to a single approach for
understanding the constitution of place in place-produced thought, we can allow
varying conceptions to remain in unresolved dialogue.
This dialogical methodology has inherent challenges. As the
anthropologist Arturo Escobar noted, “precisely because they are grounded in
different epistemologies (and in some cases ontological assumptions), there are
levels at which the positions are incommensurable.”15 However, as will be shown
in some instances of place-produced thought, this weaving together of critical
appreciations of place has already occurred. Therefore, we can think of the
“place” in place-produced thought as being perpetually modified in a feedback
loop of varying forces.
This notion of place leads to a second claim: in place-produced thought
place is nourished through a type of perpetual ellipsis in which constituting forces
operate on the thinker’s perception of place, while at the same time, place itself
pushed back against some of the cultural impositions and presumptions of the
thinker. Place is never static; its constitution continues to transform throughout
the development of place-produced thought. Therefore, we can understand place
as a bio-socio-historical zone of active exchange between subjectivity, experience,
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signs, politics, ethics, economics, and phenomena. This definition indicates one of
the key distinctions between this project and some of its antecedents because it
presents a sense of place as complex and elusive, immanent and cryptic. These
characteristics point us toward understanding place as a subject with agency that
remains in a continuous negotiation between its own desires and motivations, and
those of other forces acting upon it. This understanding of place stresses the
notion that places are not merely receptacles of human inscriptions. Instead, it
identifies the ability of place to resist and push against inscriptions as they touch
upon place, move off, and then perhaps return again, in an ongoing elliptical
exchange.
Tim Cresswell describes the elliptical exchange of place in similar terms:
“Place involves a multi-faceted understanding of the coming together of the
physical world (both ‘natural’ and ‘physical’), the processes of meaning
production and the practices of power that mark relations between social
groups.”16 This understanding of place recognizes an unfinalized in-betweenness,
or liminality, due to the movement and fluctuation of the polyvalent forces that
constitute place. Nicholas Entrikin calls this liminal quality “narrative,” because it
links material phenomena with social practices and collective identities. In
Entrikin’s words, “geographer and geography are hermeneutically joined.”17 Even
with these expanded and more complex definitions, place still remains elusive and
dynamic. The constitution of place is slippery; once we think we have it pinned
down and defined, it can shift and transform into something new.
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That elusiveness is evident in the instances of place-produced thought
investigated here. In them, place is formed through a complex and evolving
process. Just as the thinker transforms place and leaves marks upon it, the place
also pushes back on the thinker, modifying his or her perceptions, thoughts, and
ontology. Therefore, the agency and subjectivity of both place and thinker are
central to the development of place-produced thought because thinking occurs
through a dialogical negotiation between thinker and place that reworks the nature
of their beings.
The role of subjectivity and agency within place-produced thought is also
important as a source for strategic disruption and negation. Through the
development of place-produced thought, the redefinition or destabilization of both
place and thinker emerge as points of epistemic origination. Thus, place-produced
thought allows—potentially—for radical transformation. Indeed, a vital rupture in
the regulating discourses and discursive practices acting upon a place or thinker
may occur, allowing for the generation of a new reading or understanding. While
the operations generated through place-produced thought vary (the term
“operation” is meant to stress the performativity of working, functioning, and
thinking), each relies on a negotiation between the thinking subject and the
agency of place. In order to look into the nature of this negotiation a little further,
we can start with a discussion of the thinking subject.
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THE THINKING SUBJECT
In some recent philosophy, one finds evidence of a desire to move beyond the
linguistic turn and the dominance of language in philosophy represented by the
poststructuralists. Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, Judith Butler, and Giorgio
Agamben, among others, have reinvigorated the notions of action, embodiment,
and individual subjectivity. Within this movement is a turn towards agency
enacted in the world, in the realm of place. For example, in his extension of the
Foucauldian analysis of apparatuses, Agamben identifies and investigates their
effects on the subject.18 In a departure from Foucault, however, Agamben
advocates finding new ways to dismantle them through individual agency, and
indeed points out that “this problem [of reclaiming the desubjective power of an
apparatus] cannot be properly raised as long as those who are concerned with it
are unable to intervene in their own process of subjectification.”19 Agamben
asserts that the subject plays a part in the production of his or her own
subjectivity.
Judith Butler makes similar claim in her discussion of subjectification
when she candidly asks: “how can it be that the subject, taken to be the condition
for and instrument of agency, is at the same time the effect of subordination,
understood as the deprivation of agency?”20 In the following pages, it will be
demonstrated that the thinking subject does exercise a degree of agency in placeproduced thought that is reflective of Agamben and Butler’s ideas.
In developing place-produced thought, one of the methods in which
agency is exercised by the thinker is in locating or determining the margins of a
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place. In each specific case, these (often temporary) boundaries are perceived by
the thinker based upon what is most appropriate for their project. While the
boundaries and constituting forces of a place are present before it is engaged by a
thinker (and those forces frequently appear as natural or embedded), they are
often reconfigured by the subjective agency of the thinker as they engage with
place as a locus for thought. In most of the instances of place-produced thought,
the subject/thinker has some conception of the thought that will be developed in
situ. Therefore, through the exertion of agency, the thinker actually contributes to
the making or production of the place as an optimal environment for his or her
project.
One may want to argue against the power afforded to the subject within
place-produced thought by pointing out that this view privileges the individual
ego or opens up the possibility for the violent imposition of power. Indeed, there
is a concern that giving too much power to the agency of the thinking subject
could mean that place becomes merely a stage in which the desires of an
individual are acted out. This concern has been addressed by Kwon in her
assessment of several historical site-specific and community based art practices.
An alternative to this scenario entails an understanding of active subject formation
and its own constitution as an agent in the world that is a departure from the
traditional segregation of self and other – of self and world. In place-produced
thought, the relationship between thinker and place is one that acknowledges a
mutual link—an ontological bond—in the making of thought. This type of
connection to one’s environment is phenomenological in nature and contradicts
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the constrictive separation of subject and world evident in empiricism (Locke and
Hume), rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza, Kant) and even in the linguistic turn.21
In order to re-articulate and critique the traditional binary estrangement of thinker
and world, I propose an adaptation of Hannah Arendt’s discourse on ethics.
The basis of Arendt’s discourse is derived from a reading of the Socratic
dialogues. In many ways, her reading of the dialogues can be considered a rereading, one that is directed at the core of Socratic philosophy, leaving aside the
intermediary rhetoric of his student, Plato. In the context of her own meditations
on collective responsibility, Arendt focuses on Socrates’ concept of the inner
dialogue, or what he called dianoeisthai (a reflection on the nature of something),
in which thinking occurs through conversation between self and I (being-one).
One crucial aspect of Arendt’s Socratic re-examination is how she circuitously
navigates the critical connection between the singular subject and the plural (or
the political as Arendt names it). Arendt, like Socrates, advocates for solitude as
the situation in which the inner dialogue can best be realized, and thought may
properly occur. Any contact during dianoeisthai is considered unsettling and
detrimental; “if somebody addresses me, “Arendt writes, “I must now talk to him,
and not to myself.”22 Socratic estrangement, however, is given a clever
hermeneutic twist by Arendt when she ponders that “the Socratic ‘being-one’ is
not so unproblematic as it seems; I am not only just for others but for myself, and
in the latter case, I clearly am not just one. A difference is inserted into my
Oneness.”23 What Arendt points toward is the interdependence of the singular and
collective. She also deftly, yet subtlety, pokes at the unity of the hermetic singular
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subject – the metaphysical “oneness” – into which Arendt inserts a difference.
The interdependence between subject and world emphasized by their Arendtian
inseparability is significant in the context of place-produced thought because it
raises them both to the positions of co-producers of thought.
The ontological links expressed in Arendt’s inseparability of subject and
world share similarities with Heidegger’s da-sein because they both work at
reducing the illusory divide between the subject and the world. Heidegger’s
phenomenology is significant because it re-articulated the ontological status of the
singular so that being is melded with the world it is thrown into. Extending
Heidegger’s ontology of being-in-the-world, Jean-Luc Nancy also attempts to
navigate the terrain between singular and plural. Nancy pushes toward an even
more radical ontological bond when he posits that being itself depends upon a
“being-in-common,” upon an understanding that inextricably locates the
collective within the singular. Nancy deems this ontological status as being
“singular plural,” in which the individual is given through the plural, and where
“consciousness is never mine, but to the contrary, I only have it in and through
community (Nancy’s italics).”24
A comparable melding of the individual and community operates in the
thinker/place exchanges of place-produced thought. This critical connection
disavows a pejorative “un-siting,” in which place is pressed into, or appropriated
for, the servitude of an individual agenda. In place-produced thought, the
community, the plural, remains an active influence on place identity. The
Arendtian “difference” that is inserted into the subject is uncovered as the
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presence of the polyphonic multiple of community. Therefore, community can be
understood as being active in two different stages of place-produced thought.
Firstly, as Arendt and others have illustrated, the collective is preserved within the
singular subject. Secondly, community is also evident in place as one of its
constituting forces – part of the intertextual dialogue of events and actions
occurring with/in place.
I have included this discussion of the thinking subject in between the
sections about the definition of place and the delineation of place in placeproduced thought in order to further emphasize the presence and effect of the
collective in the individual subject – the perpetual to and fro between the inside
and the outside. Just as the strict division of the singular and collective is
deconstructed in some of the theories discussed above, there is a similar
relationship that marks the delineation of place in place-produced thought.
This brief discussion of the “I-Other” relationship is significant because it
is reflective of the “thinker-place” relationship in place-produced thought. While I
do not continue a more in-depth examination of the “I-Other” in each instance of
place-produced thought, it is important to note the Arendtian problematizing of
Socratic solitude because place-produced thought provides such a vivid
illustration of how the outside or collective touches upon and is ontologically
embedded into the seemingly divided, the hermetic, and the contained.
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DELINEATION OF PLACE
In many ways, the multi-faceted process of constituting place (as described
above) is paralleled by the act of delineation. As has already been noted, even
though the individual thinker arrives at the determination of the margins of place,
the process can’t be considered as univocal or unilateral, but instead is infused
with the polyphony of community. The term “margin” is used to imply a sort of
fluidity and malleability to the boundaries of a place. The parameters of the
places in place-produced thought often reflect these semantics, remaining elusive
and enigmatic – like the horizon line on a foggy winter morning. Even setting the
boundaries of place does not entail an absolute break from what is external: “A
boundary is not that at which something stops…,” Heidegger advises us, “the
boundary is that from which something begins its essential unfolding.”25 In the
instances of place-produced thought explored in the following chapters, that
which is outside the margins of a place matters as much as that which is within
place.
Jacques Derrida provides some insights into why this must be the case in
his theory of the ergon and parerga in works of art. Calling upon the traditions of
aesthetic discourse, he conveys that to even “think art in general” is to adopt a
series of oppositions –form/content, inside/outside, subject/object.26 By
identifying these oppositional presuppositions, Derrida is able to build a discourse
about liminality; and through that method, he begins to explore a space of inbetweeness where nothing is fixed or certain, where différance resides.27 The
deconstruction of the frame between the artwork (ergon) and the ostensibly
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extrinsic (parerga) is one of Derrida’s critical gestures. In fact, he argues, the two
spaces are entwined: “a parergon comes against, beside, and in addition to the
ergon… but it does not fall to one side, it touches and cooperates within the
operation, from a certain outside.”28 Giorgio Agamben conceives of a similar
contingency among stasis and dynamis in a work of art. “Every image is animated
by an antinimous polarity,” announces Agamben, “[the dynamis] always refers
beyond itself, towards a whole of which it is a part.”29 Within place-produced
thought, we see the same connectivity between the inside and outside of place;
between place and the wider environs. In most instances, discerning a locus of
thought reveals the presence of two (or more) significant places and an exchange
between them. All of these places, together, comprise the actual site of indigenous
knowledge production.
As Derrida demonstrated within works of art, the juxtaposition between
the ergon, and the demarcation of its exterior, are locked in a mutual relationship
of epistemic production by a “link which rivets [the parerga]… to the lack in the
interior of the ergon.”30 As a means of delineation, the seemingly diametrically
opposed places and the liminality between them are temporarily and contingently
defined for the purpose of the thinking project. However, the place of thought is
continuously produced, deterritorialized, and produced again in a process that
“stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface (my
italics).”31
In many ways, the approach taken by the first few thinkers whom I’ll
consider—notably Thoreau and Heidegger—involves finding a place to situate
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thought that relies on a strategy of negation. Within this tradition, negation is
destabilizing and creative, used to “celebrate a genuine point of beginning – with
its attendant hope and promise for the future.”32 Such negation can be especially
effective when ideological impositions have become fixed in place as normative
or as part of tradition. Strategic negation in the delineation of place affirms as it
denies, erases as it generates, and can function as “a kind of provisional
erasure.”33 In that regard, this action of erasure can be apophatic – enabling the
derivation of knowledge through negation.
Other strategies that a thinker may use to delineate a locus of thought
often begin with the established and recognized borders of a place. Thinkers have
approached the demarcation of these pre-existing boundaries in various ways.
Some thinkers work to a reaffirm and reassert existing borders in order to
accentuate their importance or call attention to the circumstances of their
formation. In Gordon Matta-Clark’s Fake Estates project (Chapter 3), for
instance, he purposefully draws attention to the peculiar shapes of the properties
that he purchased from the city of New York in order to underscore the
arbitrariness and the absurdity of their creation. A thinker may also begin their
strategy of delineation with the existing borders of a place in order to undermine
or think beyond those borders. This may be a crucial component for some
instances of place-produced thought that attempt to question the limitations and
impositions of the pre-existing borders of place.
Whatever strategy is deployed in the development of place-produced
thought, place is temporarily and contingently delineated in order to focus
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thinking. At the same time, the delineated place of thought remains attuned and
responsive to the parerga outside of its boundaries—continuously challenging the
inside/outside division. Even though the margins of place remain recalcitrant, the
key point is that in place-produced thought, some form of delineation occurs. The
demarcation of place by Thoreau, Heidegger, and others can be understood as a
strategic exegesis, an instrument to position a localizing center of knowledge
production – a centrum cogitationis. Within the strategic delineation, place
becomes activated as “we intend within it; we critique intentions within it; we
play with it through significations as well as references.”34
Even though I have argued for the role that human agency plays in the
development of place-produced thought, I am wary of over-emphasizing the
power of the human subject in a way that is anthropocentric and does not
“recognize objects [and places] as participants in the reshaping of the world.”35 In
fact, the agency of place has a vibrant and central role in place-produced thought.

AGENCY OF PLACE
While the last section mostly focused on the way that the agency of the thinker
can redefine a place, in each of the case studies in the following chapters, I also
examine how place resists the thinker, how places make evident their own wants
and desires. Bill Brown broaches these concerns in his “thing theory” when he
asks: “What claims on your attention and on your action are made on behalf of
things?”36 Just as many recent theories have reinvested agency in the subject, I
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argue that places also have agency, and that the agency of place plays a
significant role in place-produced thought.
As place exerts itself in place-produced thought, an intimate and
distinctive relationship between the thinker and place emerges. The thinker enters
into interdependence with place, a relationship that reduces the unilateral
authority of the thinker in favor of a shared and co-constitutive production of
knowledge. It may seem startling, at first, to seriously consider the questions of
“What do places want?” and “What desires and motivations might a place have?”
But such questions are of a piece with those of other contemporary thinkers.
When W.J.T. Mitchell asks the question “What Do Pictures Want?” he also
wonders if the exploration of non-human agency will be met with suspicious
incredulity. He addresses these doubts head on: “I am well aware that this is a
bizarre, even objectionable, question. I am aware that it involves a subjectivitzing
of images, a dubious personification of inanimate objects; that it flirts with a
regressive, superstitious attitude toward images.”37 Nevertheless, Mitchell
proceeds to explore his question and is able to demonstrate the real possibility of
agency in images. Just as Mitchell describes of pictures, I argue that the role of
place in place-produced thought “makes an appeal or issues a demand whose
precise effect and power emerges in the an intersubjective encounter.”38 The
agency of place is inscribed and woven into the thinking produced with/in it—the
force of this agency lies in the co-produced nature of the thought. Place-produced
thought can be understood as a record, a trace, of the agency of place. One of the
most powerful ways that the agency of place is manifested in place-produced
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thought is through material irruption. The insurgency of the materiality of place is
a crucial component in the production of indigenous knowledge.

MATERIAL IRRUPTION
What ties together the various instances of place-produced thought, and helps
clarify their difference from other place-influenced thought, is that placeproduced thought is not only a method of thinking, but it is a mode of producing
radical knowledge. Indeed, as will be demonstrated over the following chapters,
the production of radical knowledge is one of the most significant functions of
place-produced thought. Even for artists and thinkers steeped in an awareness of
how discourse or cultural constructs can impact being and knowledge, those
cultural discursive constructs often become fossilized and accepted. I am not
implying that place-produced thought offers an absolute return to the real or a
way out of discourse; rather, I believe that it holds the potential for disrupting
established norms and calcified modes of thinking that have become entrenched
in cultural consciousness.
What place-produced thought can do is suggest some of the ways that we
can experience and understand place in a manner that admits to the agency of
place itself. The writer Seth Kim-Cohen documents an example of how a place
can assert its own agency and interrupts the apprehension of a thinker or viewer
when he describes his experience of Janet Cardiff’s 1999 walking piece in
London, The Missing Voice: Case Study B. After taking the audio tour, Kim-
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Cohen wrote that “the environment in which the walks take place is much more
than a narrative setting… They are not passive sets, but constantly transforming
social-architectural-commercial organisms. As the listener navigates the
fictionalized version of the environment as presented in the audio, one is
simultaneously navigating the factual physicality of the actual locale,” and as he
continues a little later, “the fiction of the audio and the fact of the streets become
confused. Just as a not-real sound can cause the listener to turn toward it, the
sound of a very real oncoming car can be ignored as part of the audio.”39 When
Kim-Cohen is nearly hit by ignoring an oncoming car as he walks through
London’s East End, he is experiencing the place pushing back – the real physical
materiality of place interrupting his experience as a viewer/listener. Even though
Kim-Cohen is not the maker of the artwork, his experience of the power of
irruption by place as part of the artwork, is tantamount to the disruption of
existing knowledge. In the same way that the oncoming car interrupts the fictional
narrative of Cardiff’s audio, the agency of place can interrupt the established
perceptions and beliefs about a particular place, putting the solidity of these preexisting notions into doubt. This power of irruption is one of the most vital
components of place-produced thought as it offers the means to think beyond
current categories, delineations, or descriptions.
Place-produced thought is a method of thinking that recognizes the
potency, agency, and—to use Jane Bennett’s language—the “vibrancy of matter,”
in non-human places and things. This recognition does not completely disregard
or abandon the discursive presence that also shapes our understanding and

22

experience of places and things. Instead, place-produced thought encompasses a
multiplicity of constituting forces, even if they are not actively acted upon or
acknowledged by the thinker. The power of the forces acting upon a place can’t
be underestimated, as they often influence the production of thought without the
thinker having full consciousness of their significance. Whether one is conscious
of their impact or not, the entanglement of knowledge production with/in the
forces of place suggests a relationship between thinker and place that is
symbiotic, dialogical, and active.
The embodiment of agency in the production of place-produced thought
calls for a reconsideration of the anti-humanism so prominent since the linguistic
turn. This reassessment is not to suggest an abandonment of signification in the
discourse of subject formation; rather, it promotes an elliptical approach that
resists a singular, univocal and dominant model. In this reconsideration of
Postmodern anti-humanism and the primacy of language, each philosophical
theory can retain some of its efficacy and validity. Therefore, rather than focusing
on the divergence between theories, we would do well to analyze the relation,
impasse, expression, and violence between the constituting forces of place, as
they trace onto one another. Both the agency of the subject and the agency of
place within place-produced thought work in tandem to negotiate those traces.
The relational and temporal organization of the constituting forces of place
includes the disruption and continuous redistribution of these forces by the
coalescing actions/thoughts of the thinker/place.
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AGENCIES IN NEGOTIATION
What I am edging towards with this assertion is no less than an incursion into the
history of the discourse on the formation of the subject.40 I am certainly not going
to attempt a thorough analysis of subjectivity here, but I do want to touch upon
the shifting notions of subject formation (beginning with Descartes) to further my
case for the presence of the collective in the singular subject, and to argue for the
powerful role that place plays in human subjectivity.
Descartes imagined the formation of the subject as autogenic through
thought – res cogitans. Against indictments of solipsism towards the subject
conceived of in the early Enlightenment, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau countered
with a subject that acknowledged an external world, but also remained pure,
unified, and singular. Indeed, the intelligibility of their theories is grounded in the
productive autonomous subject. If we could imagine the formation of the later
Enlightenment subject being translated into an equation, it might appear as such:
purity + unity + autonomy = subject. After Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the
prominence of the individual mind in the formation of the subject was extended
by the transcendental idealism of Kant, who positioned the mind as central to all
experience and epistemology. Kant suggested that all phenomena were interpreted
by the a priori Concepts of the Understanding. Therefore, the pre-existing
structure of the subject’s mind formed the foundation of experience and thought.
This notion of the centrality of the individual human mind stood, basically intact,
until the 20th century.
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In the 20th century, the shift toward the anti-humanism of
Poststructuralism emerged from Structuralism’s tendency to negate the primacy
of the subject in favor of structures, signs, and discourse. For Claude Levi-Strauss
and other Structuralists, the subject was given through the underlying structures of
society – the driving force of universal patterns in human thought subsumed
individual agency. During the latter part of the century, the postmodernist critique
of the subject effectively dismantled each of the variables in the subject formation
equation so that it came to read: multiplicity + fragmentation + imposition of
outside power = subject (with no subjectivity). For Foucault and other
Postmodernists, the critical distinction of the Enlightenment subject was that it
was brought to the discourse of subject formation. As Foucault suggests, the
concept of the autonomous subject was an invention of the Enlightenment, a
product of a specific episteme. For Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, it was a
historical moment when the subject could finally slide out from under the thumb
of the monarchy and church, and emerge from the shadows of the Platonic cave
into the world of light, knowledge, and self-formation.
Much like Foucault, his contemporary, Louis Althusser also claimed that
the modern subject was a construct. As a Marxist, Althusser believed that the
state produced subjects that would best sustain and solidify its own power and
ideology. Through the determination by Ideological State Apparatuses (mass
media, cultural institutions, educational institutions and so on), and not by
individual agency or autonomy, the individual subject is produced.
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In the development of place-produced thought, human subjectivity is
considered as an active instrument of organization for constituting forces. This is
not a device of unitary power, but one that is encumbered by the plural, as both an
active and receptive epistemic organizer of meaning.41 While the human subject is
recognized as being active and possessing important agency in place-produced
thought, it is also shown to be one among many sources of agency, power, force,
and change. Therefore, in the creation of place-produced thought, the
postmodernist version of the subject formation equation has been modified as
such: multiplicity + fragmentation + imposition of outside power + subject +
place + agency = negotiation. We have retained and added to the variables leading
to the postmodern negation of the subject, but have recalibrated their sum. In
place-produced thought, an active subject and place operate within the fractured,
multiple, and collective terrain(s) of their formation to generate a continuous
negotiation.
While this typology does criticize the near complete annulment of
subjective agency in poststructuralist thought, it simultaneously recognizes that it
was those very thinkers who deconstructed the grand authority of the cohesive
singular subject. Many of the poststructuralists were quick to point out the
fractures and slippages in the logos of Western metaphysics, including the
concept of a free willing, self-contained subject. The intimate negotiation and
connectivity between thinker and place in place-produced thought achieves this
very proposition, as it resists the absolutism and ferocious autonomy of the
singular Enlightenment subject. This resistance echoes the same pitfall that
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Derrida read within Heidegger and others, namely the megalomaniacal centrality
of the self-creating subject.
Jacques Rancière offers a similar deconstruction of a primary and singular
source of meaning in his description of a viewer’s emancipation while
interpreting a work of art: “It means that every situation can be cracked open from
the inside, reconfigured in a different regime of perception and signification.”42 A
reconfiguration of place also occurs in the creation of place-produced thought.
However, in each instance of place-produced thought, the thinker is also
transformed. Through the negotiation and close production of knowledge, both
thinker and place emerge as unretractably marking one another. This type of
connection means that localized knowledge is given concomitantly through the
agency of the existing place and the thinking action of the subject; the production
of indigenous knowledge is a collective exchange.
In framing place-produced thought as a negotiation, we embrace yet
another tenet of Poststructuralism, the notion of maneuvering the slippages
between systems and constituting forces. In thinking of the relation between
different philosophies, Derrida makes an announcement that can be adapted to the
methodology of place-produced thought, as it stresses the importance of
dialogical play. Similarly, we note that the negotiation of constituting forces in
place is “to meditate upon the circularity which makes them pass into one another
indefinitely,” and furthermore “to let some elliptical displacement be produced in
the difference of repetition: a deficient displacement, doubtless, but deficient in a
way which is not yet – or is no longer – absence, negativity, non-Being, lack,
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silence (Derrida’s italics).”43 The displacement detailed by Derrida is akin to the
re-configuration or un-siting of place in place-produced thought, and indeed it
does not emerge as an absence of non-being, but rather as a powerful and
productive epistemic source.
Before moving on to examine other historical relationships with place that
are distinct from place-produced thought, I want to make a further note about the
intersection between epistemological production and ontological transformation.
As already suggested, the ontological melding of place and thinker occurs in the
development of thought with/in place. Both Foucault and Butler have written
about how epistemology can both limit and bear the possibilities for being. What
is knowable about a subject or place limits the potentiality of its being. For
Foucault, an “a priori is what, in a given period, delimits in the totality of
experience a field of knowledge, [and] defines the mode of being (Foucault’s
italics).”44
In her text, Gender Trouble, Butler criticizes Foucault’s presumption of
the body as a static tabula rasa awaiting cultural inscription. In a similar manner,
I want to suggest, through this typology, that place-produced thought provides
methods to negotiate and navigate an epistemological space that includes, but
relinquishes the predominance of signification (or any other singular constituting
force), in the formation of knowledge. Instead, the development of placeproduced thought maintains the potential of acting and thinking (what Butler calls
performance) that “suggests an openness to resignification and
recontextualization.”45 The key point is that place-produced thought holds
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ontological weight, as the emergent localized episteme becomes a part of the
being of both place and thinker. The unretractable marks of thought etch
themselves into thinker and place, causing the distinction between place, thinker,
and the thought produced to fade – thinking, doing, and place coalesce.

OTHER CREATIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH PLACE
As we move toward a better understanding of place-produced thought, it will be
helpful to clarify the engagement with place developed through place-produced
thought, by contrasting them with other relationships that thinkers and creators
have with their surroundings. I would like to draw an important differentiation
between “thinking places” generally and sites of “place-produced thought” in
particular. “Thinking places” have been the focus of several studies; for example,
Carolyn and Jack Fleming recently published Thinking Places: Where Great
Ideas Were Born. They recount many of their visits to, and observations of,
famous thinking places throughout Europe and the USA. The description and
conceptualization of thinking in place as portrayed in their text is an important
counterpoint to the relationship between thinker and place that I maintain is
cultivated through the making of place-produced thought.
Instead of recognizing place as an active agent in the production of
thought, some historical thinkers have cultivated a correspondence with place that
casts the “thinking place” as a “creative muse.” In such cases, place is denied
some of its agency and is often considered an object or experience meant to
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inspire the thinking subject. For example, in the general account of the thinking
places surveyed in their book, Carolyn and Jack Fleming describe them as a
“structure or memorable site where a visitor may receive his [sic] own inspiration
and, perhaps, as if in some mystical way, tap into the creative muse and be
energized by its power.”46 In these instances, the thinker is not in a genuine
dialogue with place, as they are much more likely to “use” place as means toward
a particular end. In place-produced thought, the place is much more than an
utilitarian object; it is a co-producer of situated knowledge.
The use of place as a creative muse in the thinking places described by the
Flemings is also related to a noteworthy distinction in the intentionality of the
thinker. Many of the creative people who have utilized thinking places that are
included in the Fleming’s book, demonstrate an intentionality in their projects, but
one that is mostly focused on finding seclusion in “a special cloister place to
nurture the creative process.”47 In place-produced thought however, there is often
a desire for more than sheer solitude (although that may be important for some).
In these instances, each thinker has attempted to converse and to think “with/in”
place. This turn of phrase should not be taken as merely a puckish neologism, for
it points to the heart of a place-produced thought as the fusion of thinker, place,
and being. “Thinking with/in” place implies a co-mingled interdependence of
polyphonic agents, each sharing in the production of indigenous knowledge.
By conjoining the actions of thinking “with” and “in,” a distinctive sort of
connectedness is implied. The intrinsic conjunction between thinker and place in
place-produced thought means that the “with” and “in” of thinking are also
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necessarily merged and expressed as “with/in.” The thinker does not merely think
“within” place – by developing place-produced thought, they enter a sort of
marriage with place, each their own bringing desires and ideas to the table, but
also remaining responsive, reflexive, and attuned to the other. Both place and
thinker push one another to realize new insights, applications, and sensibilities in
a dialogical exchange. Thinking occurs both with, and inside of place, as the
participants assert their agency on the other in an ongoing ellipsis of transforming
production.

NATURE WRITING/ LANDSCAPE PAINTING
Another method of developing a relationship with the environment that contrasts
to “thinking with/in” is found in some traditional nature writing and landscape
painting. Both nature writing and landscape painting are genres that evoke an
appreciation of, and connection between, the writer/artist and the environment. In
recent years, “new” nature writing has surfaced that more directly attempts to
think with/in place by “looking more closely at how the local feels.”48 In this
sense, much of the new nature writing is “personal and intimate” with place. As
such, new nature writing seems to be, potentially, one of the prodigious avenues
for place-produced thought. Certain projects by writers such as Robert
MacFarlane, Kathleen Jamie, Rebecca Solnit, John Elder, C. S. Giscombe, and
Brenda Hillman are creating connections with place that can often be considered
as place-produced thought.
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While newer forms of nature writing may be more akin to place-produced
thought, the type of engagement with place in some historical nature writing is
often pervaded by clichéd tropes such as the “country/city divide” or “nature as
redemptive other,” in a manner that does not acknowledge the same level of
agency that is present and so crucial to the development of place-produced
thought.
Many of the narratives in some historical nature writing epitomize the
transformative journey or struggle and rely on the cult of nature for redemptive
catharsis. For example, Farley Mowatt describes one such narrative about his
work for the Canadian government in northern Canada, where he collected
information about the diets and mobility patterns of wolves. Although his
account of the experience documents amazingly complex wolf behaviors and the
beautifully intimate relationship that he was able to develop with the pack of
wolves, at times it slips into the problematic and reductive contrast of the
country/city binary. This classic contrast typecasts the exploitive, careless, and
consumerist urban existence against one that is more mystical, magical, in tune
with, and respectful of nature. This often “simple” existence is believed to
connect human beings with a more truthful and wholesome mode of being. In
John Krakauer’s account of Christopher McCandless’ journey into the Alaskan
wilderness, there are some remnants of the moral and ideological divide between
the country and the city. For example, McCandless underlined the following
passage in his copy of Doctor Zhivago: “Oh, how one wishes sometimes to escape
from the meaningless dullness of human eloquence, from all those sublime
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phrases, to take refuge in nature.”49 In examples of nature writing such as these,
nature and place often function more as signifiers of cultural meaning, than as
active producers of knowledge in their own right. Many of these kinds of usages
in nature writing can be collectively referred to as promoting “the cult of nature”
and are historically rooted in the ideas of Romanticism. The relationship between
Romantic cultural concepts of nature and place, and their similarity to the cult of
nature is explored in the next section.
In the cult of nature, nature becomes a signifier in a sort of Barthesian
shift—that is, it takes on a mythic dimension, often carrying paradoxical
significations for moral purity, healthy living, longevity, death, fortitude, justice,
intelligence, simplicity, and altruism (to name a few). Such significations are
often based upon the notion that some intangible spirituality or deep ethereal
connection that humans once had has been lost and if we could only regain it, our
culture could be radically transformed for the better. In this sense, nature is used
as a signifier for an absence and loss. The cult of nature also often defines nature
as a moralizing and redemptive other. These representations of nature tell us
more about the cultist than about nature. As Arendt reminds us, we need to be
aware that “representations are formations, they have purposes.”50 Each of the
myths of nature have been created for a specific purpose, one that does not
necessarily lead us to recognize the ways that place can become active and push
back against the attempted impositions of culture or thinker. The greatest point to
be made here is that these meanings are inscribed onto nature (and place) in ways
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that do not recognize, to the full extent, the appeals or demands of the agency of
place.
To illustrate this disparity between the more passive roles that nature or
place may play as a mythic signifier or creative muse versus the active role of
knowledge co-producer, I often think of Albert Bierstadt’s paintings of the
American West (Fig.1). Many scholars have criticized Bierstadt for his
romanticized notions of the picturesque and his glorified and embellished use of
light.51 While I understand many of these critiques, I would also argue that the
role of the landscape in the painting is akin to the role of place in the Flemings’
“thinking places,” as neither of them endows place with its full role as productive
agent, nor do they acknowledge – to once again use Bennett’s term – the
“vibrancy of matter.” Instead, images such as Bierstadt’s are anthropocentric

Figure 1. Albert Bierstadt, The Domes of Yosemite, 1867
Image courtesy St. Johnsbury Athenaeum.

because they are the “direct descendant of the scenery cult’s key concept: the
picturesque. This term literally means ‘picturelike’ and indicates a mode of
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appreciation by which the natural world is divided into scenes, each aiming at an
ideal dictated by art, especially landscape painting.”52 In these types of
representations, place is restricted to being an object for aesthetic contemplation
and reflection. Even though landscape painting is often celebrated for its
expression of the harmonic relation between nature and humans, it can also be
read as fetishizing the landscape, turning it into an aesthetic object functioning as
a creative muse.
By contrast, in the instances of place-produced thought included in this
discussion, place often pushes back against these types of fetishizing, urging the
thinker to “acknowledge a force that, though quite real and powerful, is
intrinsically resistant to representation.”53 Therefore, the role of place in placeproduced thought is much different than that of a creative muse, as it involves a
more dialogical and inter-subjective exchange.

ROMANTICISM
Other notions about how thinkers have historically created a relationship with
their surroundings, is described in the philosophical and artistic ideas of
Romanticism. As industrialization arose in the 19th century in Germany, France
and England, so, too, did Romanticism, as many thinkers began to find inspiration
in the natural world. These writers and artists were interested in the “pursuit of
natural supernaturalism, of divinity in nature” as well as a spiritual connection
with nature.54 As a reaction to both the mechanized urbanization of the Industrial
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Revolution and the Positivist rationality of the Enlightenment, Romantics turned
to nature for a sublime encounter as means to counteract or escape the ills of
modern society. Nature was prized for its ability to remove or cleanse the thinker
from the debilitating realities and restrictions of rationally structured urban life.
Many of the Romantics sought out specific places that suited their
sensibilities. In England, most of the Romantic writers and artists either migrated
to, or frequented, the mountainous Lake District in northwest England. For many,
the Lake District represented the harmonious existence of human beings with a
picturesque natural landscape. After visiting the region in 1855, American
Nathaniel Hawthorne wrote, “I question whether any part of the world looks so
beautiful as England—this part of England, at least—on a fine summer morning.
It makes one think the more cheerfully of human life to see such a bright
universal verdure; such sweet, rural, peaceful, flower-bordered cottages… and
such nice villas along the roadside, so tastefully contrived for comfort and
beauty.”55 Much of the attraction to this region was because it matched the
discursive aesthetic ideals that the Romantics sought in the landscape – the rustic,
pastoral, and interdependence of humans and nature (Fig.2).
The interpretations of the Romantic ideas of nature and place are so
widely varied that they include everything from a celebration of ecological
thought in Romanticism, to a critique of the projection of cultural attitudes and
beliefs onto nature. Without favoring either side in this debate, an important
differentiation between place-produced thought and Romanticized “thinking
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Figure 2. John Constable, The White Horse, 1819
Image courtesy The Frick Collection, New York.

places” can still be discerned. Many of the Romantic thinking places were
established as a means to escape, as a negation of another place, as a means to get
out of an unwanted place. For example, the writer William Butler Yeats
purchased a tower (Thoor Ballylee Castle) in the countryside near the Irish town
of Gort, in some part because he wanted to escape from the world and find a
solitary place to be creative. Thoor Ballylee became Yeats’ retreat, as he was
“attracted to the beauty of the remote site.”56 The remoteness of the site was one
of the most redeeming qualities for Yeats, since he “had always seen himself as
one in a line of solitary searchers after a hidden wisdom.”57
Many of the “thinking places” in the Flemings’ text are also drawn from a
tradition valorizing solitary thinking, one that can be traced as far back to at least
Aristotle. Informing this tradition is the idea that the best and most productive
thinking occurs when one is sequestered from the world without distraction.
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However, the complete removal from one’s surroundings is at least improbable,
perhaps impossible. Place-produced thought, on the other hand, is not created as a
means to get out of place (both Thoreau and Heidegger rejected escapism), but
rather as a method of getting into, and engaging with, place. The development of
place-produced thought is driven more by a desire to work with/in place rather
than to disengage from the world.

SITE-SPECIFIC ART
Place-produced thought involves a deployment of place that is also in contrast to
the exchange conventionally understood as site-specific. The traditional
relationship of site-specific art to place is described by Robert Morris’ minimalist
site, in which the “total space is hopefully altered in certain desired ways by the
presence of the object” (my italics).58 This type of “total” site transformation
through the intervention of an artistic object is far more imposing, prescriptive,
and dialectical than the un-siting of place that occurs in place-produced thought.
Through the development of place-produced thought, the reconfiguration—or unsiting—of place is achieved when it becomes an active co-producer in the creation
of thought. This type of ontological transformation of place does not imply a total
transformation, but rather an addition of new “implications” to its identity. Once
place-produced thought has been developed, the place should not be considered as
completely “new,” as suggested by Okui Enwezor, but as a sort of progeny, made
“anew” through the additional meanings, values, and identities affixed to its
being. I want to stress here the fundamental imbrication of place, production, and
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thought that occurs in the process of developing place-produced thought. The
“anew” ontology includes its preceding identities, practices, and significations,
but is augmented and negotiated by the process of engendering place-produced
thought.
As described earlier, the ontological connection between the existing place
and its transformation by the thinker/place exchange in place-produced thought
has echoes of the relationship between the singular and the community expressed
by philosophers such as Hannah Arendt and Jean-Luc Nancy. Each of them
contends that the individual is never singular. In the enactment of subjective
agency within place-produce thought, the thinker does not think/act in pure
solitude. In his concept of the heteroglossic “sideways glance,” Mikhail Bakhtin
also claims that every person carries the influence of others, so that no one subject
can be isolated. “The self is an act of grace, a gift of the other,” asserts Bakhtin.59
Even within the supposed solitude of the Socratic inner dialogue, recall how
Arendt also illustrates the role of community in the turn toward interiority: “this
faculty of thought, which is exercised in solitude, extends into the strictly political
sphere, where I am always together with others.”60 I return to the relationship
between the singular and the collective again here to further stress the dialogical
(rather than dialectical) nature of place-produced thought that is always reaching
beyond its boundaries. As a form of re-composition or un-siting, the development
of place-produced thought occurs through a networked negotiation and generates
what Kwon portrays as a “relational sensibility [that] can… transform passing
intimacies into indelible, unretractable social marks.”61
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ENVIRONMENTAL ART
Another approach that artists have used to build a relationship with their
surroundings is through producing earth art or environmental art. These art
practices are typically conducted outdoors and often utilize local materials, forms,
and histories to create a work of art. Andy Goldsworthy, a renowned
environmental artist, creates works of art utilizing the natural materials found at
particular sites. Goldsworthy manipulates these materials into visually pleasing
creations inspired by organic forms. The meandering path of a river, the
smoothness of a sphere, the order of a rectangle, all repeat throughout
Goldsworthy’s work. His work often emphasizes the beauty in nature. Yet, it is
evident at times that “valuable beauty” originates from, and is placed upon nature
by, the aesthetic appreciation of Goldsworthy and his audience. He states, “When
I see a snake I am fascinated by its form and movement. It draws beautifully the
surface over which it travels…the perfect sculpture.”62 The valuation of the
formal qualities of nature or a place is derived from what Allen Carlson calls the
“object model of appreciation.”63 Carlson describes this type of appreciation and
value placement vis á vis our appreciation of a visual artistic object. The object is
admired for its inherent form, color, and texture but not actually as a thing in of
itself. Carlson explains the model as such: “natural objects are granted what is
called artistic enfranchisement, and they, like artifacts as Marcel Duchamp’s
Urinal, …become works of art. Appreciating a sculpture that was once driftwood
is, therefore, no closer to appreciating nature than is appreciating a purse that was
once a sow’s ear.”64
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Carlson’s assessment suggests that environmental artists typically do not
engage with place in the same manner as is inherent to place-produced thought.
The distinction is that environmental art does not always recognize the active
agency of place. Many environmental works do exhibit sensitivity and an accord
with the specific contingencies of a site, but I argue that this is executed in a way
that renders and values the place primarily as a passive aesthetic object (as per
Carlson’s definition) – rather than an active producer of knowledge.
In all fairness, Goldsworthy’s outdoor earthworks do seem to exhibit a
genuine attempt to think with/in place, but often his least successful works fall a
little short of this goal. They key point here is the contrast between being
receptive and attuned to place, and working with/in place as an active co-producer
of knowledge with its own desires and motivations. The repeated themes and
formal qualities of Goldsworthy’s work, utilized regardless of where he is
working on the globe (Fig.3, Fig.4 & Fig.5), seem to indicate that the artwork is
sometimes overlaid or mapped onto place, rather than being inscribed into it.65
One may argue that some of Goldsworthy’s work and his writings give
evidence of a desire not to control and dictate nature, but rather to actually work
with nature/place. As Goldsworthy states, “that these works appear to have grown
in place is an indication I have understood something of the internal stone and
tree. They are not an attempt at mimicry.”66 He continues by stating “I don’t see
them as being under my control.”67 These statements demonstrate his belief in his
equality with nature. This is further evidenced by the fact that Goldsworthy takes
great care not to leave behind any completely verifiable traces of a human mark.
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Figure 3. Wichita Arch, 2004 – Installed on the campus of Wichita State University, Wichita, KS.
Image Courtesy of the Ulrich Museum of Art.

Figure 4. Striding Arch, 2008 – Installed on Colt Hill, 3 km from Benbuie, Dumfries And
Galloway, UK.
Image Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.
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Figure 5. Arches 2005, Gibbs Farm, Kaipara Harbour, New Zealand.
Image Courtesy of Rob Garrett.

There is an ambiguity in his work, where what we are seeing is in-between natural
phenomenon and human intervention. However, working “with” place is not the
same as working “with/in” place. The former seems to grant the place some level
of equivalence, but this remains granted by the thinking subject, and does not go
as far in recognizing the intrinsic power of place that is vital to the co-creation of
place-produced thought.

THINKING WITH/IN PLACE
Having clarified the distinctions between place-produced thought and the other
types of relationships that thinkers have with their environments, I would like to
focus on place-produced thought itself, especially some of its inherent byproducts, as well as its potential for innovation and insurgency as new forms of
thought. Place-produced thought is a particularly vital form of localized
epistemology because of its ability to generate hetereotopic knowledge. In that
regard, place-produced thought can be unlike any other knowledges; the unique
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interaction between place, thinker, agency, materiality, and discursivity can be
powerfully irruptive and can produce alternative readings or understandings of
people, places, or things.
Part of the reason for the uniqueness of this knowledge is that in placeproduced thought, the distinction between thinking and acting, as presented in the
Arendtian-Socratic model, is undone. Indeed, thinking is posited as action, as a
process that is forceful and subversive. The development of place-produced
thought occurs through an engagement with place and not through disinterested
transcendental contemplation. The thinker actually lives the place of his or her
thought. The conjoined action-thinking of place-produced thought allows us to
distinguish it from the passive and tacit relationship with place that continuously
permeates thought and being.
Place is commonly part of our being and thought processes—we are all
shapes by the places that we inhabit. However, those who generate placeproduced thought develop a particularly deep link between thought and location.
Heidegger, for example, articulates a profound bond of place with being when he
hyphenates da-sein: being occurs “there.” Being has a presence in place, explains
Heidegger, before the truth of being is covered over and concealed by time.
However, neither place as the location for being, as Heidegger alleges, nor the
exertion of place that we experience everyday, fully coincide with the function of
place in the operation of place-produced thought. Instead, in each instance of
place-produced thought there is a concerted effort to make something occur – to
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derive a new body of thought. Place acts as locator for, and a participant in, the
emergence of a new episteme.
In the realm of postcolonial discourse, Enwezor maintains that something
like place-produced thought can act as a “series of healthy counter discourses to
colonial modernity’s self-authorized decisions.”68 And, as will be demonstrated in
the following chapters, that capacity is not limited to challenging colonial
modernity’s discourses. Rather, the focus of thought in a particular place has often
led to creativity and innovation, in no small part because place has the capacity to
react with or affect a thinker in a special way, through the concomitance of
subjective action and indigenous knowledge. This process is not without risks, but
it does exhibit an intrinsic bond – a nexus and shared ontology between place and
production.

METHODS OF THINKING WITH/IN PLACE
One method for developing place-produced thought can be called think place.
This term refers to an actual location for thinking, an environment that the thinker
chooses as a locus for thought. In order for place to serve as a point of
convergence, the thinker often establishes margins or borders for a place for
thinking. These boundaries may be permeable, transient, and seemingly arbitrary,
but their existence remains significant. The threshold of a place can be given
through various means – physical topography, cartography, relations of power,
the perceptions of the thinker, or through some combination of these. This
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delineation may radically depart from established boundaries. The
deterritorialization and reterritorialization of borders can prompt questions about
the circumstances of their original demarcation, leading to a new understanding of
what is and isn’t delineated by a certain place.
Another possible method for establishing place-produced thought is
thinking of place. This refers to an instance when place is called upon to put the
thinker in a certain state of consciousness, emotive disposition, or intellectual
framework. This does not necessarily occur during the actual physical
engagement with place. Instead, thinking of place can be achieved through
recollection and imagination. It is a vicarious embodiment, where place is
virtually engaged, to provide the thinker with particular intellectual guidance,
even from afar. Thinking of place enables the thinker to extend place as a focus
for thought well beyond the initial encounter. Thinking of place involves recalling
place for the continued creation of place-produced thought.
A third possible method for developing place-produced thought is thinking
through a place. This entails positioning place as a sounding board, in which
thought is drawn out of the negotiation with place. In this capacity, place can act
as a type of semi-conductor or as a point of resistance. Thinking through a place
engages place in a dialogue that can emphasize or diminish the constituting
variables of place. When one of the constituting forces is muffled or softened as
the place pushes back, it may still remain active, but may not act upon the thinker
(and the thought produced) in a substantial manner. In contrast, the enlargement
or expansion of a particular quality of place may also occur so that it becomes
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central and formative in place-produced thought. This diminishing/enlarging can
be subversive because it calls for the thinker to recognize an unrealized aspect of
place or turn a blind eye towards a constituting force that is hegemonic or
autocratic.
While the emphasis or restriction of certain qualities of place is often
productive and innovative, it can also be problematic, leading to myopic
conclusions in which place is used as a means to calcify hegemonic behavior. The
possibility of using place-produced thought to justify politics of rejection or
exclusion does exist.

ETHOS OF PLACE
A newly developed localized epistemology of place-produced thought will also
inherently include an ethos of place. In the close negotiation between
place/thinker, the value, idiosyncrasies, and agency of a specific place are brought
to the forefront of the thinker’s consciousness. Thinking with/in place encourages
the thinker to build a sense of respect for said place. Even though the push back
from place might by discomforting, perhaps even irritating, the thinker becomes
irrevocably engaged with/in his or her locus of thought. This type of engagement
disallows apathy. Even though the thinker may not be in love with his or her locus
of thought, by thinking with/in place an indelible awareness is developed, as the
place inscribes itself onto the very being of the thinker. By generating thought
with/in a certain locale, place is also recognized as an active agent rather than a
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passive object. As such, place-produced thought holds the potential for producing
an original and radical ethos that is both embodied and dialogical. Ewa Ziarek
describes this type of ethos as transformative because the “shift from moral law to
the event locates responsibility in the always asymmetrical, embodied relation to
the Other and redefines freedom as an engagement in the experimental praxis
aiming to surpass historically sedimented identities and to create new modes of
life.”69
To think with/in place is to be engaged with place – forming a contextual
and idiosyncratic relationship to place. This crucial connection does not mean that
the thinker can’t develop the same sort of engagement with another place down
the line. Because thinking with/in place is a mode of encounter that not only
ontologically entangles the thinker with place, but also importantly creates an
intimate co-producing relationship, respect is an intrinsic part of that engagement.
As previously mentioned, the act of thinking with/in place is a process in which
being, place, and thinking are merged. Emmanuel Levinas describes this type of
thinking when he writes: “to think is no longer to contemplate, but to be engaged,
merged with what we think, launched—the dramatic event of being-in-theworld.”70 Through this union, a place-produced ethos of care can be fostered as
part of the development of place-produced thought. In many of the instances of
place-produced thought examined in the following pages, we can discern how a
place-produced ethos of care was developed as part of the overall creation of
place-produced thought.
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POLITICS OF PLACE
While a place ethic is an inherent aspect of place-produced thought, each instance
of place-produced thought also demonstrates a negotiation between knowledge,
place, and power in the form of an indigenous geospatial politic. If we return to
our definition of place as a bio-socio-historical zone of active exchange between
various forces and ideologies—and therefore, a dynamic space of negotiation,
then we remember that a negotiation of power is inherent to these exchanges. By
seating the development of thought within the swirling mass of ideologies that
occur in place, each of these thinkers is confronted with an engagement of
politics. By immersing themselves, and becoming part of, the exchanges and
distribution of power within a place, each thinker develops a politics of place that
is reflective of, and informed by, the micro politics of place.
By engaging with place, each thinker is confronted with the dispersal of
power through the various forces acting upon or within it. As a zone, or a
bracketed site of exchanges, these assorted forces are utterly intertwined within
place. As Rebecca Solnit writes “something as tangible as soil is embedded with
something as immaterial as ideology.”71 Consequently, and critically for our
understanding of place-produced thought, place and politics are inseparable. This
means that the development of place-produced thought is always political, as each
instance demonstrates a corollary politics of place. In fact, there is often a mutual
dependency between the thinking and politics produced with/in place, as they
both stem from the close encounter between thinker and place.
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Heidegger’s thinking with/in with the landscape surrounding his mountain
hut near Todtnauberg is a good example of how a place-based politics is
intertwined with place-produced thought. While Heidegger’s interaction with the
landscape was highly determined by his pre-existing thoughts about da-sein and
being-in-the-world, his direct experience of the landscape between mountain hut
and city house was profound and illuminating. His affinity for the particular place
of his thought (especially the valley surrounding the hut), and the politics
associated with it, was undoubtedly built upon his immediate material
encounters—wandering along its wooded paths, hearing the placid gurgling of the
brook which fed his water pump, or the perhaps the brush of the wind on his face
as it whipped through the valley. For example, in “Why Do I Stay in The
Provinces?” Heidegger writes that “The gravity of mountains and the hardness of
their primeval rock, the slow and deliberate growth of the fir-trees, the brilliant,
simple splendor of the meadows in bloom, the rush of the mountain brook in the
long autumn night, the stern simplicity of the flatlands covered with snow – all of
this moves and flows through and penetrates daily existence up there.”72 In
statement such as this, Heidegger’s writing certainly seems to indicate that he was
smitten with the materiality of the place.
When I visited Heidegger’s hut at the beginning of a recent summer, with
the intentions of exploring its materiality, I found myself struggling prior to
arrival with how I should experience such a place. I wanted to remain open and
receptive to the direct confrontation of its phenomena—to best simulate
Heidegger’s own experience as best as I could. But I also knew that because I had
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studied and thought about the place so much prior to my visit, that there was no
way that this pre-existing knowledge could be excluded from the encounter. My
hope was that I could come a little closer to understanding what the place meant
for Heidegger—maybe to get a sense of his own being in the landscape. Perhaps it
was the overall peacefulness, accentuated by the sleepy serenity of the midday
sun, but I was suddenly struck by a specific sound as my wife and I walked along
a path near the cabin. The sound was the clanking of a cowbell and I immediately
turned around to find the source of the bell. To my surprise, it came from a cow
grazing far away on the other side of the valley. I was startled by how clear and
close the sound seemed. By hearing the cowbell, I suddenly became conscious of
the presence of the cattle even though they were far removed from my immediate
vicinity. Was this a sort of awakening to being-in-the-world that Heidegger wrote
so extensively about? I am still not really sure… but I do know that my own
physical encounter with the landscape of Heidegger’s thought did provide me
with some insight as to why Heidegger was so captivated by that landscape. The
natural amphitheater of the valley and the views it affords are certainly
picturesque, and the materiality of the encounter—smells, sounds, and textures of
the place—seem to stay with you, even after you have made your way off of the
mountain.
The materiality of phenomenological encounters however, was not the
only force acting upon Heidegger as he developed his place-produced thought.
Heidegger’s thinking with/in place was also defined by the discourses and cultural
ideas about the place that he brought with him. Some of his discursive baggage
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included the ideology of the Black Forest peasant as being pragmatic,
hardworking, and unpretentious. While both the material and the discursive
conditions of the landscape informed the cultivation of some beautiful thoughts
for Heidegger, the cultural ideas about the place and its people likely also
contributed to his development of a blut und boden (blood and soil) politics. As
described in Chapter Two, the landscape of Heidegger’s thought was thoroughly
imbued with his beliefs about the Black Forest peasant. Heidegger apparently
came to believe that the Black Forest peasants’ mode of living was better than
other types in its ability to embody being-in-the-world. Viewed as being
undistracted by the vacant charms of technology and urban life, Heidegger
considered the Black Forest peasants’ way of life as the best means to understand
the nature of being.
The political ideology of blut und boden represents the dangerous and
destructive side of a place-based politics. As geographer David Harvey makes
clear, when a place is believed to be pristinely and positively hermetic, separated,
and highly distinct from the Outside, the notion of blut und boden offers great
potential for breeding fear and xenophobic reactions that can be part of a placedbased politic. The horrific consequences of an ideology based in blut und boden
were demonstrated in the actions and propaganda of the Nazi party.
Unfortunately, Heidegger was also committed to a exclusionary politics of blut
und boden, and to the belief that the German landscape and ethnicity was superior
to all others, a belief that culminated in his involvement with the Nazi party.73
While Heidegger’s politics of place are certainly not agreeable, they emerged in
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conjunction with his place-produced thought, which does not carry the same
negative elements. This example illustrates that not all place-produced thought is
necessarily positive or entirely constructive, and that the same situation can give
rise to thoughts and politics that are themselves divergent. Heidegger is a
polarizing and conflicting thinker for many scholars because his philosophy mixes
the beautiful with the atrocious. The task of untangling Heidegger’s constructive
thoughts on being from his disturbing politics (both arguably a product of his
place-produced thought), is certainly tricky, complicated, and perhaps, even
impossible. In Chapter 3, I revisit Heidegger’s politics and thought to further
examine the relationship of one to the other.
What is perhaps most intriguing about the politics of place developed in
each instance of place-produced thought, whether those politics be troubling or
constructive, is that the experience of power, knowledge, and space at the micro
level is translated in some manner to the macro level. This translation provides
each thinker with a political ideology that is a component to his or her placeproduced thought. In this sense, the politics of place (and we could make this
claim about an ethos of place as well) exceeds the specificity of the locus of
thought, as it is imprinted into the continued and lasting thought of each thinker.
Rebecca Solnit has made a similar claim about the connection between
landscape and politics when she exclaims “those who deny that nature and
culture, landscapes and politics, the city and the country are inextricable
interfused have undermined that route for us all… this makes politics dreary and
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landscape trivial.”74 Place-produced thought reveals that landscape or place is
hardly trivial.

LIMITATIONS OF PLACE-PRODUCED THOUGHT
While we have noted the potentially damaging use of place-produced thought to
justify bigotry or xenophobia, another possible detriment to thinking with/in place
can be the formation or reification of boundaries. While using place to focus
thought typically requires establishing margins, too much emphasis on borders
runs the risk of otherizing. Labeled as the “other” to place, and defined by that
which is “outside” of place, the “other” can be threatened by the normative power
of place to define, delimit, or dissolve. This form of binarism has the potential to
jeopardize and contaminate place-produced thought. Otherization through place
has often been deployed in establishing radical nationalisms. The fervor of
dangerous nationalistic rhetoric has historically been grounded in reactionary and
antagonistic politics derived from place-based identities.
“Thought based on place haunts us still,” claims Augé, recalling horrific
extremist marginalizations and genocides of the past. David Harvey also worries
about how geographies of difference are used to exacerbate the separations among
communities. According to Harvey, the notion of place as a hermetically, locally
bound identity is in tension with the mobility of global networks and capital. This
tension produces anxiety over the potential loss of place and identity. When such
a climate of fear and loss permeates thought produced with/in place, it can lead to
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destructive politics of exclusion.75 These limitations of thinking with/in place
thought do not mean, however, that the methodology of using place as a focus for
thinking is a doomed or futile venture. Just as with other methods of generating
thought, place-produced thought is susceptible to the prejudices and fallibilities of
human thought. But, we should not throw out the baby with the bath water. As
demonstrated throught the case studies in the following chapters, place-produced
thought can be a valuable means of making innovative indigenous knowledge,
and should therefore remain a component of human thought development.

PLACES OF THOUGHT
Because place-produced thought is not a unified field, it should come as no
surprise that its articulations use disjunctive methodologies. The scope of the
various projects analyzed in the following chapters is, therefore, also intentionally
diverse, encompassing different types of places that have engendered distinctive
bodies of thought. Ranging from the 19th to the 21st century, encompassing tropes
of idealism, isolation, identity, walking, nature, the real, and enlisting
methodologies that include Phenomenology, Poststructuralism, and Postcolonialism, these projects were not created by makers intent upon placing them
in conversation with one another. However, when they are regarded in that way,
we can see that they share a crucial attribute: the production of a localized
episteme through a deep entwinement of place, production, and thinker. In each
case, indigenous knowledge has been produced by situated contemplation. Each
instance of place-produced thought also extends the role of place beyond
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everyday experience and the latent influence of place on one’s identity or
physiology. In each of these cases, the agency of the thinker and the agency of
place emerge as co-producers of knowledge. In the following chapters, I explore
five instances, probing the relation between the formation of the subject, the
constitution of place, and the performativity of agency. These instances do not
encompass a comprehensive taxonomy, but they do comprise significant cases of
the close intimacy that place can have with thought. They are offered as a starting
point toward a typology of place-produced thought. I have arranged these case
studies not only chronologically, but more importantly, on a trajectory from the
highly localized and materially engaged to a global de-materialized engagement.
This transition will push us to consider broader assessments for the role of the
tangible and the articulations of place in place-produced thought.
In Chapter One, I examine Thoreau’s Walden experiment as an important
instance of place-produced thought. When Thoreau made the decision to seek “the
essence of things” by living in a cabin in the woods outside of Concord, MA, he
put into motion a thinking project focused with/in place that would impact his
philosophy far beyond the two years of his actual Walden habitation. Through this
analysis, Walden and Concord are depicted as the mise-en-scène of Thoreau’s
place-produced thought, emerging as (some of) the places that have become
inexorably connected to his thought.76 In the examination of Thoreau’s relation to
Walden, we begin to better understand how places exercise their agency by
resisting the intentions of a thinker. At the same time, the Walden experiment
also demonstrates the ontological link that is established in the creation of place-
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produced thought, fusing the thinker and place together in an inextricable bond.
The chapter will also look at some of the specifics of Thoreau’s overall
philosophy and demonstrate how they are connected to the intimate encounter
between Thoreau and Walden’s landscape.
Chapter Two explores the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and his
relationship with a small cabin in the Black Forest outside the quaint German
village of Todtnauberg. Much like Thoreau, Heidegger sought out a place suitable
to develop his thinking. Heidegger’s cabin, or die Hütte as Heidegger called it,
was built as the optimal place for philosophical meditations on being and
existence. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes of existence and its relatedness to
place: “it is true that we also say of da-sein that it occupies a place.”77 Beginning
in 1922, Heidegger did almost all of his writing while staying at the cabin.
However, rather than considering only the cabin, I argue that the movement back
and forth between the cabin and Heidegger’s Freiburg residence comprises the
landscape of his place-produced thought. The slow walks between his home in
Freiburg and the cabin are examined in order to glean revelations about the
development of Heidegger’s concept of aletheia. I show how the movement
between modes and places of being produced some critical insights for Heidegger
about the continuous cycle of concealment and disclosure that characterizes the
nature of being. By thinking with/in place, Heidegger was able to generate a form
of indigenous knowledge – marking an important historical instance of placeproduced thought.
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Chapter Three analyzes the 1973 artistic project Reality Properties: Fake
Estates by Gordon Matta-Clark. This project served to focus Matta-Clark’s
thinking in a place comprised of fifteen small lots of property within New York
City. Matta-Clark’s acquisition of several small, unwanted, “unusable,” and ofteninaccessible properties will be examined as an attempt to develop a locus of
thought. In reaction to the slicing up of the urban landscape by the freeway
system during the 1950s and ‘60s, Matta-Clark’s Fake Estates project mirrors
Foucault’s critique of how ideology and thought “operate upon the entities of our
world, to put them in order, divide them in classes, group by name.”78 This
kinship makes sense, as Matta-Clark developed this body of thought as a spatial
strategy of resistance against the “regulatory systems that dominated urban
environments.”79
Chapter Four focuses on the travels of Jean Baudrillard throughout the
United States in the 1980s. In these wanderings, Baudrillard established a
particular connection to the deserts of the southwest. While he came to America
hoping that his experience would present him with support for, and evidence of,
his theory of simulacra, the place of the desert triggered a new direction of
thought. Thus, through place-produced thought, he crafted a philosophy of the
desert – a “place of signs void of all meaning.”80 As Baudrillard discovered, the
exchange between the immanent signs of the real and the cultural signs of the
hyperreal was not fixed. Instead, Baudrillard’s engagement with place
demonstrated how the lived experience of a material encounter can push back
against the cultural assumptions and significations imposed upon place.
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Chapter Five investigates the bond between the post-colonial critiques of
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and the third space of the Indian collective
imagination. Within Spivak’s concerns about the neo-colonialism of capitalism
and globalization, as well as the Eurocentricity in the major works of Western
philosophy, there is evidence that the third space of the Indian collective
imagination was activated as a locus for her thought. I show how the negotiative
and transformative power of the Indian collective imagination has informed the
very nature of her thought. Of particular sway on Spivak has been the third
space’s ability to enable certain subversive disruptions in the hegemonic practices
of British rule. In her lecture Nationalism and the Imagination, given in
Hyderabad, India in 2007, Spivak reveals that by thinking with/in the third space
of the Indian collective imagination, she has been able to develop alternative
readings of national identity and of the Subaltern to counter those produced in
dominant discourses. These place-produced thoughts have furnished Spivak with
alternative strategies for nationalist concerns that employ equivalence rather than
equality, and oscillate from within and without dominant discourses. Her hope is
to generate dialogue that searches for a “critical regionalism with trans-frontier
jurisdiction.”81
The epilogue circles back to the discussion of a typology of placeproduced thought; this includes reaffirming place-produced thought as a
distinctive type of encounter with/in place, one that occurs through a unique
process of situated cognition that produces indigenous knowledge. Included in
this discussion is an overview of key conditions, variations, and processes for
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situating place as a focus for thought, leading to the development of radical and
innovative thinking. This postscript serves as a call for continued analysis and
understanding of the potentialities of place-produced thought. While the danger
certainly exists that place-produced thought reinforces politics of exclusion and
dangerous forms of othering, the horizon for place-produced thought is open and
encourages a continued analytic of the shared ontology of place and production in
the development of future projects, and the exciting possibility of emerging local
epistemologies.
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1

INTO THE ESSENCE OF THINGS:
HENRY DAVID THOREAU

In tomorrow's world, men [sic] will not need artificial instruments such as jets
and space ships. In the world of tomorrow, the new man will 'think' the place
he wants to go, then his mind will take him there.
– Sun Ra, 1956

On July 4th, 1845, after walking a mile and a half from the small town of Concord,
MA, Thoreau settled into a dilapidated cabin on the shore of Walden Pond—
beginning his “Walden experiment.” This two-year engagement with place is an
important instance of a thinker developing thought with/in place. Thoreau hints at
how the place would come to inform his thinking when he documented his
impressions of the first day at Walden: “I had made some progress toward settling
in the world. This frame, so slightly clad, was a sort of crystallization around me,
and reacted on the builder.”1 This “reaction” became the source of Thoreau’s
place-produced thought. Here and throughout his writings, one can sense that
Thoreau concertedly treated the Walden experiment as a method to derive
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indigenous knowledge through topographically situated thinking. In order to
analyze the germination of Thoreau’s place-produced thought, I will examine
certain details of the Walden experiment and demonstrate how Thoreau entered
into an active negotiation and interaction with place.
Throughout Walden; or, Life in the Woods, Thoreau repeatedly refers to
the impact that Walden had upon the development of his thoughts. He points to
the significance that he expects situatedness will have for his thinking when he
proclaims, “I have thought that Walden Pond would be a good place for
business.”2 While this passage appears in the chapter titled “Economy,” the sort of
business to which Thoreau alludes does not involve markets or monetary
concerns. Rather, the “business” he envisions undertaking at Walden Pond is
“private business with the fewest of obstacles,” that is to say, solitary thinking.3
Hoping to circumvent some of the inhibitions to thinking and living, such as
government regulation and societal conventions, Thoreau turned to the wilderness
in order to live and think outside of those systems – to live and think in a
newfound freedom. As one progresses through the text, it becomes increasingly
apparent that Thoreau meant to use Walden as a place to focus thinking and
living.

LOCATING WALDEN
Although Thoreau often refers to his place of thought as Walden or Walden Pond,
his think place actually extended beyond the shoals of the pond, and even beyond
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Ralph Waldo Emerson’s fourteen-acre plot upon which he resided. While the
bean field and cabin had particular importance within the place of the experiment,
all of Walden Pond – indeed, the whole wooded area between the towns of
Concord and Lincoln, and the towns themselves can be considered as his think
place. Thoreau did perceive boundaries to it, even though the overall think place
contained a multiplicity of places. Some of these were more urban (Concord,
Lincoln, and the railroad), symbolizing the constraints of societal convention and
legislation. Others were the sites of actual inhabitation by Thoreau – Walden
Pond, the cabin, and bean field. Often the movement through the woods between
these places served to ratify Thoreau’s perception and ideas about each of them.
The transitions between places, as well as the places themselves, cumulatively
comprise the landscape of Thoreau’s think place.4 Thoreau explains that when one
establishes a think place with the “most admirable kind of invisible fence,” a
locus for thought has been circumscribed – a precondition for the production of
situated thought.5
Within Walden, Thoreau chronicles his methodology for choosing the
place to conduct his thinking/living experiment. In the chapters “Economy” and
“Where I Lived, and What I lived For,” Thoreau characterizes the place near
Walden Pond as well suited to his sensibilities and practical requirements – it was
in the woods, near a water source, and far enough (but not too far) from town.
Beyond mere pragmatics, however, Thoreau also perceived that the place
possessed qualities he believed essential for a thought-producing endeavor, most
notably, the capacity for solitude and the opportunity to live in nature.
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One of the most significant attributes of Walden for Thoreau was that it
allowed solitude. Granted, throughout the experiment, Thoreau never went more
than a week without some form of human contact. This fact, though, does not
negate the important role solitude played. Moreover, it reveals that Thoreau
himself was at least in part responsible for the constitution of the place he
inhabited. Thoreau perceived the place as one where he could regulate
interpersonal contact and engagement with society. Thoreau believed that the
place was solitary, and therefore it became a place where he could be alone with
his thoughts.
For Thoreau, removal from the village of Concord and from the greater
society afforded him physical and ideological distance from constraints on free
thought. As Thoreau perceived it, Walden was an open realm, free from societal
distraction and outside of dominant cultural formations. Thoreau was not so
opposed to society as to promote anarchy, but throughout his life he did remain an
advocate of free thought and wary of state control. “No doubt another may also
think for me,” Thoreau observed, “but it is not therefore desirable that he should
do so to the exclusion of my thinking for myself (Thoreau’s italics).”6 Although
Thoreau appeared to turn his back on society from time to time, he did actually
concede that there needed to be a balance between a civilized and wilderness life.
The natural world was needed, not to replace civil life, but as a counterpoint to the
distractions and delusions of government control and capitalist pursuits. “We need
the tonic of wildness,” exclaims Thoreau, or “village life would stagnate.”7 Even
though Thoreau frequently expressed his desire to remove himself from Concord,
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he also realized its necessity. For most of the two-year experiment he walked back
to town every few days to replenish supplies or hear the latest news.
Thoreau’s exaggerated emphasis upon solitude is not entirely
contradictory or hypocritical. In fact some scholars, such as Rebecca Solnit, have
claimed that it has been the various interpretations of Walden that have framed it
as an exercise in absolute solitude.8 As Solnit points out, Thoreau himself never
denied his frequent jaunts to town nor the numerous visitors he entertained at his
cabin. For Thoreau, Walden was solitary. It was the possibility of this solitude (or
perceived solitude) that served as the critical aspect of Walden Pond as a place to
produce thought. In this attraction to solitary thought, Thoreau reveals an affinity
for the thinking in solitude advocated by Socrates. For Socrates, thinking is best
conducted in its (supposed) pure form through an inner dialogue that ideally
occurs in solitude. Similarly, Thoreau believed that the pace, trappings, and fetters
of society “distract our attention from serious things” – such as living and
thinking.9
On a practical level, much of Thoreau’s time at Walden was spent taking
care of basic survival: acquiring food, water, and maintaining shelter. In terms of
the intellectual project, Thoreau managed to settle into an existence that he
believed was ripe with clarity and truth. For Thoreau, Walden offered the
opportunity to become entangled with nature – to get into the essence of things in
their natural habitat. Describing this, Thoreau used an analogy drawn from
archaeology. He imagined excavating down through the “mud and slush of
opinion, and prejudice, and tradition, and delusion, and appearance… till we
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come to a hard bottom and rocks in place, which we can call reality (Thoreau’s
italics).”10 This approach characterized the entire Walden experiment. As a
Transcendentalist, Thoreau used his time at Walden Pond to discover what he
regarded as a real and truthful existence. By living simply and in direct contact
with nature, Thoreau believed he was able to reduce living, thinking, and being to
their “lowest terms,” where he could get to their “whole and genuine character.”11

CULTURAL INSCRIPTIONS
Thoreau arrived at Walden Pond with many presuppositions, including the
elements of American Transcendentalism and Romanticism to which I just
alluded. In addition, he presumed that nature is simple and transcendental, as is
demonstrated by his call to “let us first be as simple and as well as Nature
ourselves… Fix not thy heart on that which is transitory,”12 or his exhortation that
we “spend one day as deliberately as Nature, and not be thrown to the track by
every nutshell and mosquito’s wing that falls on the rails.”13 The text of Walden is
interspersed with references to transcendental laws and truths derived from
nature, laws which he had specifically hoped to discern through the raw contact
with nature that he experienced while at Walden. Indeed, an entire chapter is
entitled “Higher Laws.” There, Thoreau reminds the reader that “Nature is your
congratulation, and you have cause momentarily to bless yourself.”14 In his
Journal entry of July 6, 1845 Thoreau writes “I wish to meet the facts of life—the
vital facts, which where [sic] the phenomena or actuality the Gods meant to show
us, —face to face, And so I came down here.”15 Statements such as these illustrate
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Thoreau’s overarching belief that through contact with nature the potential for
Transcendentalist discovery became tangible.
Thoreau also routinely positions nature as a redemptive antidote to the ills
of society – such as the frivolous pursuit of excess and gluttony. Thoreau viewed
the sublimity of nature as extremely valuable because it facilitates transgression –
a jolt to the mind that opens avenues of new intellectual exploration and modes of
living. Like Kant, who described how the power of nature could transcend the
capacity of human cognition in the experience of the sublime, Thoreau was a
believer in the heuristic opportunities offered by an experience of the
awesomeness of nature.
These varying concepts of nature reveal what James McIntosh calls
Thoreau’s “shifting stance toward nature.”16 For Thoreau, nature was certainly
equated with the real and the true, but Thoreau’s thoughts about the human
relationship with nature fluctuates greatly throughout Walden. At some moments,
Thoreau views humans as an imbedded part of nature, while at other moments, he
views humans as cut off and segregated from nature. In Thoreau’s numerous
descriptions, nature can entertain a multiplicity of roles: from nature-as-growth,
nature-as-companion, nature-as-antidote to nature-as-truth.17
Many of Thoreau’s sentiments about place, identity, and nature, reveal
ideas that he brought to the Walden experiment. The presence of these preexisting views in the development of thought with/in Walden also indicates the
inescapability of cultural discourse. Through his conceptions of things, his
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perceptions of place, and the capacities of nature, Thoreau brought an a priori
cultural consciousness into the place of the experiment. Thoreau’s description of
nature also demonstrates the presence of inscribed cultural meanings, as
(ironically) when he asserts that nature is “the language which all things and
events speak without metaphor.”18 These types of assertions by Thoreau are
evidence of a pre-conceived cultural/discursive signifier which views nature as
the source of higher laws and absolutes – and that the bare encounter with nature
reveals meaningful truths.
The lens of American Romanticism that Thoreau used to survey the
landscape was perhaps the most significant discursive structure that helped to give
the place meaning. For Thoreau, these biases often meant that Walden and, more
generally, nature, was positioned as other to society, and thus suggested that one’s
return to nature would be redemptive and regenerative. Cultural inscriptions do
not completely define Thoreau’s place-produced thought, though, for the place
itself pushed back against many of these cultural prescriptions, often modifying or
negating their influence.
Before moving on to the role of place agency in Thoreau’s place-produced
thought, I want to make note of one of the distinct aspects of Thoreau’s process of
developing thought with/in Walden. Interestingly, the final manuscript for Walden
was not actually written in situ, but was worked up from Thoreau’s retrospection
and the extensive Journal he maintained during the actual inhabitation. Thoreau
didn’t publish his treatise documenting the Walden experiment until 1854, seven
years after he departed from Walden. Even so, it can be argued that Thoreau used
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the place of Walden as a locus for thought by thinking of place during the
completion of the manuscript. As William Rossi notes, “the Journal provided a
means of perpetuating, even as it transformed the Walden enterprise and the
Walden experiment.”19
I would argue, going even further, that Thoreau extended the epistemology
of the Walden experiment not solely through reference to the Journal, but also by
thinking of place. This is a crucial distinction because the continuation of placeproduced thought would have certainly included the Journal, but by thinking of
place, Thoreau’s thinking also encompassed latent memories, recollections, and
habits of thought that he established while there. This claim means that the
Journal was simply one portion of the process of developing thought with/in
Walden. The continued engagement of place by thinking of place allowed for a
kind of perpetual performativity and production. Rossi found fault with Thoreau
for not strictly using his “Journal as journal.”20 However, if we consider what he
recorded as place-produced thought and the Journal as an intermediary device
allowing him to return to Walden by thinking of place, then we can understand
that the Journal was an instrument enabling Thoreau to have a continued thought
producing relationship with/in Walden even after his departure.

PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS
While the Walden experiment was fruitful for Thoreau in terms of writing
production, that does not, in itself, indicate that place was (albeit partially)
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responsible for producing thought; he may simply have used Walden as a
“thinking place” rather than a “think place.” However, we find that when
Thoreau became engaged with place, the co-production of thought with/in
Walden began to emerge, specifically as the place exerted itself against the
preconceptions that Thoreau brought to Walden.
As I noted in the introduction, the agency of place in place-produced
thought often pushes back against cultural presumptions and the desires of the
thinker. In this manner, Walden emerged as a co-author of the place-produced
thought that is ascribed to Thoreau. In his introduction to the Beacon Press edition
of Walden, Bill McKibben gives us a glimpse of how place can push back when
he asserts that “what nature provides is scale and context.”21 What McKibben
seems to refer to is both how the materiality of place can cause a thinker to
disregard some aspects of the place while emphasizing others, and how the
familiar human scale of things can be replaced. For Thoreau, this meant that he
became sensitive and attuned to both the minute and the grandiose qualities of
place. By thinking with/in place Thoreau’s attention was directed to the majesty
encapsulated in even the most minute creature and corner of Walden. For
example, Thoreau writes: “every little pine needle expanded and swelled with
sympathy and befriended me.”22 Thoreau also gained a new consciousness of the
cosmic and large scale, as is evident when he claims that “Walden is a microcosm
for the world.”23 Both of these levels of attentiveness—of living at a scale other
than the human—are products of Thoreau’s direct engagement with the
materiality of place. By sensing and living with/in these phenomenon, Thoreau
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developed a new awareness of their significance in the constitution and meaning
of place.
Thoreau’s direct experience of the “life force of nature” also functioned to
reaffirm his disdain for the fuss of society in favor of something more raw and
spartan – a wilderness existence without the superficial and superfluous
accouterments of culture. By penetrating into the essence of things, Thoreau
believed he was able to brush aside societal luxuries and understand what is
“necessary of life” (Thoreau’s italics). Explaining what he means by “necessary
of life,” Thoreau wrote “I mean whatever… has been from the first, or from long
use has become, so important to human life that few, if any, whether from
savageness, or poverty, or philosophy, ever attempt to do without it.”24 While
Thoreau is referring to the basic necessities of life – food, water, and shelter – he
is also alluding to the ideal conditions for free and unrestricted thought and
existence.
From early in his residence, Thoreau looked toward the materiality of
place as a means to encounter the “necessities of life” and the truth of existence.
For example, he noted: “I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately,
to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to
teach, and not when I came to die, discover that I had not lived. I did not wish to
live what was not life.”25 In this sense, place operated as an instrument of
revelation, enabling Thoreau’s thinking to develop greater clarity, magnitude, and
articulation than it had when he had been in a more “urban” setting. Thoreau’s
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connectivity to the “vitals of the globe,” developed as a central tenet of his placeproduced thought.26
Thoreau was very cognizant that his encounters with the material
phenomena of place and a shifting sense of scale impacted the way his thought
was developing. “I was suddenly sensible of such sweet and beneficent society in
Nature, in the very pattering of the drops, and in every sound and sight around my
house.”27 Similar to Bachelard’s claim, Thoreau’s lived experience of place
transformed its meaning and the thinking produced with/in it. In a short
meditation on the pickerel of Walden Pond, Thoreau comments on how they
contributed to his thinking with/in Walden. After witnessing their “dazzling and
transcendent beauty,” Thoreau is prompted to write that “They, of course, are
Walden all over and all through; are themselves small Waldens.”28 Just as he
regarded Walden as a microcosm of the world, these small fish acted as a
microcosm of Walden – displaying the same sort of beautiful simplicity and
honesty of existence found throughout the Walden experiment.
As an avid naturalist, Thoreau was drawn to directly encounter the
phenomena of Walden. Because of his naturalist concerns, but more importantly
because of his entanglement and integration with place, Thoreau’s encounters
became intrinsically connected to his philosophy. As Bill McKibben wrote of
Thoreau: “His physics informed his metaphysics.”29 Thoreau believed that
knowledge of a place – of its physical attributes and constituents – was matched
by knowledge of being; in other words, for both place and thinker, epistemology
was informed by materiality. In the process of describing his life at Walden,
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Thoreau touches upon the interconnectivity of place, thought, and materiality
when he notes that “my instinct tells me that my head is an organ for burrowing…
and with it I would mine and burrow my way through these hills [the place of the
Walden experiment]. I think that the richest vein is somewhere hereabouts.”30 The
lived experience and engagement with the flora and fauna of place provided
Thoreau with new insights into what he believed to be a more real existence – a
free mode of being unclouded by the “shams and delusions” of cultural
inscriptions. Thoreau’s experience led him to believe that this free mode occurs
through becoming ensconced—through settling in, and gaining knowledge of
place by “burrowing in” to discover its “richest vein.” As Thoreau proclaims at a
particularly reflective moment within the text: “I was as near being resolved into
the essence of things as ever I was in my life.”31

THINKING WITH/IN WALDEN
One of my main contentions about the Walden experiment is that the newfound
freedom, clarity, and interconnectivity that Thoreau discovered in an intimate
exchange with place created specific thinking that can be demonstrated to be
place-produced. An important tenet of Thoreau’s thinking with/in Walden was the
recognition of how human/nonhuman and the inside/outside of place function
together as an integrated whole. Oddly enough, it was Thoreau’s vocation as a
land surveyor (whose function is typically to define and delineate boundaries) that
helped to influence this aspect of his place-produced thought.
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Surveying was a meaningful, but ideologically complicated, activity for
Thoreau; it allowed him to be outdoors and to legally wander where he pleased,
but it also had significant political and ethical implications. As Patrick Chura
describes in his text, Thoreau the Land Surveyor, the activity of surveying was
philosophically important to Thoreau because it emphasized cultural
interrelationships. As Chura details, Thoreau was highly informed by the “Coast
Survey ideologies” which had become well known through various surveying
projects conducted by the federal U.S. Coast Survey initiative throughout the
1840s and 50s.32 “As both an important intellectual pursuit and a specifically
American cultural activity,” Chura writes, “the Coast Survey became a focal point
for the nation’s ideas about economics and the environment.”33
Using this ideology as his model, Thoreau cultivated a type of surveying
that brought several facets of culture into contact with one another. His method of
delineating and measuring place became one that united economics, politics,
science, philosophy, naturalism, and aesthetics. Even though Thoreau approached
surveying quite differently than surveying done strictly for “territory and trade,”
he still maintained ambivalence toward it, recognizing that surveying was the first
step in the development and exploitation of the landscape. The conflicting
feelings that Thoreau had about surveying were present when he began the
Walden experiment. I argue, however, that by thinking with/in Walden, Thoreau
developed a new understanding of how surveying could be used as a complex
method of getting into the essence of things. In addition, he came to believe that it
could also function as a form of civil disobedience. A critical understanding of the

74

function of surveying as a form of political resistance came to Thoreau through
the development of place-produced thought.
Chura states that “by any criterion except economic, Henry Thoreau’s
surveying career began at Walden.”34 When Thoreau completed a survey of
Walden Pond in 1846, it was done so for his own purposes in hopes that he would
increase his acumen about Walden (Fig.1). “To passively experience a world like
Walden is one thing,” contends Chura, “to survey it is another (Chura’s italics).35

Figure 1. Henry David Thoreau. Walden Pond, manuscript survey (ink on paper), 1846.
No. 133a in CFPL Thoreau survey collection.
Image courtesy of the Concord Free Public Library.

While the survey of Walden Pond gave Thoreau a greater ability to get “into the
essence of things” and dig below the surface encounter to get at the transcendental
knowledge that he thought Walden held, perhaps more importantly, it also
provided him insight as to how surveying could be a transgressive act of civil
disobedience; a constructive means of un-siting and reclaiming the landscape. The
conceptualization of surveying in this capacity was a direct product of Thoreau’s
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place-produced thought and became an important means of justifying his later
surveying activities.
Chura does well to account how the survey of Walden Pond is the first
instance in which Thoreau uses surveying subversively to create an alternative
representation of a place. Chura points out how Thoreau’s pond survey can be
read as iconoclastic more by its purposeful absences than anything else. “The
omission of the town border is a meaningful silence,” claims Chura, as the survey
presents a place with “no property lines and no discernible personal or civic
claims.”36 The only things identified are either natural (hills, trees) or personally
meaningful to Thoreau’s encounter with Walden (his cabin, railroad). Thoreau
intentionally excludes the majority of the “useful” information contained in a
conventional survey. As Chura reports, Thoreau’s survey “seems to go out of its
way to offer nothing of conventionally economic or political value to anyone.”37
In a sense, Thoreau re-constructed the place in manner that erased previous claims
and impositions and instead tried to emphasize the natural phenomena and agency
of place. As an outcome of place produced-thought, “the story told by the Walden
map is thus a forcefully iconoclastic narrative” co-authored by thinker and
place.38
Thoreau’s understanding of surveying developed through thinking with/in
place became imprinted upon his entire body of thought and his profession as a
surveyor. In many ways, the appreciation of surveying developed with/in Walden
was likely how Thoreau came to terms with and justified his later surveying
career. For Thoreau, surveying was a means of being-in-common with the world
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while also making political and ethical statements. Because Thoreau utilized
surveying as a means of knowing the landscape and finding truth, he viewed his
methodology of surveying as crucially distinctive from that of conventional
surveying for financial gain. In one of Thoreau’s last essays, “Life Without
Principle,” he extensively discusses this critical difference stating: “As for my
own business, even that kind of surveying which I could do with most satisfaction
my employers do not want. They would prefer that I should do my work coarsely
and not too well, ay, not well enough. When I observe that there are different
ways of surveying, my employer commonly asks which will give him the most
land, not which is most correct.”39 Surveying emerged as a central component of
Thoreau’s thinking with/in Walden, as it provided Thoreau not only with an
identity as a surveyor that personified the “vital personae of philosopher and
natural historian,” but also became a means to engage place in a direct and
material fashion in order to produce situated localized knowledge.40

AN INTEGRATED WHOLE
By surveying and thinking with/in Walden, Thoreau became much more attuned
to the ways that seemingly divided locations, entities, and philosophies touch
upon one another in profound and potent exchanges. There are several moments
throughout Thoreau’s encounter with Walden in which the boundaries and
distinctions between things become fuzzy or dissolved. For example, when
observing the small pickerel caught by fisherman, Thoreau remarks how they are

77

Walden, or small “Waldenses” and serve as an embodiment of the place through
which a critical conflation of location and animal entity occurs.
The deconstruction or re-territorialization of boundaries was an important
aspect of Thoreau’s experience and of his place-produced thought, and it is
perhaps best illustrated by the confusion he recounts after gazing into the glassy
surface of the pond: “In such transparent and seemingly bottomless water,
reflecting the clouds, I seemed to be floating through the air as in a balloon, and
their [perch] swimming impressed me as a kind of flight or hovering, as if they
were a compact flock of birds passing just beneath my level.”41 This incident was
far more than just directional confusion for Thoreau, as it made apparent how
easily the perception of something can slip and transform into something else
entirely. The loosening of seemingly rigid boundaries or distinctions was
significant because it demonstrated the ways that discrete entities and ideas cross
into one another.
Place-produced thought often drastically modifies the existing boundaries
of a place, bringing a new awareness to the relationship of an existing place with
other places, reassessing their alignment, overlay, and interdependence. The
thinking developed with/in Walden revealed to Thoreau how individual entities
are integrated within a greater system or collective. This revelation shares an
ontological structure with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. “As my living
present opens upon a past,” writes Merleau-Ponty, “which I nevertheless am no
longer living through, and on a future which I do not yet live, and perhaps never
shall, it can also open on to temporalities outside my living experience and
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acquire a social horizon, with the result that my world is expanded to the
dimensions of that collective history which my private existence takes up and
carries forward.”42
In many ways Thoreau was a phenomenologist, and it was through placeproduced thought that he began to recognize that being occurs in place and is
highly determined by place. “We are never alone,” wrote Thoreau, in a statement
that has periphrastic echoes of Heidegger’s phenomenological “being-in-theworld.”43 In his musings about solitude, Thoreau demonstrates his connections to
the landscape as an integrated whole. “I have a great deal of company in my
house; especially when nobody calls… Let me suggest a few comparisons, that
some one may convey an idea of my situation. I am no more lonely than the loon
in the pond that laughs so loud, or than Walden Pond itself… I am no more lonely
than a single mullein or dandelion in a pasture, or a bean leaf, or sorrel, or horsefly, or a humble-bee.”44 Initially, this revelation by Thoreau may seem
inconsistent with the solitude that Thoreau sought and found at Walden. However,
the type of solitude that Thoreau sought was not one that cut him off from any
form of contact with others, but rather was solitude from imposed cultural
restrictions and limitations. He wanted to exercise his individual freedoms while
also deepening his integration with the landscape. Ironically, it was Thoreau’s
attempt to be removed from society that led to the place-produced thinking, which
helped to reify his indelible and crucial relation to the collectively networked
organization of society.
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Thoreau’s understanding of the relation of the individual to the collective
environment of his habitation also reflects Nancy’s correspondence between the
individual and the community. For example, Thoreau states in Walden that “to
cooperate, in the highest as well as the lowest sense, means to get our living
together (Thoreau’s italics).”45 Here, Thoreau emphasizes the shared ontological
status of cooperation. He does not simply mean we need to get along together.
Instead, he insists upon recognizing the fundamental web of interactions that form
the basis of existence. Compare this notion to Nancy’s assertion that “one cannot
make the world with simple atoms… There has to be an inclination or an inclining
from one toward the other, of one by the other, from one to the other. Community
is at least the clinamen of the individual… that opens up its being-in-common
(Nancy’s italics).”46
As Thoreau increasingly became aware of these vital connections, he
realized that conflicts, social issues, and cultural activities – even those seemingly
far removed from his localized existence – necessarily demanded his attention and
response. As part of this greater whole, Thoreau had no choice but to take action
in response to the Mexican-American war, abolitionism, western expansion, and
the hanging of local reformist John Brown. For Thoreau, his own existence was
connected to these issues whether he wanted it to be or not, and therefore they
demanded he act as an individual within the collective. Just as the small pickerel
were “themselves small Waldens,” Thoreau’s own small existence was
emblematic of the entire nation, or even all of humanity.
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Thoreau’s place-produced thoughts on existence as an integrated whole,
helped to solidify the distinction of humans who live in separation, as if they are
segregated from the collective, from those who live as part of an integrated whole.
This difference enabled Thoreau to comprehend a more complex relationship
between humans and their environments than the commonplace divide of
city/country. Thoreau grew to suspect that the ills of society were not an inherent
part of society, but rather were the product of humans living as separate entities.
For Thoreau, waste, excess, and superfluous pursuits all stemmed from
individualized greed and desires. In this lengthy passage, for example, Thoreau
compares the problems of the nation to the problems of the segregated individual
– both living as though disconnected, blindly striving for the next innovation
rather than living more simply and as a community:
Our life is like a German confederacy, made up of petty states,
with its boundary forever fluctuating, so that even a German
cannot tell you how it is bounded at any moment. The nation itself,
with all its so called internal improvements, which, by the way, are
all external and superficial, is just such an unwieldy and
overgrown establishment, cluttered with furniture and tripped up
by its own traps, ruined by luxury and heedless expense, by want
of calculation and a worthy aim, as the million households in the
land; and the only cure for it as for them is in rigid economy, a
stern and more Spartan simplicity of life and elevation of purpose.
It lives too fast. Men think that it is essential that the Nation have
commerce, and export ice, and talk through a telegraph, and ride
thirty miles and hour… But if we stay at home and mind our
business, who will want railroads? We do not ride on the railroad;
the railroad rides upon us.47
For Thoreau, living as separate entities gets us off track from a productive
existence. This concept of being-in-common with the world surfaced as a vital
aspect of Thoreau’s place-produced thought, one that was considerably less
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evident in his earlier work. Before the Walden experiment, Thoreau often wrote
about the human connection with nature in different terms. For example, in one of
his earliest essays, Aulus Persius Flaccus, eponymously titled after the Roman
poet, Thoreau writes that “the divinest poem, or the life of a great man, is the
severest satire; as impersonal as nature herself, and like the sighs of her winds in
the woods, which convey ever a slight reproof to the hearer.”48 Another mention
of nature can be found in the essay, A Walk to Wachusett, in which Thoreau
comments that “all nature lay passive, to be viewed and travelled.”49 While these
examples demonstrate Thoreau’s interest in the natural world, I contend that it
was not until his intimate engagement with Walden, having experienced firsthand
the agency of place, as well as the epistemological and ontological reciprocations
with/in place, that Thoreau emerged with a new appreciation of how the
individual connects with the world. For example, Thoreau writes in Walden that
“a lake is the landscape’s most beautiful and expressive feature. It is earth’s eye;
looking into which the beholder measures the depth of his own nature.”50 Through
the Walden experiment, Thoreau deepened his perception of the ways that
humans are interrelated with nature. It is with/in Walden that he identifies
“himself with wild nature”51 and comes to the realization that “I go and come with
a strange liberty in Nature, a part of herself.”52

THINKING BEYOND WALDEN
While Thoreau’s thinking with/in Walden produced a significant body of
indigenous knowledge, Thoreau was also able to extend and apply many of the
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ideas cultivated there throughout the rest of his life. Many of these thoughts
informed Thoreau’s philosophy long after the physical encounter with Walden
had ended. “Perhaps I can never find so good a setting for my thoughts,” writes
Thoreau in his Journal, “as I shall thus have taken them out of.”53 This statement
speaks to the impact that Walden had on the development of his thought, but I
argue that it also suggests that Thoreau took the indigenous knowledge cultivated
at Walden and carried it forward as a part of his being.
Rebecca Solnit has made a similar claim about the derivation of Thoreau’s
politics. She does not allege that his political leanings were directly manifested
through place-produced thought in the same manner that I do, but she does assert
that his indigenous encounters helped to affirm his wider views on national
political debates and issues. That she should think so is not a great surprise, for
Solnit is resolute in asserting that landscapes are political and that encounters
within landscapes help to shape and inform individual politics.
In Thoreau’s case, Solnit points to his experience of picking and eating
huckleberries as one filled with political implications. In Solnit’s estimation,
Thoreau’s gathering and enjoyment of a huckleberry feast was a political
metaphor for freedom. Upon being released from a night spent in jail for not
paying his taxes (Thoreau’s method of protesting the Mexican-American war),
Thoreau’s first act was to walk two miles to a huckleberry patch where he could
pick and enjoy the berries as he pleased. Solnit argues that this was deliberate: “If
he went to jail to demonstrate his commitment to the freedom of others, he went
to the berries to exercise his own recovered freedom, the liberty to do whatever he
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wished—and the evidence in all his writing is that he very often wished to pick
berries.”54
Thoreau himself alludes to how collecting wild berries can be a means of
disrupting capitalism and acting out one’s own personal freedom. Thoreau wrote
in “Resistance to Civil Government” that upon his release from incarceration, he
was soon “in the midst of a huckleberry field, on one of our highest hills, two
miles off; and then the State was nowhere to be seen.”55 The equivalence of wild
fruit with freedom, and the activities of collecting and consuming wild fruit
became an important political fusion that influenced Thoreau throughout the rest
of his life. In Wild Fruits, one of Thoreau’s last texts to be written, he notes of
black huckleberries that “this crop grows wild all over the country—wholesome,
bountiful, and free, a real ambrosia. And yet men, the foolish demons that they
are, devote themselves to the culture of tobacco, inventing slavery and a thousand
other curses for that purpose.”56 The critical connection between wild berries and
free existence is even more explicit when Thoreau reminisces about “a sense of
freedom and spirit of adventure I used to take my way across the fields with my
pail [for gathering fruit].”57
For Thoreau, as for other makers of place-produced thought, local political
events were often translated into personal political viewpoints. In Thoreau’s case,
thinking produced with/in place furthered his political strategies of resistance.
Through the newfound freedom that he discovered by thinking with/in place,
Thoreau solidified a firm belief in active resistance against regulatory systems
that restricted individual personal freedoms – leading to ideas, writings, and
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actions espousing civil disobedience. For example, Thoreau recorded these
thoughts in his Journal less than a year into his stay at Walden: “In my short
experience of human life I have found that the outward obstacles which stood in
my way were not living men—but dead institutions.”58
Perhaps the most important thing that the Walden experiment taught
Thoreau was the preciousness and value of the individual being able to act and
think for his or herself. Near the end of Walden, as Thoreau ruminates on the
lessons learned through thinking with/in place, he urges others to seek out similar
experiences in which “new universal, and more liberal laws will begin to establish
themselves around and within.”59 In doing so, Thoreau recognizes that this may
need to be done in opposition to civil government. There is a direct link between
the place-produced thought with/in Walden and the political ideology of
resistance that Thoreau adamantly defended for the rest of his life. Indeed, this
connection is made even more matter-of-fact because Thoreau wrote his original
essay, “Resistance to Civil Government” during the Walden experiment after
spending the night in jail for not having paid his taxes.
Viewing Thoreau’s night in jail as part of his Walden experience is key to
recognizing the connection between his politics and place-produced thought. For
Thoreau, the night in jail served to further emphasize the freedom of living in the
woods, as well as the inhibitions that the state can impose upon those freedoms.
Upon emerging from prison Thoreau scanned the landscape and wrote about his
newfound consciousness – “I saw yet more distinctly the State in which I lived.”60
Prior to his inhabitation of Walden, Thoreau writes pejoratively of the state on
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several occasions. In “Herald to Freedom,” Thoreau describes the abolitionist
Nathaniel P. Rodgers “not as scientific explorer under government, but as a
Yankee sealer rather, who makes those unexplored continents his harbors in
which to refit for more adventurous cruises. He was a fund of news and freshness
in himself (my italics).”61 In another essay, “Wendell Phillips Before the Concord
Lyceum,” he writes of the “timidity and selfishness of the state.”62 In these
examples, Thoreau displays an inkling of the juxtaposition between individual
freedoms and the control of the state that would be fully realized with/in Walden.
While his sentiments preceding the Walden encounter demonstrate
Thoreau’s disdain for the state, I contend that it was not until the thinking
developed with/in Walden that Thoreau conceived of a particular type of living
and thinking as a form of resistance to the state. I argue that the experience of the
night in jail cannot stand alone as the source of this thinking because it was the
relation between imprisonment by the state and the freedom experienced at
Walden (epitomized by eating wild berries) that prompted Thoreau to set upon a
course of active political resistance. Living truthfully, freely, and near to the
“vitals of the globe” with/in place became more meaningful after the night in jail
because its political implications were magnified. Thoreau realized that his frugal
and simple existence was not acceptable according to the state. “If I will not
fight—if I will not pray—if I will not be taxed—if I will not bury the unsettled
prairie—my neighbor will still tolerate me and sometimes even sustains me—but
not the state.”63
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After the night in jail, Thoreau increasingly began to understand how the
entire Walden experiment could be considered a form of civil disobedience. In
many ways, Thoreau’s existence at Walden was antithetical to the program of the
state, and because of its independence from the state, it could be measured both as
a literal and a symbolic challenge to state control. As Thoreau recorded in his
Journal shortly after the night in prison: “When I have indulged a poets dream of
a terrestrial paradise I have not foreseen that any Cossack or Chipeway (sic)—
would disturb it—but some monster institution would swallow it— The only
highway man I ever met was the state itself.”64
The influence of place-produced thought on Thoreau’s politics is evident
when we compare Thoreau’s closing remarks in Walden (stated above), and the
beginning statements of the “Resistance” essay written while living at Walden: “It
is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The
only obligation which I have a right to assume, is to do at any time what I think
right.”65 For Thoreau, it was more important to do what one felt was right than
follow the law, meaning that each individual could establish his or her own laws.
Recall that Thoreau’s assertion is derived not only from the sense of freedom that
he found with/in Walden but also the interconnectivity that he found there. For
Thoreau, the government and its laws often promoted greed, personal gain and
selfishness. Therefore, to do what is right in spite of the law could be a means to
counteract self-interest and more consciously exist as part of a collective whole.
Thoreau did not pay his taxes as a form of protest against the actions of the
government because he realized that what happens “there” affects the “here.”
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Living in nature at Walden gave Thoreau a sense of being able to act as one
wished, rather than being forced into harmful and wasteful action. This sense of
freedom and personal responsibility toward the integrated whole became a
permanent mark not only on Thoreau’s political ideology, but on his being as
well.

TOPOPHILIA
One of the other significant aspects of Thoreau’s thought developed with/in
Walden was his ethos of place. “What I have observed of the pond,” writes
Thoreau “is no less true in ethics.”66 Thoreau is not projecting human morality
into nature here, but rather is constructing a metaphysical concept based upon
observation of the physical world through the eyes of a surveyor. Thoreau’s
physics to metaphysics surveyor-like analogy implies that just as one can obtain a
measure of water depth in a cove by studying the “outlines of its surface and the
character of its shores,”67 one can also “draw lines through the length and breadth
of the aggregate of a man’s particular daily behaviors and waves of life into his
coves and inlets, and where they intersect will be the height and depth of his
character.”68
This type of translation from physics to metaphysics was particularly
significant for Thoreau because it meant that each unique place was an
opportunity for learning – each distinctive place offered an equally exclusive
piece of knowledge. I argue that this realization was developed by thinking

88

with/in Walden, and was the fire of his passion as a zealous topophiliac.
Thoreau’s overall ethos of place – his ethical outlook developed from placeproduced thought – can be described as a profound care for place, or what Lucy
Lippard was later to refer to as a “place ethic.” Lippard defines this term as “a
respect for a place that is rooted more deeply than an aesthetic version of the
'tourist gaze' provided by imported artists whose real concerns lie elsewhere or
back in their studios.”69 In Thoreau’s case however, I would modify Lippard’s
definition to also include a respect rooted in the profound realization of the
agency of place.
Through his 26-month settlement with/in Walden, Thoreau appears to
have developed a spiritual bond with place. Through the development of placeproduced thought, Thoreau cultivated a greater interest in place and its
“connections, what surrounds it, what formed it, what happened there, what will
happen there.”70 This Transcendentalist connection to the vitality and
idiosyncrasies of place became an integral part of Thoreau’s future activities and
philosophy. Many of his projects that followed the Walden experiment were
framed around an engagement with, and love of, a specific place. Thoreau’s
books The Maine Woods and Cape Cod are clear examples of his continued
exploration of the intricacies of place. In addition, his “excursion” series,
including A Yankee in Canada and A Walk to Wachusett, also indicate his love of
place. In many ways Thoreau wanted to achieve what Estella Conwill Majozo
describes as “map[ping] the terrain of the outside world through confrontation
with the inner territory of the soul.”71
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Thoreau’s topophilia was due partly to his understanding of individual
places as distinct confluences of human and non-human traces functioning in
dialogue with one another, but also because of their special ability to produce
indigenous epistemologies. Because of Thoreau’s awareness of the power of
place, which became more substantial during the Walden experiment, he also
developed a strong conservation ethic. Thoreau demonstrates his conservationist
tendencies when he writes: “I should be glad if all the meadows on the earth were
left in a wild state.”72 As James McIntosh suggests, when “we read Walden
something similar happens to us. Our own feeling for nature deepens as we
register facts, savor descriptions, share Thoreau’s many perspectives, and
appreciate one valuable moment after another” – which are all facets of his placeproduced thought.73 Thoreau himself expresses a direct conservationist concern in
his chapter “The Ponds.” “Since I left those shores the woodchoppers have even
further laid them waste,” laments Thoreau, “and now for many a year there will
be no more rambling through the aisles of the wood.”74
Through his place-produced thought, Thoreau developed a greater
appreciation for “placeness.” This type of appreciation and care prompted
Thoreau to worry about Walden and other natural places losing their unique
character – whether through the capitalist pursuits of urban expansion and railway
construction or by the conquest, mapping, and taxonomy of space. Through his
development of a place ethic, Thoreau has become widely recognized as an
important figure in the American Conservationist movement. Organizations such
as the Walden Woods project and the Thoreau Institute have been formed to
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continue Thoreau’s “ethic of environmental stewardship and social
responsibility.”75
I contend that this ethic of respect and care for place had its greatest
development in the thinking produced with/in Walden, because it was through
that experience that Thoreau gained a greater insight into the agency of place.
There is a telling shift towards the particularities of place—of how a place pushes
back—and its role in the co-production of knowledge. Through his encounter with
Walden, Thoreau seems to recognize nature and place not just as a means to
experience a “sense of greater space and freedom,” but as an independent agent.76
In his Journal, Thoreau writes, “What is this pond a-doing? I must know a little
more.”77 The phrasing that Thoreau repeatedly uses to describe or discuss Walden
addresses the place as a personification or animation of Walden as its own entity
without becoming anthropomorphized. “Of all the characters I have known,”
writes Thoreau, “perhaps Walden wears best, and best preserves its purity. Many
men have been likened to it, but few deserve that honor.”78 It seems as Thoreau is
speaking to a dear old friend rather than a place when he looks into its “face” and
asks – “Walden, is it you?”79
The engagement with/in Walden in order to produce thought was deeply
moving for Thoreau and served to confirm the important role of place and nature
not only in a healthy, simple, and truthful human existence, but also in the vital
co-development of new thought. These feelings and ethos of place agency is
something that Thoreau continued to carry with him, as they became intimately
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inscribed into his production of thought, and even more so into his very mode of
being.

ONTOLOGICAL SHIFTS
By burrowing in and thinking with/in place, Thoreau altered not only his own
being, but also that of Walden. Both place and thinker became etched into the
other’s being, creating an ontological and epistemological bond. Thoreau’s placeproduced thought left a tenable mark on the place of the Walden experiment so
haunting that the ontology of Walden has undergone lasting modification. The
online Massachusetts Tourism Information Guide declares that because Thoreau
“immortalized the area in his book, one result has been that it is now a tourist
attraction.”80 During Thoreau’s lifetime, the pond did not receive many visitors.81
In the summer, small groups of swimmers would seek respite from the summer
heat. In the winter, the pond would be regularly harvested as a water source, as
blocks of ice were hauled back to Concord. Today, in contrast, Walden Pond is a
National Historic Landmark and a state reservation (Figs.2 and 3).
By 1935, some 485,000 people visited the Pond each year with Sunday
crowds often numbering 25,000.82 Today, one can still visit Walden Pond and
take an interpretive guided walk with a stop off at a replica of Thoreau’s cabin –
albeit one not located at the original site (Fig. 4). One can also visit the gift shop
or bookstore, though none of this will be possible until you pay your five-dollar
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Figure 2. Entrance sign for Walden Pond, March 2008
Image courtesy of Ron Cogswell

Figure 3. The park has a limit of 1000 visitors at a time, and
once that limit is reached (approx. 330 cars in the gated
parking lot), no more cars are allowed in.
Image courtesy of watrlily.blogspot.com.
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Figure 4. The replica of Thoreau’s cabin, near the entrance of Walden Pond
State Reservation. Image courtesy of Melissa Rae Cohen.

entry fee at the gates.83 Most notably, the ability to visit Walden is restricted and
controlled. The park has a “people capacity” of 1000 visitors and once this limit is
reached, the entrance to the park is closed.84 These changes to the place of the
Walden experiment are not detailed here as a reflection on the corruption of
commercialization or commodification that the place has witnessed, but rather as
a means to indicate the gravity of the alterations to the ontology of Walden.
The thought produced with/in Walden has transformed it for many into a
site of creative and spiritual inspiration. People still travel to Walden in search of
inspiration. The place of Walden has become a signifier for the thinking and
experience Thoreau once had there. Thoreau’s passing intimacy has left an
unretractable social mark that includes the cult of nature, in which nature is
endowed with a connection to “reality,” the transcendental, and the spiritual.
Walden’s ontology has also taken on socio-historical importance due to the
thinking that Thoreau produced there. The place is now often referred to as the
“birthplace of the conservation movement.”85 Today, the ontology of Walden is
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also explicitly discursive, full of signage and didactics, directing visitor’s views,
attention, and movement. Ironically, the sort of societal regulation that Thoreau
was hoping to escape now mediates the Walden landscape.
Just as the thinker transforms place and leaves marks upon it by
developing place-produced thought, the place also pushes back on the thinker,
modifying his or her perceptions, thoughts, and being. The agency and
subjectivity of both place and thinker are central in the development of placeproduced thought because thinking occurs through a dialogical negotiation that
reworks the nature of both their beings. This distinction is a significant criterion in
the development of place-produced thought because it entails a relationship that is
more think place than thinking place. Thoreau’s Walden experiment is an
important instance of place-produced thought because it demonstrates this
distinction in the co-production of thought between thinker and place. Thoreau’s
encounter with Walden included the recognition of the agency of place as an
active force, rather than relating to place as a utility. For Thoreau, Walden was far
more than a setting or backdrop to act out his own desires; Walden was a
sovereign entity that he became intimately immerged with/in.
Although Thoreau’s encounter with Walden constitutes a celebrated
instance of place-produced thought, it is also a fairly straightforward and widely
accepted example of a thinker cultivating a remarkable correspondence with
place. In the following chapters, other instance of place-produced thought will be
explored that are not as readily interpreted as an occasion in which thinking has
inextricably and intimately been made with/in place. Many of these complicate
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and challenge some of the notions of place-produced thought that we have
described and considered including the materiality of an encounter, definitions of
place, methods of engaging place, how place pushes back, the problematics of
exclusion and otherizing, and even the limitations and pernicious hazards of
creating place-produced thought.

96

2

BEING A LANDSCAPE: MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Not where man hides himself troglodyte-fashion in caves, eternally individual
and never finding humanity outside himself; nor where he moves nomadically
in great hordes, eternally plural and never finding humanity inside himself;
only where he dwells quietly in his own hut, communing with himself and, as
soon as he issues from it, with the whole race – only then will her [nature’s]
lovely bud unfold.
– Friedrich Schiller

Growing up in the shadowy fingers and rolling foothills of the eastern side of the
Rocky Mountains, in a family that prized outdoor activities, I quickly developed
an affection for, and fascination with, less urbanized spaces. I have memories of
sitting through lessons in middle school while I dreamt of being in a place in
nature outside of the city. One of my favorite daydream spots was a particular
parcel of pasture that my grandparents owned. It was a wide-open space on the
edge of the Red Deer River valley infested with prairie scrub and dotted with
evergreens. The only sounds one heard out there were like oatmeal – subtle and
robust.
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Much of my experience of this place centered around walking. From my
grandparents’ farmhouse, we would head east past the dusty corrals and the
sleeping farm machinery until the ocean of grass swallowed us up. The journey to
that field felt like a transformation as the physical signs of civilization dissolved
in my peripheral vision. The skin of urbanity was slowly sloughed off, layer by
layer, until I had a feeling that I was surrounded by nature. It was a place that
seemed both wild and lonely, where you could yell as loudly as you wanted and
no one would care – save for a small killdeer darting from her nest. Walking was
an integral part of the experience that provided a literal and metaphorical shift.
With these types of experiences and background in tow, whenever I encounter
nature writing that is excessively Romanticized, a piece of me fathoms the
enticement. I understand the allure; I understand the engrossing nostalgia, but I
also acknowledge that those places have meanings and mnemonic qualities that
have been imposed upon them.
It is hard to deny the attraction of the natural world – the magnetism of a
place that has undergone relatively limited transformation by a human hand, a
seduction of the sort that E.O. Wilson has termed biophilia. Kant expressed a sort
of biophilia in his belief that nature was the greatest source of beauty and of the
sublime, far exceeding anything created by the poet or artist. Specifically, Kant
claimed, “nature is thus sublime in those of its appearances… of which brings
with them the idea of its infinity… [and furthermore] the inadequacy of even the
greatest effort of our imagination.”1 According to Kant, in the sublime moment,
nature provides something exceeding the cognitive capabilities of the human
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mind. Perhaps this is the source of its appeal, as countless writers, poets, visual
artists, and musicians have maintained a special inclination toward the natural
world. Paul Cézanne, for example, was one of the first modern painters to break
from the Renaissance tradition of depicting illusionistic space and faithfully
imitating nature. But in rejecting the “faithful imitation of nature,” he by no
means rejected nature itself. Instead, he decreed “I must always come back to this:
painters must devote themselves entirely to the study of nature and try to produce
pictures which will be an education.”2 In his attempt to move aesthetics beyond
the quest for accurate mimesis of the natural world, Cezanne still looked to the
natural world for guidance. It was through the study of nature that he discovered a
new method of looking and of representation that enabled him to break from
traditions of mimetic rendering.
Martin Heidegger also felt the magnetism of a soft breeze, the charming
appeal of a serenading songbird, and the awesome power of a developing
windstorm on the horizon. For Heidegger, though, building a humble cabin in the
Black Forest served as far more than just a nature lover’s refuge or a place for a
weekend respite. Instead, it served as a counterpoint to his home and existence in
Freiburg. Indeed, I contend that this counterpointing was crucial in Heidegger’s
development of the concept of aletheia. As an unveiling, opening, and disclosure,
aletheia is used by Heidegger to describe how being is revealed in time. He
understood the process of aletheia as a continuous cycle of uncovering and
concealing of being, as a movement between states of being – the same sort of
flux Heidegger himself experienced in the passage from one of his dwellings to
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the other through the activity of walking. This chapter will focus on Heidegger’s
concept of aletheia – one small part of his contribution to philosophy, but one that
was crucial to his exegesis of being. I contend that the transition from city home
to mountain cabin, particularly through the activity of walking, provided
Heidegger with an experiential understanding of aletheia, one that clarified its
significance. The place of Heidegger’s thought has most often been posited as his
mountain cabin and while this place serves as a critical component, the complete
landscape of his thought actually encompassed the cabin, the city home, and the
transition between them.

DIE HÜTTE
The process of the cabin’s construction was conceived by Heidegger’s wife
Elfride, who drew an initial sketch based upon a cabin owned by the Women
Student Union of the Albert Ludwig University of Freiburg.3 The land where it
would be sited was purchased from a local farmer and the dwelling was
completed in 1922. During that summer, on August 9th, Heidegger and his family
moved in. The cabin lies approximately one kilometer (approximately one
thousand yards) from Todtnauberg, and is literally nestled in the hillside, with its
northerly side half buried in the valley wall. The position of the cabin
intentionally provides majestic views of the valley sprawled below; the tips of
Alps are visible in the expanse to the south.
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The cabin itself (Heidegger refers to it as die Hütte) was unassuming and
practical. The entire footprint measures a mere four hundred sixty square feet and
was divided into four equally sized rooms. In his text about the cabin,
Heidegger’s Hut, Adam Sharr provides a lush architectural reading of the
dwelling, including a description of its construction:
The hut is primarily a timber-framed structure. Details of its
construction suggest that it was made and assembled using hand
tools. Walls are framed using a series of vertical studs, braced with
horizontal members and filled with rubble. Some pockets in this
frame are fitted with window frames. Externally, walls are clad
with timber shingles in equal courses, lapped in two directions.
Internally, walls are lined with vertical planks, finished and treated,
of approximately equal size and spacing.4
Through this description and extant images of the cabin (Figs.1 & 2), we can
deduce that the cabin was plain, and free from superfluous luxury or
ornamentation. The interior was austere, minimally stocked and fairly empty –
even Heidegger’s study area was mostly free of books as he kept the bulk of his
library in Freiburg (Fig.3).
From 1923 until 1928 Heidegger was chair of philosophy at Marburg
University. Before this stint, however, and then again after Edmund Husserl’s
retirement in 1928, Heidegger taught at the Albert-Ludwig University of Freiburg,
which is only a short journey from the cabin. Thus, Heidegger was able to
frequent the cabin often – reading, writing, and thinking there for over fifty years.
This cabin was the site where he developed many of his lectures, essays, and
texts.
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Figure 1. Heidegger’s Hut, outside Todtnauberg, Germany.

Figure 2. Exterior of Heidegger’s Hut.
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Figure 3. Digne Meller-Marcovicz, Heidegger at his desk in the study of the cabin.
Image courtesy Digne Meller-Marcovicz.

Even though his wife oversaw the placement, orientation, and design of
the cabin, these specifications were strictly determined by Heidegger’s intentions
for the cabin. What he sought was a place of his own, a place where he could
locate and generate thoughts about being and existence. His hope was that
through reciprocal cultivation with the landscape, his thinking would become
ensconced in place, rooted in “its hourly changes, day and night, in the great
comings and goings of the seasons.”5 Heidegger’s desire to stand face to face with
the bare essence of existence resonates with Thoreau’s description of his aims for
the Walden experiment. “It would be some advantage to live a primitive and
frontier life…” declared Thoreau, “if only to learn what are the gross necessaries
of life.”6 The lack of modern amenities (electricity was not installed until nine
years after the original construction) gave Heidegger a feeling of closeness to the
elements. For both Thoreau and Heidegger, the quest to be near the essence of
nature and existence became tied to the aspiration of establishing a place to think
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on these concepts – a location to center and engender a new body of thought
gleaned through the relation with/in place.
As a place for the focus of thought, not just for reading and writing, the
cabin also served Heidegger as a place for being. This distinction was imperative
for Heidegger because within the development of his philosophy, activities such
as dwelling, building, being, and thinking are folded into one another. By
situating and focusing thought, Heidegger expected to garner new insights about
existence and the nature of being. The phrase “work-world,” especially in terms
of describing his cabin, had important implications for Heidegger. By conjoining
the two terms, he illustrated their status as mediating and co-creating one another.
Heidegger is stressing that the place of work (what we are calling the place of
thought) is inseparable from the work itself. Moreover, the phrase “work-world”
contains hyphenation, an important mode of combining terms that recurs
frequently in Heidegger’s lexicon. Placing a hyphen between two words seems
such a simple gesture. Yet, the amalgamation of two entities such as work and
world, notions that had traditionally been kept separate in metaphysics, proved to
be a profound strategy that permeated the reaches of Heidegger’s philosophy.7
Perhaps most famously, his notion of “da-sein” renders coming to being as
inseparable from the place in which it exists. Through situated thinking with/in
place, Heidegger’s affirmed his belief that being is intimately connected to place,
as expressed in his celebrated dictum on the nature of being: being-in-the-world.
This glimpse into Heidegger’s imbrication of place with being does not
afford the entire picture of the process by which he developed and delineated his
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think place. Some critical questions still to ask include: How did Heidegger
choose the place to locate and focus his thinking? What led him to this particular
spot as opposed to all others? The answer to these questions reveals that the
motivation and attraction towards the parcel of land and the cabin above
Todtnauberg were formed through a series of complex and interwoven factors.
The first of Heidegger’s considerations in locating a place for thought was
practicality. After constructing the hut, other than the five years spent teaching in
Marburg, Heidegger lived on his property in Freiburg until the time of his death in
1976. The close proximity of the cabin made it easily accessible and readily
available. Weather permitting, Heidegger often hiked the thirty-one kilometers
(approximately nineteen miles) from his home in Freiburg to the cabin. And yet,
despite this literal proximity, the cabin was remote enough to be removed from
town, surrounded by the natural world. The environment around the cabin was
just as important as the cabin itself because, as a passionate hiker, Heidegger
frequently explored the local topography through long walks. The forest’s
undulations and remoteness were deeply connected to the identity and constitution
of his work-world and place for thinking.
Heidegger’s own biography needs to be considered as an influence on the
decision about where to locate his place of thought. Born in the town of
Messkirch near the edge of the Black Forest, Heidegger’s affection for the
countryside of his youth persisted throughout his life. The site for the cabin above
Todtnauberg mirrors the landscape found in the Black Forest region near
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Messkirch and perhaps gave Heidegger a sense of his childhood, not only through
the flora and fauna, but also in the cultural habits and customs of its inhabitants.
Beyond any nostalgic childhood yearnings, the identity and concept of the
Black Forest peasant held even further significance for Heidegger. As a persona,
it was also closely connected to German Romanticism. Indeed, much of
Heidegger’s relationship with his locus of thought needs to be read through a
screen of early German Romantic philosophy. One aspect of this school that
seems especially germane for Heidegger is the notion “that ‘external’ nature is not
just a causally determined object and is part of ourselves as subjects in ways that
we cannot explain.”8
Another determining factor for Heidegger’s choice of the cabin as a think
place was an awareness of the long historical lineage of thinkers who had also
utilized huts for reflective thought in solitude. Heidegger was certainly aware of
“the Tübingen tower of Hölderlin, Goethe’s picturesque Gartenhaus in Weimar,
and Nietzsche’s convalescent home at Sils Maria in the Austrian Alps.”9 The
reclusive and ascetic lives of the pre-Socratic philosophers were also models that
Heidegger tried to emulate by dwelling/thinking at the cabin. By some accounts,
the creation of the cabin was a strategy for Heidegger to locate and insert his
philosophical legacy into the trajectory laid out by these other thinkers.10
Heidegger’s retreat to the cabin was not, however, an act of escapism or
isolationism. Often a harsh critic of escapism, Heidegger seemed, to the contrary,
interested in a form of Socratic solitude that sustained reflection and inquiry of
the sort he believed possible only in concert with the natural landscape.

106

Some of the other influences on Heidegger circulating throughout his
landscape of thought are illustrated in the images displayed in the cabin’s interior.
The absence of any other decoration calls particular attention to these few images
and their importance to Heidegger. They suggest that German Romanticism and
the ideology of the Black Forest peasant were significantly entwined with
Heidegger’s existence at the cabin. In the bedroom hung an image of a woman
wearing traditional Black Forest garb (Fig.4). In the dining area or Vorraum (front
area), hung a portrait of the German bucolic poet Johann Peter Hebel (Fig.5). In
1957, Heidegger wrote an essay entitled Hebel der Hausfreund (Hebel - Friend of
the House). In the study, where Heidegger did most of his writing, hung a portrait
of the Romantic/Idealist German philosopher Friedrich Schelling. Since so little

Figure 4. Digne Meller-Marcovicz, Heidegger in the bedroom of the cabin.
On the wall is an image of a woman wearing traditional Black Forest garb.
Image courtesy Digne Meller-Marcovicz.
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Figure 5. Digne Meller-Marcovicz, Heidegger seated in the dining area of the
cabin. On the wall to his right hangs a portrait of the poet Johann Peter Hebel.
Image courtesy Digne Meller-Marcovicz.

adornment is displayed in the cabin, we can surmise that the placement and
symbolism of the images was intentional and carefully considered. Therefore, we
can read these images as meaningful constituting forces permeating the place of
Heidegger’s situated thought.
The identity of the Black Forest was so thoroughly ingrained in his life
that Heidegger requested to be buried with branches from the forest.11 “This
philosophical work does not take its course like the aloof studies of some
eccentric,” asserts Heidegger, “it belongs right in the midst of the peasants’
work.”12 The hut was not just a location, but an embodiment of the entire world of
the Black Forest peasant – echoed in each piece of grass, each clapboard shingle,
each rustle of the trees, each movement of a writing hand, and in each thought.
These influences and forces, as part of the constitution of Heidegger’s think place,
gave him a “particular configuration of meaning,” in which he could begin to
develop thought.13

108

HEIDEGGER’S LANDSCAPE
The cabin was certainly esteemed by Heidegger, and he enjoyed staying there as
often as he could. Yet, the cabin itself was only a portion of his complete locus of
thought. What Heidegger developed as a think place or “work-world” was a
landscape – a system of places and the movement between them. That
Heidegger’s own concept of place is more akin to a landscape than to a discrete
locale is suggested by the fact that he often utilized the German word gegend to
communicate a specific notion of place.14 With no direct English translation, the
term sheds polymorphic synonyms, reading as everything from area or region, to
locality and neighborhood.
For example, in “Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking” from
1966, Heidegger uses the term as such: “The region gathers… each to each and
each to all into an abiding, while resting in itself.”15 The important distinction is
that the Heideggerian concept of place (gegend) comprises a “gathering of
elements [places] that are themselves mutually defined only through the way in
which they are gathered together.”16 This articulation of place, resembling the
multiplicity and variability of a landscape, should come as no surprise. Thinking
back to the concept of place already established here, place was established as a
“sequence of events and actions through space.” Therefore, place exists as a zone
of active exchange between the elliptical paths of its constituting forces. This
conception is quite consistent with Heidegger’s use of gegend.
Taking into account this conceptualization of place in locating and
delineating Heidegger’s landscape of thought, let us reconsider the role of the
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cabin. In contrast to the traditional reading of the cabin as the place of
Heidegger’s thought, the cabin needs to be read as one of many places gathered
together in the landscape of Heidegger’s thought. One of the other places that
should also be examined is Heidegger’s home in Freiburg. Planned and completed
in August of 1928, the Freiburg home was necessitated by Heidegger’s
replacement of Husserl as chair at the University in Freiburg.
The style of the home is in line with Heidegger’s fondness for traditional
Black Forest farmhouse architecture – a stone filled timber frame and walls
covered will timber shingles.17 With three stories of space available, Heidegger
chose to locate his study on the second floor, with a view of the backyard and the
silhouettes of the slanted hills beyond. The study was the largest room in the
house and contained a voluminous wooden desk. Heidegger’s writings and an
ample library were housed in floor-to-ceiling shelves (Fig.6). As a spatial strategy

Figure 6. Digne Meller-Marcovicz, Heidegger in his study at his Freiburg home.
Image courtesy Digne Meller-Marcovicz.
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for being closer to the essence of existence, the organization of the Freiburg study
seems a departure from the modesty of the cabin. In fact, the organization and
furnishing of the whole Freiburg domestic space appears more discursive –
conditioned by traditional cultural roles and by Heidegger’s position in society as
a leading figure at the University. Although the home tried to exude a traditional
Black Forest persona, “it is effectively a suburban house in Black Forest
clothing.”18 The Freiburg house was equipped with all of the comforts available
during the time of its construction – running water, working sanitation, and
electricity. While this place served as the center of Heidegger’s family life and his
academic appointment, he remained relatively silent in his writing concerning his
thoughts and feelings about it. Some of the impetus for this might be because the
house was much more of a shared family place, serving the various needs of many
other people and as a point of contact with children, students, friends, and
colleagues. The cabin, on the other hand, was very distinctly Heidegger’s place.
Throughout his life, Heidegger wrote about many of the locations that
inspired him, but the home in Freiburg remained relatively, and almost
purposefully, undisclosed.19 Heidegger preferred his existence at the cabin,
claiming that, “my work up there is interrupted for long stretches by conferences,
lecture trips, committee meetings and my teaching work down here in
Freiburg.”20 However, even though it was not preferred, the Freiburg home filled
an important role opposing the cabin. For Heidegger, it occupied one end of the
transitional spectrum of being, and was therefore integral to understanding being.

111

In this sense, Heidegger utilized a strategy of negation analogous to that
discussed in Thoreau’s Walden experiment. Within this strategy, the gathering of
elements helps to define each place – through what they negate just as much by
what they affirm. The actual landscape of Heidegger’s locus of thought should be
considered as the cabin, the Freiburg home, and the movement between them. Just
as Thoreau had hoped that his Walden experiment would be generative,
Heidegger expected that a think place, which included a contrast between country
and city, would proliferate new ideas about being and existence. As Sharr
suggests, “a continuous and complex tension [existed] between the provincial and
cosmopolitan throughout the philosopher’s mature life and work.”21 The transition
between these two places was key for Heidegger’s understanding of being as (in)
a continuous cycle of disclosure and concealment.

THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY
The distinction between country and city had a significant impact on Heidegger’s
life and the development of his place-produced thought. In many ways, Heidegger
essentialized each of their identities and associations to uphold a strict dichotomy.
For Heidegger, the country was a compendium of attributes associated with the
Black Forest peasant – simple, hard working, and connected to nature. The city on
the other hand, was filled with distraction and noise, chicanery and lip service – a
disengagement from being. Time and again, Heidegger makes these sentiments
clear, as when he asserted that: “The world of the city runs the risk of falling into
destructive error.”22 Similarly, in an address given in Heidegger’s hometown, at
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the celebration of the birthday of composer Conradin Kreutzer in 1955, he warns
that, “Many Germans have lost their homeland… They have been caught up in the
turmoil of the big cities, and have resettled in the wastelands of industrial
districts.”23
A similar differentiation between the country and city is explored by
Raymond Williams in The Country and the City, which examines changing
historical perceptions toward country and city. Williams begins his text with a
forthright statement: “‘Country’ and ‘city’ are very powerful words, and that is
not surprising when we remember how much they seem to stand for in the
experience of human communities.”24 As Williams makes clear, the power of the
two terms is the result of the accretion of centuries’-worth of rhetoric and
discourse. The central concern for Williams is that both country and city are
historical – transformed over time toward a multiplicity of ends. By parsing
through centuries of British literary examples, Williams demonstrates that the
relationship between country and city depends upon rhetorical contrast. For
example, the Charles Cotton poem, The Retirement, from 1676, yields this
description of the country:
Good God! How sweet things are here!
How beautiful the Fields appear!
How cleanly do we feed and lie!
Lord what good hours do we keep!
How quietly we sleep!
What peace! What unanimity!25
In clear contrast to this joyously empathic proclamation, other authors such as
George Crabbe have painted dour portraits of city life. In Book I of The Village
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from 1783, he writes “From Truth and Nature shall we widely stray, Where
Virgil, not where Fancy, leads the way?”26 And in Book II, “Yet here Disguise,
the city's vice, is seen, And Slander steals along and taints the Green.”27 Much of
this rhetoric utilizes an utopian/dystopian split that appeals to the morality of the
reader – the country is clean, quiet, and good – while the evil denizen of the city
slander and steal. A particularly important moment in the development of British
literature occurred in the 17th and 18th century, as the evocation of the rural shifted
from a tone of veneration to one of melancholic loss. The concern for the loss of
rural life in British Romanticism is paralleled in the German Romanticism that
influenced Heidegger.

THE CONCERN THAT QUESTIONS TECHNOLOGY
In many ways, a perception of the rural as melancholic is also apparent in
Heidegger’s writings. For Heidegger, an authentic form of existence was slowly
being eroded and taken over by urbanization, mechanization, and technology.
These concerns about technology are important when analyzing Heidegger’s
place of thought because they further the distinction between country and city.
The lack of amenities at the cabin, and his resistance to incorporating modern
conveniences, such as electricity, were rooted in the equation of technology with
the city, and by extension, with the concealment of being.
For Heidegger, the abstention from modern technology was not based
merely on personal phobias; rather, it had much more significance for existence
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and the nature of being. As an example, we can return to Heidegger’s words from
the “Memorial Address” for Kreutzer mentioned above:
those who have stayed on in their homeland... Hourly and daily
they are chained to radio and television. Week after week the
movies carry them off to uncommon, but often merely common,
realms of the imagination, and give the illusion of a world that is
no world (Heidegger’s italics).28
Several of Heidegger’s writings address the dangerous diversions of technology,
but no other speaks as directly about the nature of technology as does “The
Question Concerning Technology” from 1954. There, Heidegger posits a
discrepancy between the “challenging-forth” of technology and the “bringingforth” of poiesis. The bringing-forth of artwork is aligned with the revealing in
aletheia as a means to open the clearing of being. In contrast, the form of
revealing delivered by technology is described by Heidegger as such: “wherever
we try to point to modern technology as the revealing that challenges, the words
‘setting upon,’ ‘ordering,’ ‘standing-reserve,’ obtrude and accumulate in a dry,
monotonous, and therefore oppressive way.”29 The concern for Heidegger is that
technological pursuits distract us from Husserl’s imperative of getting to “things
themselves.” In Heidegger’s understanding, technology inhibits aletheia and the
disclosure of being.
Heidegger’s great concern about technology arises with his
acknowledgement of its powerful ability to cover over being, hiding the true
nature of being from us. In “Memorial Address,” for example, Heidegger warns
that there is a “process that gnaws at the very marrow of man today: man today is
in flight from thinking (Heidegger’s italics).”30 Heidegger goes on to explain that
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humanity has been losing the recognition and practice of meditative thinking to
the summons and fervor of scientific calculative thinking. Meditative thinking, for
Heidegger, is a means of being-in-the-world. It is to “dwell on what lies close and
meditate on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and
now; here, on this patch of home ground; now, in the present hour of history.”31

ALETHEIA
For Heidegger, meditative thinking is also aligned with aletheia. A term
conventionally thought to have been used by the Greeks to mean “truth,”
Heidegger reinterprets aletheia as the “unconcealment of being.” In his fresh
interpretation, the truth of being is more suggestive of revealing or uncovering.
For Heidegger, aletheia describes how being becomes unconcealed, and then soon
covered over by the familiar and mundane, by the everydayness of the world, only
to be revealed again in time as a new understanding of being. By traversing
between cabin and house, Heidegger was able to build an understanding of the
unveiling and concealment cycle of aletheia through the actual walk from
Freiburg to the mountain cabin (and back again). In fact, walking from one to the
other provided Heidegger with an experience of aletheia—an embodied metaphor.
Like the experience I often had walking out into my grandparent’s field, this hike
put Heidegger in a transitional state, one between concealment and disclosure,
during which he shed the distractions/concealments that threatened to cover over
the truth of being. This visceral understanding of aletheia, developed through
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thinking with/in place, was a vital portion of Heidegger’s place-produced thought
and one of the central concepts of his philosophy.
The connection of aletheia to walking is implicit in the language
Heidegger used to describe it. For example, he often describes aletheia in terms of
walking upon a wooded path. In the essay “The End of Philosophy and the Task
of Thinking,” he wrote that the “path to it [aletheia] is distinguished from the lane
along which the opinion of mortals wanders.”32 In Being and Time, Heidegger
reflects on a specific experience of the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides –
“The goddess of truth who leads Parmenides places him before two paths, that of
discovering and that of concealment… the path of discovering is gained only in…
distinguishing between them understandingly.”33 The metaphor of walking on a
path as a means to understand thinking and the disclosure of being also appears in
Heidegger’s collection of essays entitled Holzwege. The German word translates
as “wood paths” and the essays in this book derive from Heidegger’s experiences
walking in the woods around the cabin, and from walking in the landscape
between the cabin and Freiburg (Fig. 7). These essays further confirm
Heidegger’s connection of life experience with philosophical understanding.
For Heidegger, walking on a woodland path afforded a type of thinking
absent of teleological design. It was a method of revelation that was fully
engrossed in the world without predeterminations. Aletheia is also like a journey
on a path toward a clearing in which presence and being is revealed. And like the
references to a “path,” the metaphorical language of the “clearing” was likely also
a product of Heidegger’s walking activities. The clearing of being (die lichtung
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Figure 7. The landscape surrounding Heidegger’s cabin, seen here in the central cluster of trees.

des seins), used by Heidegger in his discussions of aletheia, and rendered in
colloquial German as (eine lichtung) has a connotation not so much of brushing
away, but rather of a forest clearing of the kind one might encounter walking on a
forest path. In “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” Heidegger
writes that the “forest clearing [Lichtung] is experienced in contrast to dense
forest… the free space thus originating is the clearing.”34 A few pages further
along in the same essay, Heidegger explains that “in that clearing rests possible
radiance [the other translation of Lichtung is light], that is, the possible presencing
of presence itself.”35
Heidegger’s own clearing of being was at the mountain cabin where “he
perceived greater authority in the bluntness of existence he found intensified by
mountain terrain.”36 In sharp contrast, the return to the city was equated with the
concealment of being, swarming as it was with technological distractions and
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meaningless, fleeting interactions. In Parmenides, Heidegger writes that
“concealing is for us displacing – a kind of ‘putting away’ or putting aside.”37
However, by remaining at either dwelling for too long, Heidegger felt displaced
from the clearing of being. Despite his preference for the cabin, he never
remained there for any great length of time. Therefore, he regularly found himself
between the two dwellings; the temporal state of being in each place was
disrupted by the transition back to its counter part allowing him to experience the
recurring dance of concealment and disclosure. Significantly, the concept of
aletheia implies just such an endless sojourn, one in which being never comes to
rest as either permanently concealed or unconcealed.
The notion of movement as integral to Heidegger’s understanding of
aletheia is connected to the importance both of this landscape and also of walking
to him. As previously mentioned, Heidegger was an avid hiker. Whenever
possible, he would walk from Freiburg to the cabin – no small feat considering
the mountainous terrain. He also enjoyed taking long walks while staying at the
cabin. For Heidegger however, walking was far more than a form of calisthenics;
walking was a lived experience of aletheia. Heidegger’s mentor, Husserl, shared a
similar belief in the conflation of walking with revelation. Husserl described
walking as a special activity that brings about both an inward and outward
attentiveness. Inwardly, walking “brings home to me that I am a total organism
[and not just a collection of parts],” wrote Husserl.38 Yet, it also reveals “beinghere is the absolute product of my body and my immediate place, the two together
in indissoluble composition.”39 Heidegger viewed walking in similar terms, not
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only as an experience of aletheia that is transitory and moves us closer to, or
farther from, the clearing of being, but also as an experience of interconnectivity
between place and being – of the basic state of da-sein, of being-in-the-world.
Husserl and Heidegger are hardly the only thinkers to connect walking
with the discovery of place and being. A large body of discourse has drawn
walking together with ontological understanding as a “state in which the mind, the
body, and the world are aligned, as though they were three characters finally in
conversations together.”40 Geoff Nicholson, author of The Lost Art of Walking:
The History, Science, and Literature of Pedestrianism, assertively claims – “Tell
me how you walk and I will tell you who you are.”41 Other writers identify
walking as a special type of human activity. Rebecca Solnit, for example, writes
“it is the movement as well as the sights going by that seems to make things
happen in the mind, and this is what makes walking ambiguous and endlessly
fertile.”42 Thoreau was also a champion of walking, dedicating an entire essay to
the emancipatory activity. For him, when done properly, walking allowed one to
be “absolutely free from all worldly engagements.”43 Both Thoreau and
Heidegger seem to agree on the efficacy of walking as a means to inhabit the
world, as a method for synchronizing being with place. The pace and physicality
of walking bring to attention otherwise unseen aspects of the landscape, including
subtle shifts in environmental minutia. Walking requires greater observation than
do other types of travel, as one literally negotiates the particulars of the terrain.
For Heidegger, the changing terrain compounded the experience of transformation
from one state of being to another. Beginning in an urban setting and then
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moving to a rural one, the elevation changes markedly over the 19-mile hike.
Beginning in Freiburg at around 900 feet, Heidegger would wind his way to the
cabin at an elevation of over 3700 feet. The paths that he used were often
unmarked and partially overgrown (Fig. 8). Along the walk, Heidegger would

Figure 8. A still from the German documentary film “Im Denken Unterwegs”
(On the Way of Thinking) produced in 1975 showing one of the paths that
Heidegger would have likely walked upon.

have been able to feel the landscape change, as the chill of the cool mountain air
settled into his bones. On the 25th anniversary of the construction of the cabin,
Heidegger wrote a poetic essay, called Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (The
Thinker as Poet) in which he describes parts of the landscape seen on the journey
between cabin and house. The landscape is fairly challenging and the demands of
the climb (either up or down) could be taxing. Yet, in the poem, Heidegger
describes the details of the landscape with a certain tenderness: “When in early
summer lonely narcissi bloom hidden in the meadow and the rock-rose gleams
under the maple” something amazing is revealed – “The splendor of the
simple.”44 As an activity that brings one closer to a place, walking is
transformative as it enables embodiment and reflection – leading to a different
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state of being. Heidegger’s walking changed the walker, through engagement,
movement, and thinking with/in place.
One renowned Heideggerian scholar contends that the apparent correlation
between physics and metaphysics “does not mean the real origin of such work
(philosophy) can be construed in terms purely of the particular details that make
up each philosopher’s life-situation.”45 Such an assertion might make us hesitate,
wonder whether too much importance is being placed upon walking and the
physical landscape in Heidegger’s understanding of aletheia. However, in
Heidegger’s case, it does seem tenable to translate his experience of place directly
into philosophical thought. Heidegger’s method of practicing philosophy was one
heeding Husserl’s call – “to the things themselves.”46 Heidegger was not a
proponent of speculative metaphysics; instead he was a firm believer in direct
experience. For example, in a lecture given early in his career, he stated that
practicing philosophy was a “way of behaving.”47 Therefore, I argue that the walk
from Freiburg to the cabin created the conditions for arriving at that the idea of
aletheia and as a means of practicing a rigorous investigation of its process.
Upon Heidegger’s death in 1976, the New York Times published an
obituary by Hannah Arendt, who wrote “Heidegger never thinks ‘about’
something; he thinks something.” For Heidegger, thinking something meant doing
something, which means that he lived and breathed aletheia in order to gain
knowledge of its origins and process. In this sense, the understanding of the
philosophical concept of aletheia was structured by the metaphor of walking
between two places of existence. In George Lakoff’s terms, the strategy of using
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walking to reveal the fundamental process of aletheia can be considered as an
“ontological metaphor.” In The Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Mark Johnson
describe how “our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies)
provide the basis for an extraordinarily wide variety of ontological metaphors.”48
It must be noted that while the emphasis on the experience of walking has been on
the physical, lived, and immediate, it is recognized that these experiences
transpire within a wider framework of contingent influences such as political,
cultural, and personal forces. For Heidegger, the mental and physical
transformations that occurred through walking became an ontological
transformation – comprised of the concealing and disclosure that characterizes
aletheia.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF RETREAT
Since his death, both the mountain cabin and the Freiburg home have remained in
the possession of Heidegger’s extended family; however, their respective
ontologies have been irrevocably transformed by the thought developed with/in
them. As noted earlier, place-produced thought leaves unretractable traces on the
being of place as well as that of thinker. Both experience an ontological
alteration. Just as place acts upon the thinker, and the thinker acts upon place, the
product of their co-dependence leaves the being of both parties indelibly
transfigured.
For many, the landscape of Heidegger’s thought remains a source of
distressing intrigue. Much of this is due to Heidegger’s well-documented
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involvement with the Nazi party. Many scholars have criticized the ideology of
Heideggerian thought for being rooted in the rhetoric of blut und boten, which
itself was embraced by the Nazi party. In many ways, this association has become
a permanent addendum to the being of the place.
Because a love of a particular place can engender that kind of regionalist
ideology, some believe that place-produced thought should necessarily be viewed
with a wary eye. It can prompt misguided thinking. And certainly, many scholars
would agree with Jeff Malpas when he claims that “there are elements of
Heidegger’s thought and action that those of us committed to a broadly liberal,
democratic form of life must find repugnant.”49
However, in the examination of aletheia, we have shown that as a
philosophical concept, it is not so much entrenched in the particulars of a specific
ethnogeography (Deutschland) as it is derived from the physical experience of
movement between places and states of being – movement unfolding over time. It
was Nietzsche who first revealed that universal truths were historical and
grounded in time, emerging as new truths each time they are uncovered. As a
passionate follower of Nietzsche, Heidegger also understood this as the essence of
being, revealed in the cycle of aletheia.50 Through movement in time – by
walking – the nature of being was exposed to Heidegger. Remaining stationary in
either Freiburg or the cabin would have resulted in the concealment of being, as
the ubiquity of the familiar would have drawn the clearing of being to a close.
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Whether one condemns the use of the cabin in Heidegger’s thought or
instead, chooses to celebrate it, there is little doubt of the pervasive influence of
Heideggerian thought on later 20th century thinkers – Levinas, Sartre, Derrida,
and Agamben are counted among them. The weight of this prominence has made
the landscape of Heidegger’s thought something of a tourist attraction, not unlike
Walden Pond. A walking tour of the landscape has been established and the
Todtnauer-Feriendland website describes the path as a “panorama circular route”
known as the Martin Heidegger Rundweg that takes one on a 4 mile hike from a
parking lot along a trail through the valley that passes above Heidegger’s cabin
before looping back around below the cabin (Figs. 9 and 10).51 The trail was
designed by the Heidegger family in 2002 and has five markers scattered along

Figure 9. Signpost for the Martin Heidegger
Rundweg.

Figure 10. Map of the Todtnauberg area with the
Martin Heidegger Rundweg displayed in red at
the top right corner.
Image courtesy of Tomas Nygren.

the way providing biographical information and direct quotations. The first of
these signs seems, at first glance, to read as a contrite vindication wer gross denkt,
muss gross irren (he who will think greatly, must err greatly). However, irren,
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which can also be translated as wander, rove or ramble. The phrase can therefore
be re-read with an emphasis on movement: “he who will think greatly, must
wander greatly.”
The establishment of Heidegger’s trail can be read as a product of the
ontological shift that occurred when thought and place were fused together. The
imminence of the traces from Heidegger’s thought is still negotiated by the family
today. “He is still living here, as far as I am concerned,” claims Heidegger’s son
Hermann.52 A sign near the cabin has been erected that reads – “The hut is still
owned by the Heidegger family and used privately by them. Visitors are not
permitted. Please respect the privacy of the family.”53 A similar note appears
within Sharr’s book asking for the privacy of the Freiburg home as well. That
such signs are necessary points to the continued interest people have in the locales
where Heidegger worked. The way that Heidegger’s landscape of thought is
encountered, perceived, and interpreted remains ineradicably mediated by the
thought produced there.
Complicated though Heidegger’s relationship with the cabin, the Freiburg
home, and the movement between them may have been, the main concern of this
chapter has been to argue the imbrication of this place with thought in
Heidegger’s philosophy. A body of knowledge was produced that was situated
and focused in a fusion of thinking, place, and action. Much of Heidegger’s
writing touches upon the relationship of physical engagement and metaphysical
erudition. For him, philosophy was a lived experience, one that directly taught the
philosopher about aletheia. The clearing of being emerged like an opening on one
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of the paths that Heidegger regularly traveled through his landscape of thought, as
he attempted to navigate between the two poles of his own existence.
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3

SITE UNSEEN: GORDON MATTA-CLARK

This world just drops a bunch of rules on top of you…
– Donald Draper, Madmen

Each space, each spatial interval, is a vector of constraints and a bearer of
norms and ‘values.’
– Henri Lefebvre

During his rather short lifetime, Gordon Matta-Clark (1943-1978) produced an
astonishingly diverse group of artistic projects. Experimenting with photography,
film, sculpture, performance, site-specificity, and installation, Matta-Clark’s
activities were consistent with the emphasis on fragmentations and accumulations
that characterized much of the artwork of the 1970s. While he voraciously
explored an assortment of approaches and media, Matta-Clark is perhaps best
known for his “cut” pieces—physical interventions into architectural spaces—
typified by his project Splitting from 1974. In Splitting, Matta-Clark made an
incision through the entire structure of a suburban New Jersey house—both
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literally and metaphorically cutting the place open to reveal and deconstruct its
spatial organization (Fig.1).

Figure 1. Matta-Clark, Splitting, 1974.
Image courtesy Barbican Art Gallery.

Some critics have interpreted Matta-Clark’s “cut” pieces negatively,
seeing them as a form of transgression that borders on violence; in fact, MattaClark received several angry letters about Splitting. One such letter from an
architect railed that Matta-Clark was “violating the sanctity and dignity of
abandoned buildings by interrupting their transition to ruin.”1 Another, from the
critic Maud Lauvin, claimed that Matta-Clark’s “wounding of a house can be seen
as a male violation of a domestic realm with female associations.”2 These
criticisms, like many of the others that Matta-Clark received, posit the
architectural space as sanctified and secure. Therefore, any transformation is cast
as degenerate. This is especially true of the domestic space used in Splitting, as
the home can be read as a symbolic “spatio-temporal retreat [and respite] from a
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public sphere.”3 This association of violence to Matta-Clark’s artwork is
reasonable. Many of his pieces required extreme physical exertion and labor
involving heavy tools. The incisions that he made into buildings have a strong
tactile and visceral quality, and the evidence of the cutting action, such as
splintered wood or frayed edges of plaster, feature prominently in the photo
documentation of many of his projects (Fig.2). However, a close and rigorous
reading of Matta-Clark’s “cuts” can reveal that they are not primarily (or even
predominantly) acts of mindless violence.

Figure 2. Matta-Clark, Conical Intersect, 1975.
Image courtesy David Zwirner Gallery.

As an artist whose development was rooted in the New York avant-garde
of the late ‘60s, Matta-Clark, along with many other artists, felt the urge to
critically question the established norms of their contemporary environments. I
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argue that his work—including the cuts—should be considered as strategies of
resistance to the spatial distribution of power and the discursive reorganization of
urban space. Moreover, it was through the development of place-produced
thought that Matta-Clark formulated this strategy of resistance, one that began to
emerge through his situated thinking with/in the odd shaped properties of his Fake
Estates project from 1973.
Matta-Clark’s aversion to the hegemonic tropes of Modernist architecture
and urban planning began during his studies at Cornell in the late ‘60s. Those
early intimations became more fully developed through Matta-Clark’s thinking
with/in place—grounded in the intimate encounter with place that he had as a
resident of NYC. There, Matta-Clark witnessed first-hand the means by which
Modernist architectural projects privileged simple, clean, and functional design
over anything else.4 Several iconic buildings displaying the aesthetic philosophy
of Modernist architecture began to dot the skyline of NYC in the 1950s, including
the Seagram building designed by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and the United
Nations Headquarters designed by Le Corbusier and Oscar Niemeyer. By
thinking with/in place, Matta-Clark enacted a form of political resistance that was
both a response to the “abstract tendencies of modern architecture… [and to] the
degeneracy these models wrought in the urban environment.”5 As Matta-Clark
witnessed the indifference or lack of concern for landscaping, aesthetics, and local
usage of space, a failure epitomized by Robert Moses’ newly constructed freeway
system, he was impelled to cultivate a politics of place that resisted such
impositions.
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For Matta-Clark, the obtrusive imposition of power upon the landscape
was disturbing because it radically altered the ontological value of different places
in one fell swoop. He deplored these state regulated spatializations of power and
knowledge and sought a means to subvert them. Recognizing that, I argue that the
Fake Estates project is not only Matta-Clark’s think place, producing critical
insights about the philosophy of “the cut” and the reiteration of power, but also a
political act, an attempt to subvert the dispersion of power that defined the form
and being of the lots that became part of Fake Estates. Before examining that
project and Matta-Clark’s later “cuts,” though, some historical and cultural
context regarding NYC of the late ‘60s and early ‘70s is in order. That context is
deeply connected to Matta-Clark’s entire artistic output.

GEOGRAPHIES OF RESISTANCE
Beginning in 1969, New York City experienced a particularly unfavorable eightyear period. Police corruption was rampant, and economic and political
turbulence cast a veil of distress over the spirit of most New Yorkers. As early as
1968, one of mayor John Lindsay’s commissioners even commented: “The city
has begun to die.”6 No single event can be pinpointed as the start of the downturn
for NYC. As is the case with many crises on this level, a convergence of political,
social, and economic problems yielded a general malaise. As Jefferson Cowie
explains, the melancholy stemmed from the realization that “the immense
institutional achievements of the previous generation… were both sources of
power as well as systems of constraint on the future fortunes of the American
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working class.”7 Polarizing war efforts in Vietnam, racial backlash, and an
economic downturn compounded this anxiety.
In addition to budgetary woes, the city also saw increases in “white flight”
and ghettoization. With the escalation of felonies in NYC throughout the ‘60s,
many members of the upper middle class migrated to the perceived safety of
suburbia. During the same period, public housing for low-income families in the
urban center proliferated. Public housing “by the sixties… became ethnicized as
‘ghettos,’” claims Lucy Lippard, “confining social evils (and resistance) in
specific places.8
Within this environment, the power relations related to place became
especially evident. “Isolation epitomizes the ghetto, which has become a fortress,”
contends Lucy Lippard, “a last bastion, to keep some people in and others out.”9
Many New Yorkers in the ‘70s felt frustration with their seeming inability to
affect change, with the crushing sense that there were stuck in place –
geographically, socially, and economically. The frustration and dissatisfaction are
implicit in Matta-Clark’s “cuts” into buildings. His “cuts” were conceptualized as
a form of resistance against these cultural conditions, against the use of place as
an instrument of power that delimits in these injurious ways. Matta-Clark
believed that his interventions into architectural spaces could engender important
perceptual shifts in the way that places were occupied and utilized.
As a graduate of Cornell’s architecture program, Matta-Clark was well
versed in the current tropes and theories circulating in the world of architecture.
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Rather than buying into the dominant Modernist ideology typified by Le
Corbusier however, Matta-Clark left Cornell feeling disturbed by the canons of
Modern architecture and the political control of urban landscapes. His desire to
question the formalism of Modern architecture and to create a sense of an
ambiguity regarding place were also reflective of shifting cultural sentiments.
Cowie describes this disposition as an “outward contest of power relations that
defined the first half of the seventies.”10
A widely recognized example of such contestation is proto-punk, which
blossomed at this same moment. Many proto-punk musicians effectively
expressed the vitriol and exasperation of the collective existential crisis in the
early ‘70s. One American proto-punk band, The Stooges, captured the converging
hopelessness and dissatisfaction that many felt, distilling it into short caustic
bursts of buzzing guitars and snarling lyrics. In songs such as Search and Destroy,
lead singer Iggy Pop desperately moans:
I am a world's forgotten boy
The one who searches and destroys
Honey gotta help me please
Somebody gotta save my soul.
While epitomizing the sense of frustration and angst in the early ‘70s, these lyrics
also appear as a fitting description for Matta-Clark’s own own artistic sensibility,
expressing as they do the marginalization that Matta-Clark identified with, as well
as the desire to question and destroy dominant forms of power.
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The ballooning agitation with the architectural old guard came to a head
for Matta-Clark in 1976, when he was invited to participate in an exhibition at the
Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies in NYC. Around 3 o’clock in the
morning on the day that the show was to open, Matta-Clark entered the space of
the exhibition while the installation was still in progress and gained permission
from the curator to shoot out some of the already cracked windows with a BB
gun. What ensued was both a performance and political statement. While blasting
out all of the windows on the floor of the exhibition, Matta-Clark delivered an
acerbic diatribe “against its esteemed members and the architectural ideologies
they supported.”11 As Matta-Clark later claimed, “These were my teachers. I hate
what they stand for.”12
While the physicality of this act is undeniable, I propose that it was most
significantly a type of conceptual violence, and an important point on the arc of
thought that characterized Matta-Clark’s developing practice. And while the
connection between the blasted windows and the later “cuts” is readily evident,
that arc did not begin with blasting out the windows. Rather, evidence of it can be
discerned as early as the Fake Estates project from 1973. From the thinking
cultivated with/in the Fake Estates project, Matta-Clark was able to re-affirm the
intimate linkage between place and identity, as well as appreciate how the “cut”
(in its various articulations) could act as a form of reinscription and reclamation –
as a means to play with the constitution of place and allow for it to be made
“anew.”
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FAKE ESTATES
The Reality Properties: Fake Estates project (commonly referred to as Fake
Estates) from 1973 was an important juncture in the development of MattaClark’s artistic theories and practice. Further, this project is a significant instance
of place-produced thought; Matta-Clark derived much of his mature theory and
practice from his thinking with/in the small urban properties of the Fake Estates
project. The development of Matta-Clark’s ideas about, and deployment of, “the
cut” as both a philosophical concept and a spatial strategy of resistance are
inextricably connected to the fusion of place and thought initially manifest in the
Fake Estates project.
The project began with Matta-Clark’s acquisition of five small parcels of
real estate from the city of New York. Gradually, he acquired a total of fourteen
parcels in Queens and a fifteenth on Staten Island (Fig. 3). The crucial question to
consider when analyzing the Fake Estates project is why Matta-Clark chose these
precise bits of the urban landscape.
In a broad context, their location within NYC was of utmost importance.
Beginning with re-zoning in the late ‘50s (the first major re-zoning since 1916),
the rapid rearrangement of the city continued through the early ‘60s. In the
escalating transformations of NYC by city planners, private redevelopments, and
the movement of people and capital, the city underwent a radical reorganization.
The primary player behind the restructuring was Robert Moses. And, perhaps not
surprisingly, “Moses’s vision derived from the popular urban design theory of the
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Figure 3. Aerial Map of Queens and Staten Island identifying the location of the 15 lots.
Image courtesy Cabinet Magazine – http://cabinetmagazine.org/events/oddlots.php
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day promoted by French architect Le Corbusier in his 1925 plan for “Voison for
Paris,” which included the ruthless demolition of the current urban landscape in
favor of a “revolutionary re-design of the city.”13 Beginning in the period
immediately following the war, Moses set about reconfiguring NYC to be more
automobile friendly, in part by integrating an expansive set of freeways that
connected Manhattan to Brooklyn, the Bronx, and Staten Island. The design of
many of these expressways prioritized efficient, accessible car travel over
landscaping, aesthetics, and local traditional usage of space.
In a sense, these freeways acted as cuts, restricting and redirecting
pedestrian and automotive traffic. They also cut off neighborhoods from places
that had contiguous exchanges before the road was created. The cutting up and
division of space transformed the identity and value of places by disrupting or
severing the types of relationships and exchanges that were possible with other
places in the landscape. As Roberta Brandes Gratz writes, Moses’s plans
effectively “erase[d] neighborhoods, undermine[d] social capital, and wipe[d] out
longstanding economic investment.”14
The creation of the freeway system also generated “gutterspaces,” parcels
of land that were deemed valueless. In fact, research suggests that the
gutterspaces purchased by Matta-Clark were likely created by Robert Moses’s
freeway infrastructure reorganization of the post-war period.15 Guy Debord
vilified the ability of urban expansion or reorganization to remove the uniqueness
and value from places when he wrote that “Urbanism is capitalism’s seizure of the
natural and human environment in which banalization dominates.”16 These
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banalized gutterspaces are often compact, and have unorthodox shapes and
dimensions (Fig.4). For instance, one of the Fake Estates properties measured
2.33’ by 355’ while another was 1.83’ by 1.11’. Matta-Clark acquired each these
properties for very little money (around $35.00 a piece) after the previous owners
had failed to pay taxes on them and they were seized by the city. Many of the
properties, including a 2.77’ by 100’ lot were surrounded by other properties or
fenced off, making them completely inaccessible (Fig. 5).
Matta-Clark was intensely aware of how the face of his home city was
altered by the freeway systems and re-zoning of the Moses administration. In an
undated note, Matta-Clark wrote that, “as a native New Yorker my sense of the
city as home runs deep, being full of an honest regard for its state and the quality
of life available there.”17 The relationship between quality of life and the
organization of space was a long-term concern for Matta-Clark. And while
observing the spatial reorganization of the city, Matta-Clark became increasingly
conscious that the reorganization of place was being undertaken as an instrument
of power. In an interview from 1976, Matta-Clark declared: “what I am reacting
to is the deformation of values (ethics) in the disguise of Modernity, Renewal,
Urban Planning, call it what you will.”18
During the early 1970s, Matta-Clark expanded his thinking regarding the
relationship of place and identity. Rather than only focusing on the people who
have been marginalized, Matta-Clark began to more directly examine how places
can exacerbate the disenfranchisement of certain groups. The concern for the
ways that a place may condition and contain its inhabitants also led Matta-
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Figure 4. Schematic drawings of all 15 properties.
Image courtesy Cabinet Magazine – http://cabinetmagazine.org/events/oddlots.php
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Figure 5. Lot 1 - Block 2497, lot 42 between 69th St. & 79th St. on 53rd Drive
Image courtesy Cabinet Magazine http://cabinetmagazine.org/issues/10/GMC_lotpages/lot1.html

Clark to consider how places themselves can be marginalized within a larger
spatial organizational system. For Matta-Clark, place and identity were so closely
related that their relationship was ontological. He realized that when the world of
an entity is altered, the being of that entity also undergoes a radical
transformation. In the case of the Fake Estates properties, Matta-Clark recognized
that the designation of the small parcels as “unusable” spaces had transformed
their very being. More importantly, Matta-Clark also recognized that this
determination of being was a product of the spatial reconfiguration of the city
through state intervention, and did not represent their entire measure of being.
Another crucial attribute of the places that Matta-Clark acquired for the
Fake Estates project was their inaccessibility and marginalization. For MattaClark, these places were victims of demarcation processes that served the
dominant power structure, as exercised through the state and the exchange of
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capital.19 Matta-Clark was drawn to the condition of these properties because
“their level of disinterested abandonment virtually removed the property from the
realm of society.”20 Matta-Clark was specifically drawn to exposing the multiple
systems of power responsible for this “virtual removal” – including Modernist
ideology, Moses’ freeway plan, rezoning laws, and the rule of the grid. In his text
from 1966, The Order of Things, Foucault discusses the relationship between
power and geography, asserting that the a priori episteme “in a given period,
delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, [and] defines the mode
of being of the objects that appear in that field.”21 This notion is applicable to the
episteme of the Moses regime responsible for the delineation of the Fake Estates
properties. Within this episteme, these spaces were seen as unusable and simply
byproducts of making “conscious determinations about the future of the city
through state intervention.”22
The properties of the Fake Estates lacked conventional value because they
could not be readily accessed or built upon. They deviated from the concept of
property in the episteme of NYC during the early ‘70s. Thus, they ceased to have
an understandable meaning or significance. In Non-Places: Introduction to an
Anthropology of Supermodernity, Marc Augé makes a distinction between a place
and a non-place: “if a place can be defined as relational, historical, and concerned
with identity, then a space which cannot be defined as relational, historical, and
concerned with identity will be a non-place.”23 Augé’s notion of non-places is
reflective of Foucault’s concept of the heterotopia, a counter-site: “real sites that
can be found within the culture [that] are simultaneously represented, contested,
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and inverted.”24 By thinking with/in the non-places of Fake Estates, Matta-Clark
transformed them into a new type of heterotopia. These spaces that had been
removed from an active role and function in society – having been virtually
erased by the spatial reorganization of the Moses urban planning strategies—were
remade.
That the properties were marginalized non-places was of great
significance to Matta-Clark.25 He had a longstanding interest in activities and
entities operating on the “edge of a system.”26 For example, he had a strong
passion for graffiti writing, which he regarded as the inscriptions of maligned
youths attempting to inject their voice into the facade of the city.27 This
fascination was manifested in the Photoglyphs and Graffiti Truck projects of
1973. Photoglyphs consisted of photomontaged graffiti from the outer boroughs
while Graffiti Truck invited locals to tag Matta-Clark’s truck with spray paint,
which he then cut into sections and sold as works of art. Both works were
displayed under the title Alternatives to Washington Square Art Show after his
joke application was rejected by the actual Washington Square Art Fair. Both
projects demonstrate Matta-Clark’s concern for empowering the marginalized and
for rejecting established conventions. Further suggestion of Matta-Clark’s affinity
for the maligned is evident in his own words: “I have based my outlook and my
work on those given things in the environment which have passed over into a
neglected state… just as much out of a very personal identification with the
cultural and social sense of being.”28 Not only did Matta-Clark identify himself
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with the properties of the Fake Estates project, he also viewed these places as
potential geographies of resistance.
The strategy of resistance that Matta-Clark developed by thinking with/in
place was not strictly opposed to power, but rather sought to expose the
distribution of power in place, including the limitations and conditions thrust upon
a place. This strategy of resistance derived by thinking with/in place should not be
overestimated, however, as Matta-Clark’s intention was not to emancipate or
grant the places agency. Rather, his strategy should be thought of more as akin to
play. By playing with place, Matta-Clark hoped to loosen the grips of the imposed
state authority used to designate the character and value of place. This
playfulness encouraged the possibility of yielding a “sense of ambiguity of a
structure, the ambiguity of a place.”29 As Matta-Clark added, this is “the quality I
am interested in generating.”30 At the heart of the Fake Estates project was a
desire to reveal the power relations that had shaped the identity of the properties
and show that places have a multiplicity of identities—not simply the one
prescribed by the state. By doing so, Matta-Clark was able to demonstrate that the
creation of these spaces was part of an ideological agenda that saw the urban
landscape as a “sprawling chaos that needed replacement with functions spatially
separated from each other, and therefore needed to be questioned and disrupted.31

THE CUTTING OF FAKE ESTATES
While Matta-Clark had begun exploring “the cut” several years before he created
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the Fake Estates project, those earlier efforts lack the conceptual rigor and focus
of his later ones. In many ways, the thinking with/in place that Matta-Clark
undertook in Fake Estates enabled him to evolve his understanding of the
possibilities of “the cut.” In 1971 while working in the basement of 112 Greene
Street in Soho, Matta-Clark generated his first project that included a laceration
into an architectural structure. Cherry Tree consisted of a hole cut into the floor of
the basement that was dug out to the depth of six feet. Within the hole, a cherry
tree was planted. After surviving only a few months, the vestiges of the tree were
buried in the hole. The entire cavity was then sealed off with concrete and lead
before being conceived as a new work with a new title – Time Well, also from
1971. The next year, Matta-Clark began a more ambitious exploration of the “cut”
in his series of projects collected under the shared title Bronx doors, Bronx
Floors, all of which were much more radical than any of Matta-Clark’s previous
endeavors. The Bronx doors, Bronx Floors pieces consisted of chunks of walls,
ceilings, and floors removed from old abandoned warehouses in the Bronx
(Fig.6). While the project predates Fake Estates by over a year, and seems to react
“precisely to the imposed… order” of the place, just as Fake Estates also does, it
was the fragments of the displacements – along with photo documentation – that
were displayed in the gallery as works of art.32 The focus of the cutting actions
were on the extraction of pieces of wall, ceiling, and floor, that then acted as
minimalistic sculptural forms aestheticized as art objects. Therefore, while the
Bronx doors, Bronx floors projects utilized cutting techniques, the “cut” was not
yet employed as a strategy of resistance because there was not a significant
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conceptual response to the site of their execution and extraction. The place of “the
cut” was not deliberately and carefully chosen for its particular perceptual and
political attributes. Rather, locales were chosen for more practical reasons: they
were easily accessible and could be modified without too much hassle or
restriction.
The next step in Matta-Clark’s evolution of “cuts” came early in 1973,
when he traveled to Milan, Italy. There, in an abandoned warehouse, Matta-

Figure 6. Matta-Clark, Bronx Floors: Threshole, 1972
Image courtesy The Estate of Gordon Matta-Clark and David Zwirner, New York.

Clark constructed Infraform, consisting of “a right-angled triangle [cut] through
the perpendicular intersection of two block walls.”33 In many ways, Infraform
seems to have been more a logistical experiment to further test the possibilities of
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building incisions – almost a form of practice for later projects. Only a few
photographs survive as documentation of this project. In both Bronx doors, Bronx
floors and Infraform, Matta-Clark does not seem to have achieved the same
deliberate thoughtfulness and situatedness of “the cut,” as will be evident in his
post-Fake Estates activities. That major transition in the nature of his “cuts”
began by developing thinking with/in the Fake Estates project, when Matta-Clark
actively situated his thinking within a particular place (the 15 lots). By cultivating
his thinking with/in place, he was able to engender a conceptualization of “the
cut” that was metaphorical, conceptual, and political rather than just literal.
The notion of “the cut” as a philosophical concept and strategy of
resistance realized through Fake Estates allowed Matta-Clark to move beyond
employing more literal cuts simply as physical acts. The broader understanding
of their significance also enabled him to refute the accusations that the strategy
was rooted in violence and hostility. By identifying and purchasing the lots of
Fake Estates, Matta-Clark created his first metaphorical cut – carving them from
the urban fabric and wresting them from their designation as gutterspaces. MattaClark was able to bring awareness to the sites that were previously unseen—
calling into question the identity and limitations foisted upon them. In a sense,
these sites, which were banal and invisible, were brought into a dialogical play of
spatial relations, imposition of power, agency of place, and identity.
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THE CUT: DISRUPTING POWER
Matta-Clark’s development of the “cut” as a philosophical concept and spatial
strategy of resistance and Michel Foucault’s writings of that era share a concern
for the distribution of power through spatial organization. In an interview from
1976, Foucault explains how the division of spaces, through both physical
demarcation and taxonomical language, can be spatial strategies for the dispersal
of power. “There is an administration of knowledge,” asserts Foucault, “a politics
of knowledge, relations of power which pass via knowledge and which, if one
tries to transcribe them, lead one to consider forms of domination designated by
such notions as field, region and territory.”34 Foucault here indicates that these
spatial concepts and the language used to articulate them are devices through
which the relations of power are transmitted. Foucault recognizes language as a
mechanism of power. Once an entity, such as a specific place, has a certain
taxonomical description, it is shaped and restricted by that linguistic term.
Classifying a site as a “gutterspace” or non-place simultaneously prescribes the
limits of knowledge about, and the potential of being for, such a place.
Foucault also addresses the possible subversion of the spatial dispersion of
power within a lecture entitled, Des Espace Autres (Of Other Spaces), in which he
discussed his notion of heterotopias as being “outside of all places, even though it
may be possible to indicate their location in reality.”35 Foucault expands upon the
idea of some places being “outside” of other places by introducing the concept of
heterotopias of deviation. These heterotopias are established when the exchanges
or power relations within a place deviate from those taking place in other cultural
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spaces. In many ways, the properties of Fake Estates fit this description of a
heterotopia because they were perceptually and even physically outside of the
entrenched norms of properties in NYC.
Heterotopias (such as the Fake Estates properties) fascinated Foucault
because they do not operate by the same rules as other cultural spaces. As
Foucault explains, heterotopias of deviation—prisons and hospitals for example—
are places where people are sent when their behavior strays from normalized and
established rules. This concept can be adapted to thinking about places
themselves. As in Fake Estates, the places exist “outside” of the regular practices
and codes of the contextual urban spatial organization.
The sites that were to become the Fake Estates properties lacked capitalist
value – they had relatively low exchange value or use value. Henri Lefebvre has
written about the values forced upon spaces by the hegemonic social and
economic class as a means to serve its own needs and maintain its dominant
position. While Lefebvre does not share Foucault’s emphasis on the role of
language in the production of a place, he does agree that “nowhere is the
confrontation between knowledge and power, between understanding and
violence, more direct than it is in connection with intact space and space broken
up.”36 When space is broken up, a dialectic emerges between the knowledge of or
within a space and the power exercised through demarcation. For Lefebvre, the
economic and social relations acting upon and within a place determines the
nature of the confrontation between knowledge and power. Robert Moses and his
urban planners were acutely aware of this relationship and of how it could be
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manipulated to control behavior. Moses’s view was that the state needed to
intervene in economic and social relations occurring in place and that the city
needed to be “reshaped, thinned out, [and] controlled” in order to do so.37
This understanding of the prescriptive control of space and its function in
the Moses regime brings us back to the development of the “cut” established
with/in the Fake Estates project. It also allows us to see how Matta-Clark
activated the Fake Estates as a different kind of heterotopias of deviation—one
that was much more political—as a means to subvert the state control of space. In
doing so, the “cut” became less as an act of violence and more a form of play. As
a form of play, the strategy of resistance developed by Matta-Clark with/in Fake
Estates is akin to what Judith Butler calls a “reiteration of power.”38 This
reiteration enables physical acts to become political actions, and through
repetition exposes the conditions of power responsible for the formation of a
subject/place. This reiterative process can become a strategy of resistance because
“the reiteration of power not only temporalizes the conditions of subordination
but shows these conditions to be, not static structures, but temporalized – active
and productive.”39 As a reiteration of power, which is also a means to play with
power, Matta-Clark’s “cuts” were able to reveal the contingent and fluctuating
conditions of power being imposed upon a place—by taking the means of control
and using it as a means to subvert that control. In Fake Estates, Matta-Clark calls
attention to, and plays with, the contingencies of the lot formations and their
designation as non-places/gutterspaces by the Moses planning projects. By
revealing these conditions, Matta-Clark was hopeful that the places could
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temporarily exceed the limitations of power to which they remained tethered—
that the places could push back against their forced designations.
By thinking with/in place Matta-Clark was able to arrive at a new
realization of the non-physical implications of “the cut.” Through the situated
nature of the Fake Estates project, Matta-Clark was able to respond to the
particular conditions of the place and conceive of the “cut” as a method to
question the decisions “regarding how we order and organize entities, subjects,
bodies [and places].”40 Through the crucial situatedness of thought, the Fake
Estates project enabled Matta-Clark to employ “the cut” in an entirely original
manner that did not require a physical incision, but created the potential to disrupt
the existing perceptions and supposed fixed identity of the properties.

CUTTING AND FOLDING – WHAT DOES PLACE WANT?
After Matta-Clark purchased the various lots that became the Fake Estates
project, he intended to display them as artworks, albeit indirectly, via written and
photographic documentation. Even though he was not able to assemble this
documentation himself before his death, Matta-Clark did leave some vague
instruction as to how they should be displayed as a complete work of art
including: “a) documentation of the land with dimensions and whatnot, b) an
overall photograph of the actual site, c) the collaged photo-strips, and d) the
property itself.”(Fig.7).41 Following these directions, Matta-Clark’s widow, Jane
Crawford, posthumously assembled these collages for a Matta-Clark retrospective
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exhibition held in Spain in 1992. Though these collages are the only remaining
material expression of the project, the lasting impression on the properties has
been far greater than their inclusion in a collage.

Figure 7. Matta-Clark, Reality Properties: Fake Estates, “Jamaica Curb,” Block 10142, Lot 15, 978
Collaged gelatin silver prints, deed, and three maps.
Image Courtesy The Estate of Gordon Matta-Clark and David Zwirner, New York.

Like Thoreau and Heidegger, Matta-Clark left unretractable marks that
have served to transform the ontology of his think place. And again like the
situations of Thoreau and Heidegger, the place pushed back, inscribing itself onto
the thought and being of Matta-Clark. As Donald Goddard writes in his review for
Cabinet magazine’s re-examination of Fake Estates in 2006: “There are so many
ways in which these parcels of space barely register, or are deliberately played
down, yet they are among the most evocative things Matta-Clark did as an artist
and person, partly because there is no separation between the two [Matta-Clark
and the Fake Estates properties]; one cannot be forgotten for the other.”42
As was also the case in the other instances of place-produced thought, the
place chosen for the development of thought does not passively receive the
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imposition of the thinker’s activity. The place has its own agency that resists,
filters, or supports the thinking produced with/in its locale. Consequently, the
place necessarily has to negotiate the new thinking into its ontological status
through what Gilles Deleuze refers to as “folding;” through “folding” an entity
incorporates new forces or influences to “produce new modalities of being.”43
This notion is consistent with the contingent constitution of place as a network of
relations ceaselessly morphing over time. It also resonates with our conception of
place explored in the introduction—a bio-socio-historical zone of active
exchange.
In considering how place pushes back against the thinker, a pertinent
question to ask might be: What does place want? Perhaps the properties of Fake
Estates did not want to be part of an artistic project. Perhaps they did not want to
be involved as a site and tool of resistance to the spatial distribution of power in
the urban landscape. Matta-Clark ruminates about whether this is the case, in an
entry in his notebook from 1970:
RATHER THAN FINDING MORE WAYS OF USING AND
EXPLOITING WHAT IS LEFT AND FORGOTTEN AND
REMAINS EMPTY, IT WOULD BE FAR MORE USEFUL TO
ALLOW THE DEAD ENDS THE THEIR PEACE AND
QUIET… THE FAILING OF THE ARCHITECTURAL STATE
SET MENTALITY IS ITS HOMOGENOUS ACCESSIBILITY
FOR TO ALL AND AN OPPRESSIVE MANIA FOR
INFLUENCING THE ENTIRE FABRIC DOWN TO THE IN
ALL OF ITS DETAILS OVER ALL ITS SURFACES…
THEREFORE ROOFTOPS, WATER FRONTS EMPTY LOTS,
WHATEVER KNOWN USABLE SURFACES THAT ARE
DOING ALL RIGHT ON THEIR OWN ARE TARGET FOR
‘IMPROVEMENT.’44
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Here, Matta-Clark seems to recognize the sovereignty of place, the sense that it
might be better to allow place to remain free from the inscriptions of the
“architectural state set mentality.” In these types of statements, Matta-Clark
implicitly acknowledges the subjectivity and agency of place.
While it is difficult to know precisely what the sites in Fake Estates
wanted, the properties did, in fact, revert to their condition prior to Matta-Clark’s
inclusion of them in the project, giving them—for a time—“their peace and
quiet.” Upon his death in 1978, his estate—including the fifteen properties—was
turned over to his wife Jane Crawford. Not knowing that taxes needed to be paid
on them, she disregarded the tax bills and by 1980 the properties were reclaimed
by the city. Each of the sites became, once again, a gutterspace.
This is how they remained until 2003 when the editors of Cabinet
magazine became curious as to what happened to the Fake Estates properties.
They discovered that four of the properties had since been sold, but the others
were still owned by the city. They attempted to acquire the properties as part of a
venture (including an initial essay, an exhibition, and publication) that revisited
the Fake Estates project. But the city, suspicious of the magazine’s motives,
refused to sell the properties. Eventually they agreed to temporarily license the
properties to the magazine. Cabinet then commissioned sixteen contemporary
artists to develop imaginary and actual projects that could be realized within one
of the remaining properties. These were eventually displayed in 2005 as an
exhibition and subsequent publication entitled Odd Lots: Revisiting Gordon
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Matta-Clark’s Fake Estates at the White Columns Gallery (formerly the 112
Greene Street art space) in New York City.
The revitalized interest in the place of Matta-Clark’s thought speaks to the
ontological shift that occurred through the production of situated thought.
Apparently, the sites did not entirely return to their status as gutterspaces.
Instead, some thirty years after the activation as a place for thinking, the interest
in the history, identity, and being of the places was reignited. Even though the
places may have resisted the influence of the thoughts situated within them, the
network of their relations had irrevocably come to include and incorporate (fold)
in the thought of Matta-Clark.
Still another closely related project, this one by architect Martin Hogue
called [Fake] Fake Estates: Reconsidering Gordon Matta-Clark’s Fake Estates,
was created in 2006. Hogue’s intent was to ask “some interesting questions: can
the site constitute an end product within architecture? Is a constructed site
somehow less than a building?”45 As Hogue states “the Fake Estates become both
a site to be critically reinvested as well as the starting point for other, more
speculative endeavors… This project seeks to visually articulate the agency of
maps through a consideration of those moments when conventions for
establishing the location and the precise boundaries of a site produce a conceptual
‘excess of surveying.’ Maps constitute not simply a way to locate parcels—in a
way, one might argue that the Fake Estates and the [Fake] Fake Estates are byproducts of mapping and surveying activities.”46 This is perhaps further evidence
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of the ontological transformation of the properties, as they now are utilized by the
likes of Hogue as the source of “speculative endeavors.”
I want to make a brief note here about the critical role of mapping and
surveying in Matta-Clark’s project as a means of making an breaking boundaries
as an important link to Thoreau’s place-produced thought. Both thinkers shared a
keen interest in thinking with/in place in order to reconfigure and reterritorialize
the borders of place in defiance of the existing physical, ideological, and political
delineations.
Since the Cabinet magazine project and Hogue’s [Fake] Fake Estates, the
properties themselves have for the most part faded from artistic and critical
consciousness.47 When asked in 2012, Jeffrey Kastner, senior editor for Cabinet
said “I’m afraid I don’t actually know if the city owns them or not.”48 Perhaps this
is evidence of the place pushing back? While these places will always retain the
unretractable marks of Matta-Clark’s thought and encounter, they are not
absolutely defined by this exchange, just as their label as “gutterspaces” did not
wholly determine them. These properties have pushed back by remaining in flux
and moving along the paths of their own divergent histories. Some of the
properties have been purchased by adjacent property owners and are now
amalgamated with neighboring properties, others have remained untouched, while
others have faded into the banalization of the urban landscape… and maybe they
want it that way. Perhaps they have found the “peace and quiet” that Matta-Clark
thought they should be allowed.
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Given the cultural climate of New York City in the early ‘70s, it is not
surprising that an analysis of Matta-Clark’s conceptual development would
demonstrate that he was compelled to resist the power relations that were present
in that environment. Many of his contemporaries in art, music, and literature also
found themselves concerned with the often frustrating and confusing cultural
impositions of the era. However, Matta-Clark’s reaction and strategy against these
conditions was wholly unique. Through the situatedness of his thinking he was
able to produce localized knowledge that enabled the conceptual shift of “the cut”
from the literal to the metaphorical.
My main contention here has been that this development was placeproduced, largely through his work on the Fake Estates project, and reflected the
interests of those sites, producing an understanding of “the cut” that was more
thoughtful and deliberate than Matta-Clark had been able to achieve in earlier
articulations. Most importantly, the Fake Estates project rescued Matta-Clark
theories and practice from a reading that suggests an insensitive macho artist,
recklessly and violently slashing into the spaces of our existence. Instead, we can
understand how Matta-Clark utilized the “cut” in an attentive and prudent manner,
“aimed at revealing and undermining power where it is most invisible and
insidious.”49 The logic of the “cut” became a response to the city being cut up
through state intervention. Matta-Clark’s response to the Robert Moses spatial
ideology was to make place “anew” and to recognize that “the city was not a
machine for living, as architect Le Corbusier had pronounced. Urban life [and
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places] could not be reduced to engineering models for traffic, housing,
entertainment” or gutterspace.50
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4

DESERT OF THE REAL: JEAN BAUDRILLARD

The picture [of the desert] implies many and sometimes contradictory features
beyond our first mental glimpse of it.
– Peter Wild, The Opal Desert

As an environment of extremes, the desert has often been viewed as a place that
can confuse, disorientate, or alter one’s perception of reality (maybe even open
the doors of perception—if you are more of a mystic). The impression of the
desert as a place of altered states stems, perhaps, from the seeming endlessness of
sky and land, or possibly from the almost frightening lack of verticality. In the
desert, the horizon—an important reference point for spatial orientation—can
seem as miniscule or imperceptible as a single pencil line traced across a blank
white page. The discombobulation and confusion of the senses felt in the desert is
often partly attributable to physiological effects. As the temperature does a mighty
pendulum swing from the crippling heat of the day to the snapping midnight chill,
the body can be exposed to hyper- and hypothermia within the very same day. In
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fact, the desert is renowned for its effects on the body. Many tales of traversing
the desert include descriptions of seeing mirages—ethereal images that arise out
of the sand right before a traveler’s eyes as apparition, trick of light, or actual
hallucination.
When the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard visited the deserts of the
American southwest in the early 1980s, he also had an experience that altered his
perceptions. Although Baudrillard does not note any specific physiological
trauma, such as hallucinations, he does describe a profound cognitive
metamorphosis that transpired in the desert. I argue that Baudrillard’s experience
in the desert should be considered as a notable instance of place-produced
thought, one in which the place pushed back against the pretensions of the
thinker. By thinking with/in the place of the desert, Baudrillard was able engender
a new strategy of thought and investigation, one based upon what I am calling
here “rapid excursive successions.” Through the development of place-produced
thought, Baudrillard was prompted to reconsider his theoretical commitment to
the idea that cultural signs are the primary means by which things have meaning.
The experience of the desert marked a turning point for Baudrillard—it became
his think place as it reshaped not only his style of writing, and strategy of
investigation, but also—and most consequentially—the development of his
thought.
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COMING TO AMERICA
The first of Baudrillard’s longer sojourns in the United States took place in 1975,
when he taught for a few months in both San Diego and Los Angeles. In the early
1980s, Baudrillard again spent time traveling through America, especially through
the desert regions of the southwest. “As soon as I had a free moment, I went off
into the desert,” writes Baudrillard, “For me that was the real scene.”1 These
wanderings were not meant as escapist vacations allowing Baudrillard to unwind.
Instead, they were motivated by the intention to gather evidence supporting his
pre-existing theoretical concepts about America. As the sociologist Arthur J.
Vidich claims, Baudrillard came to “America not to discover it, but to confirm his
already fixed images of it.”2 Most of Baudrillard’s “fixed images” were
influenced by his theory of simulacra, the notion that in contemporary culture,
signs were responsible for creating what Baudrillard called a “hyperreality.”
In his 1981 publication, Simulacra and Simulation, Baudrillard argued that
in the postmodern world, mass media technologies provide the individual with a
hyperreality that is more exciting and engaging than everyday life, and is
therefore preferable to everyday realities. Baudrillard stressed that hyperreality
informs and orders the thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors in the everyday life of
the individual. In large part, Baudrillard’s desire to travel America was because he
believed it was the epitome of the hyperreal, a place where simulated experiences
and images had supplanted reality and where any sort of clear differentiation
between the real and hyperreal had dissolved. In Simulacra and Simulation
Baudrillard uses cinema as an example of the hyperreal: “the relation that is being
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formed today between the cinema and the real is an inverse, negative relation: it
results from the loss of specificity of one and of the other.”3 According to
Baudrillard, cinema had become hyperreal because it was no longer presented as
imaginary or unreal. For Baudrillard, American culture, specifically, had similarly
abandoned a distinction between everyday realities and the cinematic. By coming
to America, Baudrillard wanted to see this for himself, to immerse himself in the
simulacra. “America is neither dream nor reality,” claims Baudrillard, “It is a
hyperreality.”4 Baudrillard had a definite agenda for his travels, namely the desire
to bask in what he believed to be the full realization of the hyperreal. Yet, within
his collection of observations about America and the desert, published in 1986 as
America, Baudrillard reveals still other motivations for his American journey.
The first of these motives was to get away from Europe—not simply
geographically but also psychically, emotionally, and philosophically. For
Baudrillard, the culture of Europe weighed heavily on the thoughts and behaviors
of its inhabitants. “The essential thing was to escape from Europe
metaphysically,” Baudrillard stated in a later interview with Philippe Petit, to be
“far from a nostalgic culture and history.”5 Baudrillard believed that America had
a novelty unencumbered by tradition, custom, and historical cultural rules. In
America, any concept could be manifested in (hyper) reality without having to
acknowledge, or adhere to, moral, aesthetic, or critical traditions. Another reason
Baudrillard wanted to travel to America was because of his fascination with the
desert. For Baudrillard, the desert was heterotopic—in the Foucauldian sense that
it was a place that deviated from the established norms of place—a place of
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otherworldly fantasy so unusual that a metaphysical awakening seemed likely to
occur there. Of course, much of Baudrillard’s perception of the desert as a place
of awakening or transformation actually relied on representations of it in popular
literature and cinema.
In fact, throughout the pages of America, Baudrillard makes several
references to the cultural influences shaping his perception of the desert, including
Reyner Banham’s book, Scenes from America Deserta, published in 1982. Within
Scenes, Banham details the visual splendor and intellectual insights that he
observed in his own travels through the American deserts. “Reyner Banham is
right [about the desert],” states Baudrillard, “you have to accept everything all at
once, an unchanging timelessness and the wildest instantaneity.”6 Thus, while
Baudrillard regards the west as “wild”—a place with a visible untamed
primitivism, he gets that idea (at least initially) not from direct experience of the
desert but through a written source.
Another key influence on Baudrillard’s perception of the American desert
was popular cinema, especially the iconic Westerns of John Ford. Films such as
Stagecoach (1939), My Darling Clementine (1946), and Rio Grande (1950) were
shot in the Monument Valley region along the Utah-Arizona border (Fig.1). The
Western themed films of Ford (seven in total) revitalized the genre of the
American Western film and supplied both Americans and Europeans with
defining images and ideas about the landscape of the American southwest.
Baudrillard mentions Ford in his writing and shares the director’s slightly neoromantic view of the desert. In Ford’s films, the desert is often depicted as a
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rugged and unforgiving stage for playing out human conflict. “Monument Valley
is the geology of the earth, the mausoleum of the Indians,” writes Baudrillard,
“and the camera of John Ford.”7

Figure 1. John Ford and John Wayne on location in Monument Valley shooting Stagecoach in 1939.
Image courtesy www.moviediva.com

Baudrillard not only indicates some of the well-defined ideas he held
about America and the desert even before crossing the Atlantic, he also reveals
some specific tasks he hoped to achieve during this American sojourn. “I went in
search of astral America,” he declares, “the America of desert speed, of motels
and mineral surfaces.”8 Baudrillard’s aspiration was that this search would yield a
“marvelously affectless succession of signs, images, ritual acts on the road,” that
is, that it would enable an experience of hyperreality.9 These were his
expectations—to escape Europe and to reaffirm his theories of simulacra and
hyperreality by relishing the artificial signs and simulations of America. At the
same time (and perhaps ironically), Baudrillard was also curious about having an
experience that would put him in contact with the real. Underlying Baudrillard’s
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travels in America was the question of whether there was any place left in which
the real and hyperreal could be differentiated from one another—this was a
crucial part of Baudrillard’s theory about the hyperreal—not that it was the
antithesis of the real, but that it subsumed the real. It seems that Baudrillard
believed the most likely possibility for temporarily disrupting the hyperreal was to
have a material experience in the desert – to find the desert of the real. Even
though Baudrillard bought into many of the tropes and mythologies about the
American west—such as Fordian and other Western films, Kerouacian travel
adventures, hippie counter culture, hot rod custom car culture, mysticism, the
frontier myth—he experienced much more than those myths would suggest.
Baudrillard’s notion of having a material/embodied experience in the
desert that was connected to the real was by no means a novel one. The ritual of
using the desert as a catalyst for personal metamorphosis through direct
engagement has a long history, dating back several thousands of years in the
Judeo-Christian mystical tradition. Many Native American cultures have also
included the desert as a vital component for the vision quest, a transformative
ritual in which one gains acumen about themselves and the world through
engagement with the energies of the landscape. In assorted media, the desert is
presented in similar ways—as a magical place where personal growth and
transcendental change can happen.
A good illustration of this perception is in one of Ford’s westerns, The
Man Who Shot Liberty Valence, from 1962. The narrative of the film unfolds with
James Stewart’s character (Ransom Stoddard) arriving in the small desert town of
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Shinbone, fresh from some law school out east, full of optimism, naiveté, and a
somewhat idealized notion of human relations. Stewart’s character goes through a
series of physical and emotional tribulations that test the limits of his beliefs and
values, transforming him into a wiser, seasoned, and more accomplished person.
At the end of the film, having survived the challenges of the desert town,
Stewart’s character emerges anew, completing his transformation from a wideeyed novice attorney to worldly-wise U.S. Senator. The film reiterates and
codifies the trope of the desert as a place of transformation that, by the 1960s, was
well ensconced in popular culture. “I think you can say that the real star of my
Westerns has always been the land,” claimed Ford.10
The Fordian depiction of the desert may have helped to fortify
Baudrillard’s expectation that a radical new type of experience could (perhaps
even would) occur there. This expectation, along with notions of shamanistic and
psychedelic transformation, was a large part of the attraction of the desert for
Baudrillard. By traveling to Disneyland, Las Vegas, and Times Square, he was
able to ratify his theories of simulation and the hyperreal. Since these places
conformed to his theory of the hyperreal, Baudrillard sought to discover a place
that might resist his theories. He wanted to know if there were any places left in
America that were not completely absorbed by the hyperreal. Baudrillard
wondered if there was anywhere in which one might experience the real.
While it is absolutely the case that Baudrillard’s motivation to experience
the desert was based upon pre-existing, media-driven perceptions, I argue that in
many ways, his desire to witness the real was nonetheless realized during his
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wanderings in the desert. Baudrillard did have a type of mystical episode there,
although it did not consist of discovering the essence of life or making a new age
spiritual connection with a Gaian force; it was more of an interruption of cultural
signs. What happened in the desert was that the place pushed back—it resisted the
meanings given through the cultural signs of hyperreality. As the raw selfevidence of the real was laid bare, Baudrillard noticed how what one can call the
“immanent signs of the real” created a disruption in the existing cultural signs and
altered their meaning. For Baudrillard, this meant that the landscape of the desert
contained bits of the real that could sometimes distinguish themselves from, and
modify, the signs of the hyperreal.
An important ancillary effect of this resignification was that the place also
fended off (some of) Baudrillard’s preconceptions about America, a consequence
that is discernible in the transformation of his attitude and beliefs about America.
Before arriving in America, Baudrillard’s judgment of American sociality was
quite dismal. He believed America to be an exemplar of the simulation order, in
which “real” interaction and meaning had been replaced in favor of the
“hyperreal.” In Simulations and Simulacra, Baudrillard writes that in America,
“people no longer look at each other, but there are institutes for that. They no
longer touch each other, but there is contactotherapy. They no longer walk, but
they go jogging, etc. Everywhere one recycles lost faculties, or lost bodies, or lost
sociality, or the lost taste for food.”11 In another paragraph from the same text,
Baudrillard again pejoratively describes America: “a mental implosion and
involution without precedent lies in wait for a system of this kind, whose visible
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signs would be those of this strange obesity, or the incredible coexistence of the
most bizarre theories and practices, which correspond to the improbable coalition
of luxury, heaven and money.”12 Baudrillard’s indictment against the mediafueled consumerism of America seems evident as he predicts an implosion of the
escalating American fixation on excess and artifice.
In many ways, Baudrillard’s early view of America is aligned with the
stereotypes of global mass media—that Americans are obese, overindulgent, and
vapid. The apparent inclusion of these sorts of stereotypes in Baudrillard’s writing
has caused many critics, including Vidich and Denis Dutton, to view America as
irresponsibly reductive and overly disparaging. However, upon a close reading of
America, one may discern a shift in Baudrillard’s perception of America.
Baudrillard relates how the experience of place pushed back against his
stereotypes, giving him a greater appreciation for American culture. Toward the
end of the text, Baudrillard extols the emancipatory dimension of American
thought: “We criticize Americans for not being able either to analyze or
conceptualize. But this is a wrong-headed critique. It is we who imagine that
everything culminates in transcendence… their perspective is the very opposite: it
is not conceptualizing reality, but realizing concepts and materializing ideas.”13
For Baudrillard, the emancipatory quality lies in the break that America has made
with old world European theory and history. As Baudrillard claims, Europe may
have “invented a certain kind of feudalism, aristocracy, bourgeoisie, ideology and
revolution” that are meaningful for Europeans, but they simply have no resonance
in America, and therefore have been cast aside.14
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Following his experience of thinking with/in the American desert,
Baudrillard grew into a proponent of America, acknowledging both his new
vision of American culture and also the radical shift in his philosophical strategy
and conceptual development that took place there. As the experience of the desert
translated into the writing that became the Cool Memories series, Baudrillard even
seemed to become a staunch defender of America. Near the end of the first Cool
Memories text he proclaims, “I shall never forgive anyone who passes a
condescending or contemptuous judgement on America.”15 Of course statements
like this one should be considered in the light of Baudrillard’s roguish personality,
as he himself at times seems to write of America with disdain. However, after
traveling through its landscapes, Baudrillard’s view of America does seem to have
morphed from one that sees a world “rotten with wealth, power,” into one that
celebrates speed, freedom, and jubilant possibility.16 “Lets us grant the country
the admiration it deserves,” states Baudrillard.17 Beyond a new affection for
American culture, the experience of the desert more importantly provided a
radical alteration to Baudrillard’s intellectual strategy and theoretical
development.

PHENOMENAL REDUCTION
Through situated thinking with/in the desert, Baudrillard was compelled to take
account of the immediacy of the landscape—the craggy physicality and stark
visuality of the desert. Of all the places that Baudrillard traveled as he crossed
America, the deserts of the southwest seemed to have most fully captured his

169

attention. A large majority of the pages in America include a discussion of the
desert, with the entire final section of the text collected under the heading “Desert
for Ever.” Baudrillard’s sustained interest in the desert seemingly emerged from
several interconnected and situated cognitive developments. I argue that each of
these developments came to Baudrillard while thinking with/in the desert and are
linked to the transference of physical experience to philosophical thought—
physics becoming metaphysics. Like Thoreau’s experience in the Walden
experiment, Baudrillard seems to have been engaged by, and infatuated with, the
physicality of the landscape.
By confronting the physical landscape of the desert, Baudrillard was led to
exclaim that “This is the only place where it is possible to relive, alongside the
physical spectrum of colors, the spectrum of the inhuman metamorphoses that
preceded us, our successive historical forms: the mineral, the organic, salt desert,
sand dunes, rock, ore, light, heat, everything the earth has been, all the inhuman
forms it has been through, gathered together in a single anthologizing vision.”18
The philosopher of hyperreality was presented with a place where the real
managed—even if ever so slightly—to make itself distinguishable from the
hyperreal, a place where cultural signs did not determine meaning without some
resistance. In a sense, the place shook Baudrillard, dislodging the assuredness and
totality of the logic of Simulacra and Simulation. It brought Baudrillard to the
immediacy of experiencing and thinking of the real through the phenomenal
encounter of the landscape. This was momentous in the development of
Baudrillard’s thought, as the poststructuralist philosopher found himself struck by
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the phenomenological force of the desert. For Baudrillard, the real of the desert
seemed to subvert some of the cultural signs and images that continuously
modified and mitigated its meaning. “The very idea,” writes Baudrillard, “of the
millions and hundreds of millions of years that were needed peacefully to ravage
the surface of the earth here is a perverse one, since it brings awareness of signs
originating, long before man appeared (My italics).”19 In the desert, Baudrillard
witnessed scenes with extraordinary visceral tangibility. The bodily experience
opened his awareness to the possibility that things and places can have meanings
beyond those supplied by cultural signs.
By thinking with/in place, Baudrillard was challenged to examine the
tactile and material surface of things. What emerged from this challenge was that
Baudrillard recognized and acknowledged distinctive types of signs: on the one
hand, those derived from the semiotics of culture, and on the other, those that
were immanent surface signs of the real landscape. What Baudrillard discovered
was that the sensory wonders of the surface signs often served to disrupt the
meanings transmitted by cultural signs. For Baudrillard, the desert seemed to have
a unique ability; “a geology, a sidereality, an inhuman facticity, an aridity that
drives out the artificial scruples of culture.”20 Baudrillard also recognized the
influence this disruptive capacity could have on the perception and constitution of
a place. I argue that the turn in Baudrillard’s experience can be referred as
“phenomenological.” However, it should not be misconstrued as an abandonment
of poststructuralist semiotics in favor of phenomenology. Baudrillard himself
makes this clear in response to a question by Philippe Petit, in which he is invited
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to clarify his position on the experience of the desert. He responded by saying that
he was “on the side of – not a phenomenological, but almost a phenomenal
reduction of things. You never, in fact, escape transcendence, any more than you
can escape discourse, but at a given point the lighting changes, and even ideas
pass by the landscape like unidentified objects.”21 In this statement we again find
an example of Baudrillard’s playful impishness. He refuses to concede to a
phenomenological experience in the desert, even though he says as much only a
few lines later in the same text: “Everything [in the desert] is restored to its raw
self-evidence.”22 Instead of offering a direct assertion, Baudrillard engages in
semantic word play, calling his desert experience a “phenomenal reduction.”
Despite recognizing the magnitude and power of immanent signs in the
desert, Baudrillard also retains the belief that cultural signs are still at least
partially responsible for framing his experience.23 The persistence of cultural
signs is evident in the literary and cinematic allusions that recur in Baudrillard’s
references to the desert. Throughout the pages of America, Baudrillard often
mentions the cinematic quality of the desert, as when he observed, “the desert you
pass through is like the set of a Western.”24 For Baudrillard, the identity of the
desert remained entangled with its representations in films, even to the extent that
the images from the screen often take “precedence over reality.”25 “It is useless,”
contends Baudrillard, “to seek to strip the desert of its cinematic aspects in order
to restore its original essence; those features are thoroughly superimposed upon it
and will not go away (Fig.3).”26 However, as Baudrillard also discovered, the real
of the desert had the ability, every so often, to stand out from the signs of the
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Figure 3. Chris Richardson, Frontispiece. This image appears at the beginning of
the section entitled “Vanishing Point” in the new edition of America published in 2010.
Image courtesy of http://www.chris-richardson.net
This image shows the integration of the cinematic in the desert by depicting a cowboy watching a
movie on a large screen in the landscape of the desert. The mural itself also functions as a
cinematic screen, painted in a trompe l'oeil manner on the side of a building facing a parking lot.
There is a blurring of distinction between the “real” cars parked in front of the wall and the
“virtual” landscape unfolding in front of them.

hyperreal in film and mass media. For Baudrillard, the subversive encounter with
the real was a “way of sweeping away all the cultural superstructures.”27 Yet
Baudrillard also saw how the appearance and subversion of the real was fleeting,
as it was quickly subsumed by the hyperreal. The “raw self-evidence” of the real
could briefly meddle with the hyperreal, and then just as quickly be gone in the
flood of unrelenting cinematic effects. That brief moment was enough, however,
to enable the real of immanent signs to create a possible fissure in, or parallax to,
the stream of signs in the hyperreal.
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NEW SEMIOTIC ORDER
Perhaps as important as the geography of the desert was the experience of
physically moving through the desert. Motion was crucial for Baudrillard because
it helped to illustrate that the relationship between place, immanent signs of the
real, and the cultural signs of the hyperreal is not static; rather, it is—at least
sometimes—in flux and negotiation. Prior to his desert excursions, Baudrillard’s
theories had drawn heavily on semiotics as articulated by Saussure via Barthes.
Baudrillard’s analysis of the sign, however, broke way from Barthes’ because he
posited that both the structure of the sign and its operation had progressed through
history beyond what Barthes had described. While Barthes had explored how the
relationship of the signifier to the signified was transformed within a particular
context to create a mythology, Baudrillard believed that at the end of the 20th
century, in a world governed by mass media, that signs had evolved to the point
where, as part of the hyperreal, they were cut off from their referents. Baudrillard
deemed these signs “floating signifiers” because they did not have a “referent or
ground in any ‘reality’ except their own.”28
For Baudrillard, the experience of the desert triggered a reconsideration of
his theories about “floating signifiers” and the hyperreal. The revelation of the
real, through situated thought, presented Baudrillard with signifiers that were not
completely free floating. Instead, the immanent signs of the real in the desert were
connected to the physical phenomena of the desert landscape. This challenged
Baudrillard’s existing theory in which there was no longer any differentiation
between the real and the hyperreal. It was not that all cultural signs had been
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erased in the desert, but rather, for Baudrillard, their meaning could sometimes be
subverted by the physical rawness of the primal landscape. Baudrillard refers to
this as “desertification,” in the sense that the meaning of a sign in the hyperreal
could be altered or drained to a “zero sum of meaning.” As he describes, the
awesome corporeality of the desert topography has a way of interrupting cultural
signs:
The natural deserts… create a vision expurgated of all the rest:
cities, relationships, events, media. They induce in me an exalting
vision of the desertification of signs and men. They form the
mental frontier where the projects of civilization run into the
ground. They are outside the sphere and circumference of desire.
We should always appeal to the deserts against the excess of
signification, of intention and pretention in culture.29
In the desert, Baudrillard experienced a “phenomenal reduction,” in which some
cultural signs, and “even your sense of belonging to the human race are all
numbed by the fact of having before you the pure, unadulterated sign of 180
million years.”30
I suggest that Baudrillard’s experience of phenomenal reduction in the
desert led him to recognize a new semiotic order. This new semiotic order
allowed him to accommodate what seemed to be anomalies to his existing
theories: the immanent signs of the real in the desert. Baudrillard’s own
language makes clear what those are, when he refers to having before you the
“pure, unadulterated sign of 180 million years”31 or “signs originating, long
before man appeared.”32 Through phrases such as these, the reader is again
confronted with the notoriously slippery and puckish side of Baudrillard. On the
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one hand, Baudrillard acknowledges that the signs of the hyperreal do not wholly
define some aspects of the desert, but on the other hand he still uses the language
of semiology to describe them. While it seems like these “signs originating, long
before man appeared” have subverted the Baudrillard’s theory of sign structure,
he does not relinquish the logic of the sign, and instead incorporates a reading of
the physical rawness of the primal landscape into his theoretical system by
creating a new semiotic order.
Throughout the pages of America, Baudrillard uses the word “sign” in
several different ways, marking a change from one based on the hyperreal to one
that is employed loosely (and playfully) enough to encompass a variety of signs,
including immanent signs of the real. For example when Baudrillard writes “I
looked for it [America] in the speed of the screenplay… in the marvelously
affectless succession of signs”33 or “the desert you pass through is like the set of a
western, the city a screen of signs and formulas,”34 he is using the term “sign” to
indicate a cultural sign. For Baudrillard, a cultural sign of hyperreality is akin to
his description given in Simulacra and Simulation—“It has no relation to reality
whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum.”35 In contradistinction, Baudrillard
also uses “sign” in other passages of the text to denote another type of sign. For
instance, Baudrillard writes about “signs with no hierarchical ordering… [and] the
power of pure open space, the kind you find in the deserts. The power of the
desert form: it is the erasure of traces in the desert, of the signified of signs in the
cities, of any psychology in bodies. An animal and metaphysical fascination – the
direct fascination of space, the immanent fascination of dryness and sterility.”36
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Another quote, already mentioned above, also indicates a type of sign distinct
from cultural signs: “The natural deserts tell me what I need to know about the
deserts of the sign… we should always appeal to the deserts against the excess of
signification, of intention and pretention in culture.”37 In the first examples the
term “sign” seems to refer to signs of the hyperreal and in the latter, to immanent
or surface signs of the real. By employing the term “sign” for disparate usages,
Baudrillard seems to want to have it both ways—signs with signifiers that are free
floating and others in which the signifiers are grounded by a real topographical
referent—further evidence of his elusive and mischievous disposition. As Mike
Gane writes, “Baudrillard does occasionally appeal to a radical empiricism of
experience against ridiculously out of date concepts. Experience is never purely
empirical in Baudrillard.”38 Gane is referring to the same sort of description for
Baudrillard’s desert experience as mentioned above—Baudrillard wants to have it
both ways. He is not willing to abandon his commitment to semiotics and
simulacrum, yet, he also realizes that there is a “phenomenal reduction” in the
desert—“the mineral substance of light, the corpuscular fluid of the colours, the
total extraversion of one’s body in the heat”—that exceeds the reaches of the
hyperreal.39
Baudrillard’s openness to modifying his own theory of signs should come
as no surprise. As already mentioned, the notion that the structure of signs could
be altered over time was an inherent part of Baudrillard’s overall argument for the
progression of the sign. As part of this progression, Baudrillard conceived of the
3rd order of simulation, which moved beyond Barthes semiology to the hyperreal.
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The notion of a shifting, historical, or culturally specific structure of the sign was
central to Baudrillard’s theory of sign structure. This brings us back to the new
semiotic order necessitated by the experience of the real in the desert. Through
glimpses of the real in the desert, Baudrillard seemingly (temporarily) adjusted his
theory to account for the presence of real phenomena in the physical landscape.
As early on as the third page of America, Baudrillard presents the apparent
adjustment in his implementation of the term “sign” as part of a new semiotic
order, both informing and confounding his reader, like a trickster poet: “The very
idea of the millions and hundreds of million years that were needed to peacefully
ravage the surface of the earth here is a perverse one, since it brings with it an
awareness of signs originating, long before man appeared… And yet they are
signs. For the desert only appears uncultivated (Baudrillard’s italics).”40 Later in
the text, Baudrillard describes the relationship between the cultural and immanent
in even more direct terms. “It would be wrong headed to counterpose Death
Valley, the sublime natural phenomenon, to Las Vegas, the abject cultural
phenomenon. For the one is the hidden face of the other and they mirror each
other across the desert.”41 In both of these quotations, Baudrillard seems to be
wrestling with the relationship of the real and the hyperreal – of the immanent and
the cultural. In his experience, the desert actually allowed for a distinction
between the real and hyperreal, rather than dissolving their differences, as the
hypereal so deftly accomplishes. Therefore, Baudrillard needed a means of
accounting for the experience of the real in the desert. His solution to the
seemingly contradictory handling of “sign” is the development of a new semiotic

178

order in which multiple types of signs co-mingle. As Richard G. Smith writes,
Baudrillard’s strategy “is to deconstruct the apparently impervious surface, or
continuum, of the code, or the Semiotic.”42 In Baudrillard’s hands, the place of
the desert is shown to be a confluence of immanent signs of the real and cultural
signs of the hyperreal within a zone of active exchange.
While I argue that the physical rawness of the desert prompted Baudrillard
to reconsider his theory of the structure of the sign in the hyperreal, I also contend
that this adjustment was limited and contextual. It does not seem that the
recognition of the real in the desert motivated an overhaul of his theory in terms
of the operation or reach of the hyperreal. Instead, Baudrillard seemed to regard
the desert as the last bastion of the real, the only remaining place where the real
was discernable. Moreover, he seemed to suggest that as the reach of the
hyperreal continued to extend, even these places would soon vanish. “Everything
has now turned into culture and it has even become very difficult to go beyond
one's own culture since one finds it everywhere,” claimed Baudrillard in an
interview from 1995. “There will even be a moment when one will not be able
find any deserts. Deserts are a metaphor for disappearing objects, evanescence
beyond culture. Now they have become increasingly culturalized they are
virtually impossible to find.”43

RAPID EXCURSIVE SUCCESSIONS
While the experience of the real in the desert constituted an important part of
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Baudrillard’s place-produced thought, it does not represent the situated thinking
that would have the greatest impact on the development of his subsequent
theories. The portion of Baudrillard’s desert experience that would have the
greatest legacy on his thinking is what I think of as “rapid excursive successions.”
Baudrillard provides a sense of the experience of these “rapid excursive
successions” in the desert when he writes that: “The absence of discrimination
between positive and negative effects, the telescoping of races, technologies, and
models, the waltz of simulacra and images here is such that, as with dream
elements, you must accept the way they follow one another, even if it seems
unintelligible.”44 What Baudrillard observed was how a certain movement and
speed through the expansive landscape of the desert allowed one to fly from one
image to the next, or from one thought to the next, without a logical correlation
between successive images or thoughts. Baudrillard called this emancipatory
thought process a “spatial, mobile conception – freed from historical centrality.”45
The discursive practice that highlights such a type of thinking for Baudrillard is
being termed here “rapid excursive successions.”
The locomotive relationship that Baudrillard had with the desert, a
relationship that was central to his experience, can be characterized by one word:
speed. As we have examined in other instances of place-produced thought, the
method and rate of locomotion through place informs the experiences and thought
produced with/in place. For Thoreau and Heidegger, the slow and contemplative
nature of walking played a significant role in their projects. Baudrillard’s
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movement through place by car was much faster than a walking saunter, and
therefore, provided him with a different type of encounter with place.
In his descriptions of the desert, Baudrillard regularly celebrates the
mobility and freedom of driving through the desert. “Driving is a spectacular form
of amnesia,” writes Baudrillard, “Everything to be discovered. Everything to be
obliterated.”46 The ecstasy of this celebration is reminiscent of Filippo Marinetti’s
connection between speed, mobility, and freedom in the Futurist Manifesto. “Up
to now literature has exalted a pensive immobility, ecstasy and sleep,” denounces
Marinetti, “we intend to exalt aggressive action, a feverish insomnia, the racer’s
stride, the mortal leap.” Just as the Futurists did, Baudrillard celebrates the
liberation he associates with the speed of the automobile both by physically
allowing him to have great mobility, but also by conceptually facilitating
detachment from a traditional theoretical base. In his descriptions of American
cars, such as the one he used to traverse the desert, Baudrillard makes a particular
note of the ability they “have of leaping into action, of taking off so smoothly, by
virtue of their automatic transmission and power steering. Pulling away
effortlessly… riding along as if you were on a cushion of air, leaving behind the
old obsession with what is coming up ahead, or what is overtaking you.”47
The duration and pace of Baudrillard’s desert excursions—a small number
of fast-paced campaigns—afforded him insight into the conceptual possibilities of
rapid succession. Baudrillard’s experience was defined by the freedom of the
open throttle of the automobile on the spacious roads of the desert. This particular
type of movement was essential to Baudrillard’s experience of rapid succession
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because it enabled him to witness the desert landscape as an unchanging expanse,
which hardly changes mile after mile, which is then shattered by passing through
a settlement, roadside attraction, or unique landscape formation. The flashing of
successive images, as one passes through a town, is even more punctuated by the
perpetual views of the desert vastness preceding and following these encounters.
This flurry of visual information does not encourage lingering on any one
impression for very long.48 The type and method of Baudrillard’s movement in
the desert is significant because it served to alter his perception of time and space.
Between his method of travel and the desert environment itself, Baudrillard
quickly discovered that his typical perception of time and space was almost
useless. The dizzying expansion and compression of time and space in the
desert—for example, when something on the horizon looks fairly close, but after
hours of driving, still appears to be the same distance away—forced Baudrillard
to observe things differently, latching onto the visual fragments as they flew past.
The ability of the desert to play with perceptions is well documented. As
the desert writer William L. Fox notes, the desert has a tremendous power of
“absconding our expectations of how to measure time and space.”49 Baudrillard
also comments on this type of perceptual shift: “when you emerge from the
desert, your eyes go on trying to create emptiness all around; in every inhabited
area, every landscape they see desert beneath, like a watermark. It takes a long
time to get back to a normal vision of things.”50 The way that Baudrillard moved
through the desert, with the speed of the open road, assisted in this perceptual
shift and marked a key component of his experience.51
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Following his desert excursions, Baudrillard began to utilize the rhetorical
equivalent of the disconnectedness he experienced while speeding through the
desert—a succession of fleeting fragments and aphorisms—in his writing.
Baudrillard asks himself near the end of America: “Why are the deserts so
fascinating?” He then promptly answers himself, saying, “It is because you are
delivered from all depth there – a brilliant, mobile, superficial neutrality,” which
is “a challenge to meaning and profundity, a challenge to nature and culture, an
outer hyperspace, with no origin [in cultural meaning?], no reference-points.”52
For Baudrillard, this meant that the rapid movement through the desert created a
sense of active exchange between signs and images in which the solidity of
meaning, origin, or singular reference was denied. This experience was significant
because it prompted a shift in the development of Baudrillard’s thought,
germinating from the desert experience of rapid excursive successions. As an
embodied metaphor, Baudrillard realized that assemblages of pithy snippets
gathered from immediate and fleeting observations offered alternate perspectives
to those derived by traditional theory and close analysis.
While I am arguing here that the speed and movement through the desert,
and the rapid transition from one impression to the next, contributed to
refashioning Baudrillard’s thought, I would add that he was undoubtedly primed
to find that approach valuable by a well-established tradition of philosophical
aphoristic journal writing. Some of the aphoristic literary collections that
Baudrillard may have been familiar with included books by Goethe, Kierkegaard
and Wittgenstein. He was also definitely aware of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and
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Evil, a text divided into numbered sections, many of which consist of a single
aphorism. In Baudrillard’s writing, Nietzsche is a constant companion.
“Nietzsche, as far as I am concerned, is the one who has continued to be the most
important,” writes Baudrillard, “but not as a point of reference, as someone I
would cite, but as a spirit (esprit), as a stimulus (impulsion), or inspiration.”53
Baudrillard knew of the aphoristic tradition used by Nietzsche long before
he arrived in the desert. In principle, therefore, he could have adopted this
approach prior to his desert engagement. But he did not. For Baudrillard, it was
the phenomenal reduction and the movement through the landscape (adapted as a
sort of vanguard empiricism) that impacted him so greatly. “I knew about all of
this [the desert]… when I was still in Paris of course,” claimed Baudrillard, “But
to understand it, you have to take to the road.”54 Baudrillard refers here to the preexisting perceptions acquired from the hyperreal of mass media versus the
immanent signs of the real in the landscape of the desert. The latter remained
unrecognized until Baudrillard was immersed and thinking with/in the place.
On the road, careening through the desert, Baudrillard witnessed the
“succession of signs, faces, images” through the windshield of his car, as if they
were flashing on a screen.55 From these fleeting impressions, Baudrillard gleaned
observations and insights, prompting him to fall in love with the fragment. And,
as Geoff Dyer claims, he came to adore “slipstream exaggerations, heat-ripple
visions and switchback revelations.”56 Baudrillard relished the subversion and
outbreak of new possibilities in using a fragmentary and excursive observational
strategy. What Baudrillard was able to accomplish with this style is a sort of
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postmodern mash up of often-disparate thoughts to create new meanings. In his
post-America writing, Baudrillard opened up his range of analysis to include
myriad topics, and bears the stamp of what Gane calls “remarkable
experimentation and play.”57
Many of his detractors, however, have assumed Baudrillard’s fragmentary
style and strategy to be a misstep. As Vidich claims, in writing America,
Baudrillard was “substituting impression for analysis, feeling and intuition for
careful study.”58 Vidich chastises Baudrillard for this strategy, asserting that
America “creates a literary aesthetic by sacrificing intellectual and artistic
precision” and that it is “largely empty of insight.”59 Another philosopher, Denis
Dutton, declares in his review of America that Baudrillard “leap[s] from one
bombastic assertion to the next, no matter how brazen.”60 In making these
critiques, Vidich and Dutton seem to miss the point. It is no accident that
Baudrillard avoids a traditional, rigorous academic analysis. Instead, he puts into
practice the strategy learned in the desert, hoping that an alternative perspective
and understanding of America could be produced that stood in contradistinction to
those offered by traditional analytical methods.
Baudrillard uses the strategy of rapid succession as a means to avoid the
paralysis of analysis. “If you approach this society [USA] with the nuances of
moral, aesthetic, or critical judgment” claims Baudrillard, “you will miss its
originality.”61 Although Baudrillard here seems to suggest this style of
observation is especially well suited to analyze contemporary American culture,
throughout the remainder of his life he continued to use a strategy of rapid
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excursive successions to create new perspectives and meanings between
established fields of study and cultural theories that address everything from
terrorism to mass media. Immediately following his desert experience, the
profundity of a strategy of rapid excursive successions seems to have deeply
resonated with Baudrillard, as he adopted it with even more zeal for his very next
book, Cool Memories, which was published in 1987, one year after America.
Baudrillard was so pleased with the outcome of the first Cool Memories
publication that he eventually extended it into a series of five texts (Cool
Memories I-V). The impact of Baudrillard’s place-produced thought seems
evident, as each of these texts reflects Baudrillard’s desert experience and the
thinking developed there by presenting a “whirl of things and events as an
irresistible, fundamental datum.”62 Each of the Cool Memories books consists of
short bursts of thoughts, snappy witticisms, and tiny morsels of biting cultural
criticism assembled together. This structure can be related back to Baudrillard’s
desert experience, flying along in his car while a visual pastiche of signs, images,
and impressions flashed across his windshield. While this rhetorical equivalent of
rapid excursive successions is an important element of the Cool Memories series,
the experience in the desert—of fragmentary and fleeting impressions—had still
another, and even more significant, impact on the development of Baudrillard’s
thought, leading to a profound turn in the progression of his philosophy.
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RADICAL UNCERTAINTY
Many scholars agree that a significant shift occurred in Baudrillard’s thought
during the late 1970s or early 1980s, around the same time as his travels in the
desert. Mark Poster identifies an important shift in Baudrillard’s thought with the
publication of Fatal Strategies in 1983. It is in this text that Baudrillard fully
adopts the analysis of the hyperreal over the “representational subject.”63 Gane
also designates a similar time period in which Baudrillard’s theories undergo a
transformation, although he asserts that “Seduction [from 1979] is the work that
marked the turning.”64 In Baudrillard’s writing from the period when he began
spending time in America, according to Gane, one finds the first evidence of both
his shift away from Marxism and from traditional argumentation and toward more
fragmentary and aphoristic writing. In Fatal Strategies, Baudrillard begins to
challenge the logic of the subject in which the “Kantian categories of time, space,
causality” are believed to be rationally applied to the experience of reality.65
Within this text, Baudrillard also begins to criticize the footing of critical social
theory, pointing to how, in the post-modern world saturated with the hyperreality
of mass media, “rationalist epistemologies are inadequate for the analysis of the
media and other new social activities.”66
I argue that the impetus for this shift is rooted in the rapid excursive
successions of the desert experience. In an interview with CTheory from 1995,
Baudrillard gives an indication of this connection. Asked about his travels and
whether he considers himself as “The Accidental Tourist,” Baudrillard responded:
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I guess a form of speculation, a capacity for crossing, traversing,
yes… If going around an object or looking at it from multiple
viewpoints, defines the tourist, yes that is true. But there is also the
fact that tourists avoid, let off, abandon a number of belongings
and I did strive to do that… I tried not to refer to all of the history
of ideas, philosophy even, to all of that richness I admired the
most. Somewhere they are still close to me, but I did try not to
make references to them, I chose to forsake them.67
Baudrillard’s response reveals the adoption of a strategy of rapid excursive
successions that came to inform his thought through investigative strategies that
“avoid, let off, abandon” traditional theoretical grounding in favor of thoughts
formed through scraps of passing observation.
From the early-1980s onward, Baudrillard further expanded the
fragmentary strategy of rapid excursive successions formulated in the desert, as
his theorizing and philosophy attempted to subvert the boundaries of various
fields of study and remain “without a school or an attachment to a social
movement or intellectual discipline.”68 During the period following his desert
travels, Baudrillard began to increasingly display his preference for the fractal and
enigmatic. This is evident in the proliferation of topics that Baudrillard began to
address in his writing—leaving nothing off limits—as is suggested in the blurb on
the back of Cool Memories. “Baudrillard’s last book was about America,” it reads
“His new one is about cats, Foucault, Alfa Romeos, leukemia, Catholicism, the
Berlin Wall, mattresses, Laurent Fabius, Jean-Paul II, roses…” Cool Memories II
(1987-1990), published in 1996, continues with a similar wide array of topics.
Touted by the back cover as a “wide ranging discussion of events and ideas,”
moving “between poetry and waterfalls, strikes and stealth bombers, Freud and La
Cicciolina, shadows and simulacra… Reagan’s smile and Kennedy’s death.” Even

188

the organization of the Cool Memories series demonstrates evidence of the move
away from a traditional linear sequencing for a text, as the grouping of sections
under the year they were written is abandoned in Cool Memories II, and is
replaced by a continuous stream of aphorisms.
Gane has referred to this turn toward the fragmentary in Baudrillard’s
thought during the early ‘80s as a move towards “radical uncertainty.” In his postdesert writings, Baudrillard progressively incorporates uncertainty and
fragmentation to investigate the contradictions and inconsistencies of culture. For
Baudrillard, the utilization of a fractured and uncertain methodology seemed well
suited for analyzing a world which itself had become fractured and uncertain. “If
the world is paradoxical, [then Baudrillard believed that] theory must be even
more paradoxical.”69 In the rapid excursive successions experienced in the desert,
Baudrillard found the perfect strategy for theorizing about the world. In this way,
we can consider Baudrillard’s place-produced thought as an instance of thinking
through place, even after the physical interaction with the place had ended. This
lingering presence of Baudrillard’s think place in his philosophy was profoundly
influential—even to the point of altering Baudrillard’s existence. By transforming
Baudrillard on an ontological level, the desert seemed to have radically
transformed his development as a thinker and human being. “Long before I left,”
laments Baudrillard “I could not get Santa Barbara out of my head.”70
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REAL AMERICA DOES NOT EXIST
While Baudrillard was deeply impacted by his travels in America, he also had
some lasting influence on America. As the writers Aurelian Crăiuțu and Jeffrey
C. Isaac assert, Baudrillard has been the “most prominent postmodern thinker
who has written on America.”71 I claim that Baudrillard’s writing on America can
be considered as an investigation about how Americans experience place, one
emerging out of his own place-based experience of the American landscape.
Written nearly thirty years ago, Baudrillard’s critique foresaw the increasing role
of the hyperreal and the proliferation of technology that now defines how
Americans experience place.
In his book, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Baudrillard suggests that
the Gulf War never happened in the sense that it was only experienced in the USA
as hyperreal signs and images. For Baudrillard, the experience of the Gulf War
was so mediated by mass media that it was something cinematic and artificial—
successfully subsuming the real war into the floating signifiers of the hyperreal.
The hyperreality presented by the 24-hour news cycle was not the war itself, but a
discursively constructed version of the war. In his writings about America,
Baudrillard implies that a similarly discursive construction through the hyperreal
occurs in how Americans experience place. The real places of America do not
exist because they are so thoroughly experienced through the mediation of
cultural signs and technologies (hyperreality).
In his experience of certain places in America (Disneyland), Baudrillard
realized just how pervasive the hyperreal is, which enabled him to predict how its
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unrelenting growth would soon lead to the domination of the fourth order of
simulacrum in the experience of place—the virtual. This is the ontological leap
that Baudrillard makes in his gathering of information about America. Baudrillard
was able to forecast, and in many ways assist, in the radical shift of how place is
experienced in America, ultimately modifying the very ontology of America.
Although Baudrillard was surprised and perhaps somewhat elated by the
distinction of the real from the hyperreal in his desert excursions, he also
acknowledged that distinction as increasingly less likely to occur. Baudrillard’s
prediction of the onset of the virtual in America, as part of the historical
progression of simulacra, helped to define a shift in the way that Americans
would experience place in the wake of the digital information age that would
exchange the real for the virtual. The use of the virtual as a mediator between the
viewer/traveler and the landscape has become commonplace in the 21st century
digital era. Navigation and digital mapping software or applications (Google maps
being one of the most popular) have become regular features on everything from
automobiles to hand held digital devices, accessible at almost any time or
location. These types of technologies provide a virtual representation, which users
can then utilize to navigate a real place. This virtual layer has become so
ubiquitous and widespread—even in the form of geotagging images on social
media sites—that it is often perceived as part of the place, and absolutely
mediates our experience of place.
Devices that provide augmented realities, the Google Glass for example,
have the same effect of blurring any remaining distinction between the real and
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the virtual. Google Glass is a computer in the form of a pair of glasses worn by
the viewer. By using voice commands, images and information are displayed on
the lenses of the glasses so that from the perspective of the user, images are
overlaid onto what they see before them, effectively merging the virtual with the
landscape (Fig.4 and Fig.5). This merger changes the way that place is
experienced, which also means that the place is changed. It is through the
exchange with place that we gather information and organize our thoughts about
individual places—which is a major force in the constitution of its being (and
ours, presumably). Baudrillard makes this connection when he reflects on driving
in America: “This [he refers to the fluid experience and freedom of driving in
America] creates a new experience of space, and at the same time, a new
experience of the whole social system.”72
Just as Baudrillard had his perceptions of time and space altered by
travelling through the desert, he also foresaw how a similar type of alteration or
shift in the perception of place would coincide with the spread of the virtual.
Baudrillard’s thoughts about how place would be experienced in the fourth order
of simulacra—the virtual—stemmed from his own experience of the hyperreal in
America. Baudrillard understood that the evolution of the hyperreal into the
virtual would likely be embraced first in America and would radically change the
manner in which Americans experience the place of America, and indeed this
occurs on a daily basis with the implementation of digital navigation and mapping
technologies.
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Figure 4. A view from the perspective of a Google glass user showing the navigation graphics
overlaid onto the landscape. Image courtesy www.google.com/glass/start/what-it-does/

Figure 5. Another view from the perspective of a Google glass user showing the navigation
graphics overlaid onto the landscape.
Image courtesy http://www.howitworksdaily.com/technology/how-smartglasses-work/
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All of this proliferation of geolocational technology has rendered an even
greater variation in the experience of place. “Place” is now more than ever
heterogeneous “places,” depending on which technologies are used or activated in
the navigation and understanding of place. The ubiquity of these mediations has
increased the impossibility of having the same experience of place more than
once. The pervasiveness of technology in the experience of place for many
Americans has reached the point in which media and technology pundits such as
J.D. Lasica have made claims that “geolocation capabilities will simply be baked
into our everyday on-the-go lives.”73 The use of geolocational technologies
reshapes sensory data in powerful ways – they can often initiate rapidly changing
exchanges with place as the technology may even change or update as the
experience is occurring. This means that multiple experiences of “places” can
occur within a seemingly singular experience of “place.” These types of
technologies have facilitated the proliferation of exchanges within a situated
socio-historical zone to become more diversified, complex, and networked.
The alteration to the way that Americans experience place through the
mediation of geolocational technologies will ultimately lead to a transformation of
the place itself—this is Baudrillard’s ontological leap. As previously mentioned,
Thoreau shared a similar assertion about the transformative power of technology
more than one hundred years before Baudrillard when he claimed that “the
railroad rides upon us.” For Baudrillard, I argue that the first indication of this
transformation comes out of his place-produced thought with/in the American
landscape. Baudrillard believed the alterations to the experience and
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understanding of place should not be taken lightly. With the further disappearance
of the real, the virtual will increasingly modify the understanding, organization,
and classification of place, essentially forming an ontological transfiguration.
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5

THE NEGOTIATION OF THIRD SPACE:
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK

One would cut through all the heavy layers of ideology that have been borne
down since the beginnings of the family and private property: that can be
done only in the imagination… to change the imaginary in order to be able to
act on the real.
- Catherine Clement

The human imagination can significantly transform the everyday. In this sense, it
can be thought of as a place of revolutionary innovation, an incubator for what
might seem impossible in a given epoch. For example, Leonardo da Vinci
imagined flying machines in the pages of his notebook long before the first
airship or the flight of the Wright Brothers. As the writer Virgil Nemoianu claims,
the human imagination is a potent resource because it can “introduce us to a series
of things that have not happened in our own worlds.”1
In aggregates, such as the “collective imagination,” the human
imagination is also a site for originating new forms of knowledge, identity, and
subjectivity. Indeed, a collective imagination is a place in which the hopes, fears
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and desires of a collective are negotiated, a place where disparate ideologies and
cultures encounter each other in a dialogical exchange. This chapter argues that it
is such a place—specifically the third space of the Indian collective
imagination—that the philosopher Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak used as the setting
for situated contemplation, for the development of thought produced with/in
place. As an interstitial site of negotiation and invention between the body politic
of the colonized and the imposition of colonial rule, the third space of the Indian
collective imagination had a particular and significant impact on Spivak’s
methodology of analysis, object of critique, and development of thought.

THIRD SPACE
I have borrowed the term “third space” from Homi K. Bhabha. If first and second
spaces are meant to indicate those of the colonized and the colonizers, then the
third space is identified as something else besides; a space that mixes elements of
the two other spaces in order to map an alternative geography that can remain
contested and unsettled. According to Bhabha, a “third space” is a place of
hybridity and exchange. Within these exchanges there is an “emergence of
interstices – the overlap and displacement of domains of difference – [in which]
the intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness, community interest,
or cultural value are negotiated (Bhabha’s italics).”2 It is the character of the
Indian collective imagination as a “third space” – a place of contestation and
negotiation – that Spivak especially interacts with, in developing her placeproduced thought. In many ways, the development of Spivak’s thinking has been
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deeply grounded within what she refers to as the “inventive equivalence” of the
third space of the Indian collective imagination. As Spivak explains, inventive
equivalence does not involve a removal of difference, but rather entails, “thinking
without nation, [using] space-names as shifters, in a mythic geography”3 that can
disturb “measures in terms of a standard at whose heart is Western European
nationalism.”4 She has utilized this place-produced thought to develop an
insurgent critique of the discursive tropes of Western metaphysics and
Eurocentricity. Viewed with this awareness of its integral relationship to “mythic
geography” and intimate relation to place, I argue that Spivak’s philosophy
contains a critical spatial and topographical quality that is often unrecognized. As
such, this chapter will demonstrate the crucial roles of materiality, situadedness,
and the co-production of thought with/in place, in the development of Spivak’s
thought.
Spivak’s philosophical development is especially noteworthy within this
overall project because it includes the production of a situated epistemology
with/in place, but without an explicit terra firma. The geographical borders of
India do not absolutely define the third space of its collective imagination
(Spivak’s think place), as the third space is not completely defined along
nationalistic, ethnic, or religious lines. As a zone of active exchange, the third
space of a collective imagination can be diasporic, extending beyond the borders
of established nation-states (which are themselves temporal human constructs).
Thus, Spivak’s place-produced thought is not directly imbricated with physical
topography in the same manner as the other examples described in this text.
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Nonetheless, by thinking of the third space of the Indian national
imagination as a type of place, we can regard it within the parameters of a place as
first established in our initial discussion of place and space, that is to say, as a
socio-historical zone of active exchange between various forces and ideologies—
and therefore, a dynamic space of negotiation. The third space of the Indian
collective imagination functions as a focalizing locus for Spivak’s thought in the
same manner that physical geographies operate in other instances of placeproduced thought.

DISCURSIVE MATERIALITY
The absence of materiality in Spivak’s place of thought might, at first, seem
problematic, particularly because materiality was critical to the other instances of
place-produced thought that we have explored. However, we need to recall that
the materiality in other instances of place-produced thought was significant
because of how it demonstrated the agency of place. The encounters with
materiality for these other thinkers are examples of the place pushing back,
asserting itself against the presumptions of the thinker and the impositions of
culture. This distinction emphasizes that the agency of a place is part of, but also
more than just its materiality. Instead, the agency of place should be considered as
a product of its stratified histories, encounters, and the forces acting upon and
within its margins. The sum of its agglomerated particulars is what provides place
with a continuously shifting agency, not merely a singular aspect of its material
constitution.
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The third space of the Indian collective imagination—while lacking the
actual materiality that other sites of place-produced thought may possess—still
has a similar force of indigenous agency, making it capable of pushing back
against the presumptions of the thinker. Even so, there is still more to be
considered in terms of materiality for Spivak’s locus of thought. By further
examining materiality in place-produced thought, not only can we better explicate
the character of materiality, but we can also reveal a vital materiality operating at
the core of Spivak’s thinking.
First, we would do well to recognize the influence of language, discourse,
and ideology on the materiality of every occurrence of place-produced thought. In
the Walden experiment, for example, even though Thoreau perceived that by
living in a cabin on the edge of Walden Pond he would be brought closer to the
“essence of things,” he brought his own discursive presumptions to the experience
of materiality within the place. For example, Thoreau expresses that “a taste for
the beautiful is most cultivated outdoors, where there is no house and no house
keeper.”5 The possibilities for the materiality of a place are in some ways
determined by the thoughts, language, and capacities of the person experiencing
the encounter. Baudrillard’s engagement with the material desert was undoubtedly
filtered through interlocutors such as Jack Kerouac, John Ford, Reyner Banham,
and pop culture representations. All of these discursive layers came with
Baudrillard to the desert, injecting his experience with pre-existing notions of
materiality. Each encounter with materiality is marked by the concept and
perceptions of materiality that the specific person brings with them. Therefore,
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while other instances of place-produced thought may seem to have a more direct
engagement with raw materiality, we need to remember the discursivity of
materiality particular to each thinker within the context of their encounter with
place. For example, when Matta-Clark first learned of the “gutterspace” properties
and was able to visit one of them, he was struck by the nature of their existence
and the conditions responsible for their creation. For most other observers, these
small parcels of land were meaningless and useless, and a material encounter with
them would likely have done little to changed that conception. Materiality in the
same location is experienced very differently for each individual, depending upon
the background, intentions, and motivations framing his or her experience.
Secondly, even though Spivak’s thinking may not be explicitly anchored
to a terra firma, there is still a material basis to the development of her thought.
This includes her childhood experiences living in Kolkata, her own body, her
movement(s) between the USA and India, and perhaps most importantly her
continued encounters with Subaltern women. Even though Spivak has lived in the
USA for most of her life, she has maintained close relations with various
Subaltern groups. For instance, Spivak speaks about her experiences with a group
of Sabar women—how they demonstrate within their songs an inventive
equivalence and negotiation akin to that which animates the third space of the
Indian collective imagination. Spivaks notes that the inventiveness of their lyrics,
which often mix fact with fantasy, are a microcosm of third space processes and
productions. As Spivak explains in an anecdotal format:
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Imagine the frisson of delight that passed through me the first time that I
heard these women weave a verse that began: Manbhumer Man raja—
‘King Man of Manbhum’—using the precolonial name of this place that
nobody uses. The next line was even more delightful: Kolkatar rajar
pathorer dalan bé—‘the King of Kolkata has a stone mansion.’ Kolkata
was in the place of what I am calling ‘inventive equivalence.’ They were
going to Kolkata, a little group for a fair, so they were honouring the
King of Kolkata by preparing these songs. Kolkata is my hometown and
I was thinking, as I sang with these women in that remote room… who
would the King of Kolkata be? Kolkata is a colonial city and, unlike
older Indian cities had never had a Nawab… it never had a Hindu Raja
either. But the women were singing ‘The King of Kolkata has a stone
mansion,’ where Kolkata occupied the place of a shifter, and who was I
to contradict?6

Through song, these women were able to construct a narrative about
Kolkata that wove together histories and invented attributes into their present
collective experience of traveling to Kolkata. For Spivak, these types of
encounters have provided a materiality or grounding to the play between positions
or claims that characterizes the function of the third space of the Indian collective
imagination. These encounters have also revealed to her how the third space can
“appropriate material of all sorts into its machine, robbing the content of its
epistemic charge.”7 That ability to become “neither the One… nor the Other…
but something else besides,”8 is markedly present in Spivak’s thinking and notable
when she proclaims: “I realized that, as for all peoples who are not the felicitous
subject of the European Enlightenment, their perennially blocked path to
‘modernity’ has been hybrid, not ‘European.’”9 In terms of this type of play or
hybridity, the third space of the Indian collective imagination (and therefore
Spivak’s thinking) echoes Jacques Derrida’s thoughts about the nature of a text.
For Derrida, a text is “at the same time open, proffered and indecipherable, even
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without our knowing that it is indecipherable (Derrida’s italics).”10 When Derrida
speaks about a text, he urges us to understand the inseparability of the text from
context, meaning that the text is never fixed. The text operates as more of a “third
space” in which diversified voices intermingle and clash in continual play.
Derrida insists that this play means that the text is “constituted by its never-fullyto-be-recognized-ness.”11 There is an important connection between Derrida’s
assertions, Spivak’s thinking, and the function of the third space of the Indian
collective imagination, because it emphasizes the performative tendencies utilized
to produce knowledge and meaning.

CRICKET AND COLONIALISM
Some historical context for the anatomy or framework of the Indian collective
imagination and its development in the 20th century is in order here. The Republic
of India, as it is known today, had been a trading partner with numerous European
companies since the beginning of the 18th century. In 1848, British regulation of
the region was strengthened when an English lord was appointed to the top
position in the East India Company, which was the most powerful organization in
India. The East India Company controlled trade and flexed its muscle through the
use of private armies. Once the company was dissolved in 1874, England took
over direct control of India, which was subsumed under colonial rule. India
remained under stringent British control until 1947, when it became an
independent nation. The shift for India from being a colony to being a postcolonial nation, and the exchanges between colonizer and colonized during that
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process, were significant in the development of Spivak’s thinking. Of particular
import for her was the third space of the Indian collective imagination and its
relation to British attempts to produce, maintain, and promulgate its authority in
India. One of most explicit and readily understood instances of this confluence
can be found in cricket.
First introduced during the 1840s as a segregated sport, one in which
English and Indian players never mixed, cricket “evolved into an unofficial
instrument of state cultural policy,” serving as a vehicle to further disseminate
ideas about imperialist standards of character and social behavior.12 The
anthropologist Arjun Appadurai writes that the structure, etiquette, and rules of
cricket were intended to “transmit Victorian ideals of character and fitness to the
colony.”13 As the reach and popularity of cricket flourished in India, cricket teams
from England began to tour India playing matches against “Indian” teams –
originally comprised of Englishmen living in India. However, as the number of
highly skilled Indian cricket players increased, there was a sense of public
urgency (closely tied to the rise of Indian nationalism) for Indians themselves to
represent India on its national cricket teams. This demand mean that there “had to
be other parallel entities in the colonies against which the English nation-state
could play: thus, ‘India’ had to be invented, at least for the purposes of colonial
cricket.”14
Through its growing popularity and its representation of a collective
identity, Indian cricket became firmly established in the realm of the national
imagination. Once a part of the national imagination, cricket became subject to
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the agency of the social collective, molded at the interstices of heterogeneous
cultures and ideas. Through representations in the collective imagination via
cultural outlets such as mass vernacular literature, public broadcasting, popular
cinema, and increased indigenous patronage, Indian cricket was presented as a
“critical instrument of [Indian] subjectivity and agency in the process of
decolonization.”15
Indian cricket grew into a means of actively playing out, in a physical and
visual manner, the ideological and political conflicts swirling within the third
space of the Indian collective imagination. As a form of ideological play, cricket
can be considered as a “microcosm of the fissures and tensions of a deeply
divided society: fissures that it both reflects and plays upon, mitigates as well as
intensifies.”16 As a visualization of the operation of the third space of the Indian
collective imagination, cricket also served as a source of Indian identity and
subjectivity formation. Appadurai writes that when “Indians from various
linguistic regions in India see and hear the cricket narratives of television and
radio, they do so not as neophytes struggling to grasp an English form but as
culturally literate viewers for whom cricket has been deeply vernacularized.”17
Thus, cricket transformed, and a colonial sport became a new form of “inventive
equivalence.” A key aspect of this inventive equivalence was the tangible
subversion of caste hierarchies and the challenge to Western constructs of the
Subaltern subject.
As early as 1906, the victory of a mixed caste Indian cricket team over a
group of European cricketers was celebrated by the Indian Social Reformer
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newspaper as having “done far more to liberalize the minds of thousands of young
Hindus than all other attempts in other spheres.”18 As Ramachandra Guha also
writes, these types of victories “were seen variously as a triumph over caste
prejudice and an assertion of a suppressed national spirit.”19 That a game might
have such far-reaching consequences is not unreasonable. Roger Callois has
asserted that “the competition and simulation [acted out in games] may and
indeed do[es] create cultural forms to which an educational or esthetic value is
ascribed.”20 It is the notion of cricket as a site in which third space conflicts and
contestations are enacted that creates a crucial connection to Spivak’s thinking. A
comparable subversive process and assertion of Subaltern subjectivity is inscribed
in Spivak’s thinking about the critique of Western metaphysics and
Eurocentricity.
Beginning as a symbol of, and instrument for, colonial power, cricket was
transformed in the Indian context into something quite different. This production
of an “inventive equivalence” amounted to a cultural re-visioning. Indian cricket
became clearly distinct in its character, process, and presentation from the
colonial English model of cricket, while still maintaining a historical connection
to its British roots. Appadurai cites that “the impact of media, commercialization,
and national passion have almost completely eroded the old Victorian civilities
associated with cricket. Cricket is now aggressive, spectacular.”21 Or as Ghua
more generally states, “the game has come to mean something quite different here
from what it did, and often still does, in its original home.”22 The journalist
Soumya Bhattachary also describes how the game of cricket was re-visioned in
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India, particularly after the ICC Cricket World Cup in 1983, as it became the
symbol of a “New India, a Young India, a Fearless India” and the “delirious staple
of Indian public life and discourse.”23 The fervent embrace of cricket as a
collective passion in India is demonstrated by their role as a major player in world
cricket since the 1970s, winning the World Cup twice within that span. Cricket
has been re-territorialized; in its contemporary manifestation, English cricket has
been transformed in India into “something else besides” – not just a leftover from
a colonial oppressor. As Shadra Ugra maintains, “India sees cricket – and indeed
an image of itself on a global scale – through its cricket team.”24
In the transformation from “cricket played in India” to “Indian cricket,” a
crucial indigenous modification occurred which enabled Indian cricket to become
a forum for the negotiation of collective consciousness and agency. This shift
transpired when the challenges within the game of cricket were presented as the
personal struggles of some of its most famous cricketers. These narratives of
personal struggle came to stand as metaphors of the collective struggle for
subjectivity and identity. Once this shift occurred, Indian cricket was no longer
merely a game. In describing the famous cricketer Gundappa Vishwanath (Fig.1),
Anandam P. Kavoori details how he would will “the public, his partner (so to
speak), to reach more fully into themselves, to participate with increasing
abandon.”25 The viewing public for cricket came to feel as though the struggles
and victories of the individual cricketers were also their own struggles and
victories. By becoming a metaphor of collective identity, cricket ceased to be an
extension of colonialism, and became instead a “social practice that forms the

207

background of everyday life.”26 As Guha claims, cricket was instilled in the
collective heart of Indians because it acted out the concerns of the collective on
the playing field.

Figure 1. The famous cricketer Gundappa Vishwanath at bat.
Image courtesy of Getty Images.

LIMINAL PHILSOPHY
This act of translating cricket from a colonial instrument of power into a
representation of passionate collective subjectivity is a critical illustration of the
operation of the third space of the Indian collective imagination. However, it’s
worth noting that Spivak never explicitly writes about cricket.27 In the context of
this analysis, it doesn’t matter that Spivak never directly references the
development of cricket in India, because I am using it as an example of how the
power of the third space of the collective imagination can negotiate and alter
existing forms of subjectivity and knowledge. Spivak’s thinking is connected to
Indian cricket in the shared reliance on the third space of the Indian collective
208

imagination. It is the transformative and negotiative ability of the third space of
the Indian collective imagination that is most indelible for Spivak, rather than any
of its individual productions such as cricket. Spivak has been much more drawn to
the third space of the Indian collective imagination in the oral-formulaic traditions
of endemic storytelling and folk songs. “I am not asking us to imitate the oralformulaic,” claims Spivak, “I am suggesting that the principle of inventive
equivalence [drawn from the oral-formulaic] should be at the core of the
comparativist impulse.”28
Spivak’s connection to the oral-formulaic and the Indian collective
imagination has a long history. Born in what was then called Calcutta in 1942,
Spivak studied and lived there until the early 1960s when she came to America to
continue her education at Cornell. Despite moving her main home to America
more than 50 years ago, Spivak has continued her engagement with India by
returning there to teach and work with various groups. It is Spivak’s sustained
efforts to think with/in the Indian collective imagination that has enabled her to
maintain a symbiosis, both working with, and learning from, the power of the
third space. These encounters have helped Spivak to invigorate her connection to
the collective imagination, as well as provide a materiality for it in the form of
tangible bodies and subjects.
The Indian Independence of 1947 marked a tremendously influential
moment in the development of Spivak’s thought. Indeed, at a lecture given at the
Centre for Advanced Study in Sofia, Bulgaria, and later published as a book
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entitled, Nationalism and the Imagination, Spivak spoke of the impact of Indian
independence:
Elation in the conversation of the elders, interminable political
discussions. Remember, we were 300 years under the Islamic
empire and then 200 years under the British. So it was big… The
important event was Partition, the division of the country…
Overnight Kolkata became a burdened city; even its speech
patterns changed. If these were the recollections of Independence,
the nationalist message in the streets created schizophrenia.29

The feeling of schizophrenia that Spivak describes came about mainly through
Indian Partition. As nation-states were geographically reorganized, many people
seemed to lose the “comfort felt in one’s corner of the sidewalk, a patch of
ground… which the nation thing conjures.”30 As Spivak continues, “when this
comfort is taken away, there is a feeling of helplessness, loss of orientation,
dependency, but no nation thing.”31 Without a specific parcel of land in which to
anchor and ground the sense of nationalism, the third space of the Indian
collective imagination became a key site for the negotiation of Indian identity and
subjectivity. The schizophrenia that Spivak refers to is the uncertainty and openendedness of Bhabha’s “intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness”
as it is negotiated within the third space of the collective imagination. Therefore,
for Spivak it has been the re-visioning function of the third space of the collective
imagination that has been most profound, rather than the act of Independence or
Partition itself. Due in part to her experience of Indian Independence and
Partition, Spivak enthusiastically embraces a form of nationalism that “is the
product of a collective imagination constructed through rememoration.”32 As
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Spivak and other Indians experienced during Partition, when the piece of ground
that one derives much of his or her identity from is radically modified by political
or cultural actions, a loss of comfort with such a place may occur. In such an
instance, the collective imagination takes on even more prominence as a source of
rootedness, belonging, and identity.
Near the end of the lecture, Spivak reiterates one of the main lessons that
she learned from the “rememoration” or re-visioning of the state by the collective
imagination, in the formation of an identity for itself as part of the Independence
process: any collective imagination “trained in the play of language(s) may undo
the truth-claims of national identity thus unmooring the cultural nationalism that
disguises the workings of the state—disguises the loss of civil liberties.”33
Spivak’s own development of thought is rooted within the play of language and
negotiation of difference in the third space of the Indian collective imagination
mentioned above. Spivak hints at this type of site-specificity for her
thinking/speaking when she notes, “I tend to always speak in context. I always
carry the trace of what I do, where I am.”34
In many ways, Spivak’s place-produced thought is a form of critical
regionalism, sharing tensions between the local and the global that are evident in
all forms of place-produced thought. Just as Spivak’s critical regionalism attempts
to be “free of the baggage of nationalist identitarianism” and moves beyond
national boundaries, the overall notion of place-produced thought that we have
been exploring endeavors to do something comparable.35 As Spivak’s project
demonstrates, place-produced thought is often able to chip away at the legacy of
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established norms such as the Platonic binarisms in Western philosophy because
it often attempts to “undermine possessiveness, the exclusiveness, [and] the
isolationist expansionism of mere nationalism.”36 Spivak’s place-produced
thought is reflective not only of post-coloniality, but also of post-nationality. The
emphasis of critical regionalisms over any essentialized concept of nation was
largely derived from Spivak’s experience with the localized manifestation of the
collective imagination in indigenous stories and song.
For Spivak, the product of situated contemplation in the third space of the
Indian collective imagination has been a type of liminal philosophy, a method of
thinking that opens “something else besides,” as an alternative to binarisms. As
described above, the translation of cricket through the third space created a
dialogical hybrid that was not purely a representation of colonizer or colonized.
This type of “in-betweenness” is still present within contemporary Indian cricket.
As Ugra writes, “Indian cricket today stands for both First World market
domination and Third World aspiration; inclusion and insularity; arrogance and
open-mindedness (Ugra’s italics).”37 This same type of in-betweenness has also
marked much of Spivak’s philosophy. The nurturing of a liminal philosophy has
been crucial for Spivak because it provides the possibility for mounting a critique
from both inside and outside of a discourse. This has enabled Spivak to work
within the customs of Western philosophy, but at the same time, to turn away
from its prescriptions, generating what Bhabha calls a “re-articulation, or
translation, of elements that are neither the One… nor the Other… but something
else besides, which contests the terms and territories of both” (Bhabha’s italics).38
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Being “neither the One… nor the Other… but something else besides” is a
position that Spivak has attempted to maintain throughout her life as she openly
acknowledges her Indian roots as well as her place of privilege teaching and
living at one of the elite Western academic institutions. Yet, just as the third space
of the Indian collective imagination is constantly being negotiated and contested,
Spivak continues to think (and exist) within the indeterminate “by learning to
unlearn her privileges as a prestigious academic residing in the USA… [and by]
learning ‘to speak to (rather than listening to or speak for) the historically muted
subject of the subaltern.’”39
Spivak’s liminal philosophy also provokes questions about what, and who,
has traditionally been outside of certain discourses, forcing one to consider the
ideological and discursive motivations for those exclusions. Much of the thinking
and methodology that Spivak has derived from the third space of the Indian
national imagination has been constructed as a critique of Eurocentricity,
hegemony, gender, and the elitist presumptions of Western thought. Spivak has
mounted these critiques not only through the expansion of post-colonial studies,
but also through a deconstructionist negotiation of the major philosophical works
in Western metaphysics.
Just as we have seen in the other instances of place-produced thought
described here, Spivak herself was transformed through the creation of placeproduced thought. She adapted the functions of the third space of the Indian
national imagination, such as inventive equivalence, liminality, the interstices of
difference, and the undermining of power, into a distinct mode of discourse
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analysis, cultural study, and mode of being. Indeed, Spivak maintains a liminality
between the worlds of privileged Western Ivy league academia and the materiality
of her identification as an Indian rooted in the third space of the Indian collective
imagination.

A POSTCOLONIAL CRITIQUE
One of the methods that Spivak has utilized to extend her thinking with/in place
into critical analysis has been to recognize the third space of the Indian national
imagination as a form of discourse. By thinking of the third space of the Indian
national imagination as a discourse, one can see how it (re)produces subjects and
epistemologies. In fact, in Benedict Anderson’s influential text, Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, he describes
how the development of nationalism or national consciousness is “conceived in
language, not in blood.”40 In Anderson’s view, collective identities are
constructed like a discourse because they entail a “re-presentation and negotiation
of consciousness.”41 This concept of an identity formed through language is
related to the theories of Jacques Lacan. In many ways, Anderson’s claims about
collective identity formation are derived from Lacan’s views about the emergence
of individual identities. For Lacan, language is a Symbolic order that precedes and
makes possible human subjectivity. Reality is interpreted through the mediation
of language and instigates the formation of the subject. The writer Philippe Julien
describes the influence of the Lacanian Symbolic order as such: “Even before
birth, the child is inscribed in a symbolic universe that determines its place.”42
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The determination of identity through language and discourse is echoed on a
larger scale in Anderson’s consideration of imagined communities.
Of course, the association of the third space of the Indian collective
imagination with a form of discourse is consistent with Spivak’s affinity for the
deconstructionist texts of Derrida. Spivak first gained critical prominence in 1976
by writing a pensive and celebrated preface to the English translation of Derrida’s
1967 text Of Grammatology. Since then, Spivak has incorporated Derrida’s
teachings, especially deconstruction, into her own thinking. Spivak has been
particularly drawn to one of the tasks of deconstruction—to expose the
unfinalized play between oppositional positions within a discourse.
Herein lies a critical connection between the third space of the Indian
collective imagination and discourse. Just as Derridean deconstruction posits
discourse as “a play of presence and absence, a place of the effaced trace,” the
third space of the Indian collective imagination can also be considered as a place
that is indeterminate and interstitial. For Derrida, writing (or discourse) can be
anything or “all that gives rise to an inscription in general.”43 By considering the
operations of the third space as a form of discourse, Spivak has been able to take
the same sort of transformative and negotiative functions found in the third space
and apply them in numerous critiques, including the canons of Western
philosophy.
One example of this thinking is Spivak’s A Critique of Postcolonial
Reason. Within this critique, Spivak mounts a third space/deconstructionist
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negotiation of three of the major figures in the tradition of Western philosophy:
Kant, Hegel, and Marx. As Spivak claims, her goal for the critique is to “examine
the structures of the production of postcolonial reason.”44 What Spivak reveals
throughout this critique is the Eurocentric and normative epistemic
presuppositions embedded within the philosophy of these three thinkers. Spivak
then demonstrates how the Other or “native informant” is a necessary construct
for the logic and production of thought by these three heavyweights.45 As she
details, each of them constructs and essentializes the trope of the native informant
as a means of otherization, one that forecloses and dismisses the possibility of
agency and subjecthood for the native informant. By deconstructing this
foreclosure, Spivak’s aim is to provide a “counter narrative that will make visible
the foreclosure to the position of the narrator.”46
One of Spivak’s main tasks in her critique of Kant, Hegel, and Marx is to
speak to the Subaltern within and through the writings of these three men, but also
to not allow their ideas about the Subaltern to become codified and naturalized by
the passage of time and their popular acceptance in the study of philosophy.
Instead, Spivak learns and unlearns their theories, pulling them apart to reveal the
problematic complicities within each philosopher’s logic.

KANT
Beginning with Kant in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, Spivak examines how
Kant’s third Critique, The Critique of Judgment, is predicated upon a
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geopolitically differentiated subject. Spivak insists that Kant’s subject (the one
who holds the power of the critique of judgment) is “generally dependent upon
the rejection [Verwerfung] of the Aboriginal.”47 Spivak’s claim is based upon her
reading of a particular passage from the third Critique that is reproduced here
with her notes included:
Grass is needful for the ox, which again is needful for man as a
means of existence; but then we do not see why it is necessary that
men should exist (a question which is not so easy to answer if we
cast our thoughts by chance [wenn man etwa… in Gedanken hat]
on the New Hollanders or the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego).
Such a thing is then [alsdem ist ein solches Ding] not even a
natural purpose; for it (or its entire species [Gattung—the
connotation of “race” as in “human race” cannot be disregarded
here]) is not to be regarded as a natural product.48
Spivak acknowledges that this particular reference to “New Hollanders
(Australians) or the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego” has historically been brushed
aside in the discussion of Kant as an “unimportant rhetorical detail.”49 Spivak
asserts that this phrasing should not be left unexamined, as it reveals a critical
geopolitical differentiation of Kant’s subject. “Its crucial presence in The Critique
of Judgment cannot be denied,” stresses Spivak.50 Through her analysis, Spivak
illustrates the necessity of the native informant within Kant’s rhetoric, produced
as the parerga to the ergon of the Western world. As a certain outside to the ergon,
the native informant intrinsically operates in relation to a lack within that ergon.
“If the third Critique is read as the indirect orchestration of a universalist
teleology,” states Spivak, “the parergon that it yields is the raw man [native
informant].”51 As such the raw man (New Hollander or Fuegan) plays an integral
role in the transformation of the raw into the philosophical by the Western subject
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of reason. The raw man exists, as an empty space that can be inscribed by the
Western subject, which Spivak believes is Kant’s global project for the Western
subject.52 This project of the European subject, to bring the raw (East) to the
philosophical (West), is the thinly veiled specter of “imperialism as social
mission.”53 Throughout her reading, Spivak demonstrates Kant’s complicity in
that form of imperialism by differentiating the native informant as raw, unnatural,
and non-subject. Spivak’s intent is not to merely “diagnose Kant’s hidden
‘beliefs,’” but rather to utilize the re-visioning inherent in the thinking developed
with/in the third space of the Indian collective imagination (and the teachings of
deconstruction) to render a “something else besides” – an alternative reading of
Kant.

HEGEL
Just as Spivak does with her analysis of Kant’s third Critique, she attempts to
expose the implicit foreclosure of the native informant in Hegel’s reading of the
Srimadbhagavadgita. Within this critique, Spivak demonstrates how the two very
different inscriptions by dominant forces—one originating from inside India, and
the other from outside (Hegel) —share “structural complicity.”54 By
demonstrating this similarity, Spivak intends to avoid “some of the too-easy
West-and-the-rest polarizations sometimes rampant in colonial and postcolonial
discourse studies.”55 Therefore, rather than placing Hegel’s text in stark
opposition to a Indian nationalist reading of the Gita, an endeavor which would
really only serve to legitimatize colonial difference, Spivak attempts to navigate
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the oppositional difference between the two readings. Spivak’s goal is to illustrate
how both readings are strategic examples of dominance that foreclose the
subjectivity of the native informant.
In Spivak’s critique, both of the texts achieve this foreclosure through a
“manipulation of the question of history in a political interest.”56 Through a close
reading of a specific passage from Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Arts, Spivak
illuminates how his reading of the Gita interprets the Spirit in India as stagnant
and unprogressive. Here is an excerpt from the passage that Spivak references:
I am the taste in flowing water, the splendour in the sun and the
moon, the mystical world in holy scriptures, in man his manliness,
the pure fragrance in the earth, the splendour in flames, in all
beings the life, contemplation in the penitent, in living things the
force of life, in the wise their wisdom.57
Spivak’s interpretation of Hegel’s reading of Krishna’s list is that the Spirit never
changes and remains the same in all forms. According to Spivak, Hegel “needs to
say that the Spirit-in-India makes monotonous lists in a violently shuttling way.”58
“Hegel’s conclusions from these rather difficult passages” claims Spivak, is that
the Spirit-in-India is “extremely monotonous, and on the whole, empty and
wearisome.”59 This unchanging spirit does not fit into the Hegelian morphology
of the Spirit that evolves over time. In Hegelian philosophy, if the Spirit is never
transformed, then it would never reach its telos of a fully self-conscious
realization. Spivak indicates how the native informant is foreclosed as part of the
great realization of the Spirit by quoting Hegel directly: “ The Indian knows no
reconciliation and identity with Brahma [the so-called Hindu conception of the
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Absolute] in the sense of the human spirit’s reaching knowledge of this unity
(Hegel’s italics).”60 Hegel’s claim is even more plainly stated here: “Indians
cannot move history.”61
Along with a critique of Hegel’s reading of the Gita, Spivak demonstrates
how an Indian nationalistic reading also serves to inscribe the “Law” onto the
native informant. Spivak points to how some Indian nationalistic groups have
used the Gita as a tool for identifying and preserving “national continuity.”62 For
these groups, the Gita is supra historical, representing a “permanent truth.”63 As
Spivak illustrates, many of these groups use their interpretation of the Gita to
delimit the identity and agency of the native informant. In the form of a regulatory
device, the Gita is utilized as a form of body politic, placing normative
inscriptions upon the Indian subject. Spivak argues, therefore, that just as Hegel
does with his reading, the nationalist interpretation of the Gita attempts to insert a
specific figuration upon the native informant—one serving the particular needs
and authority of each type of reading. “Nationalism,” Spivak contends, “is in
many ways a displaced or reversed legitimation of colonialism.”64 Both Hegel’s
and the Indian nationalist reading of the Gita are guilty of prescribing the limits
and definition of the Subaltern subject to suit the fulfillment of their own needs.

MARX
In the final portion of Spivak’s overall critique of these three key figures in the
Western philosophical tradition, she takes aim at the philosophy of Marx. As with
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Kant and Hegel, Spivak details evidence of how Marx creates a complicit
foreclosure of the native informant. For her analysis, Spivak focuses on the
“implications of a notorious phrase that Marx probably used only once: ‘the
Asiatic Mode of Production [AMP].’”65 Marx’s motivation for differentiating an
Asiatic mode of production from a European one was to explain why Asia had not
experienced the same progression from feudalism to capitalism that has
characterized European history. As Spivak points out, Marx’s postulation of an
AMP is wrought with Eurocentricity, as it is based upon a historical narrative of
progress grounded in a European version of history, and the assumptions of
capitalism as the progression of modern society. By doing so, Spivak exposes the
foreclosure of the native informant in which the “extraordinary achievements of
the pre-capitalist imperial civilizations are generally ignored.”66 This figuration of
history by Marx is a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy that “makes visible the fault
lines within the account of history as (European) modes of production.”67
Just as it did in the works of both Kant and Hegel, the foreclosure of the
native informant here satisfies a certain philosophical interest. Within her
exposition of Marx, Spivak demonstrates how the “AMP has revealed itself to be
neither historico-geographically ‘Asiatic’ nor logically a ‘mode of production.’”68
Spivak’s main critique of Marx, as was the case with Kant and Hegel, is that
Marx has constructed a specific Asiatic subject, history, and mode of production
that serves to further his own logic and argument. As Spivak argues, Marx
produces and defines the Subaltern subject to suit his own needs; so that he can
place those subjects outside or to the side of his version of historical economic
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evolution. By removing the Subaltern/Asiatic subject – the native informant –
from his theory of capitalism’s progression, he essentially removed any
discrepancies to that history, which forms such a significant part of Marxist
philosophy. In doing do, Marx spoke for the native informant, foreclosing and
dismissing the Subaltern subject and their history.
In her re-reading of all three of these figures, Spivak maintains an
approach that is careful not to attempt a resurrection of the lost voice of the native
informant. Rather, Spivak points towards the impossibility of such a task,
especially in the figuration of the native informant by these three. Instead, Spivak
anticipates the opening of a third space, in which “active interception and
reconstellation” can occur, much like what occurred with cricket in the third space
of the Indian collective imagination.69 Spivak also reminds us that none of her
critiques are intended to be damning or accusatory. Instead, she hopes to “produce
something that will generate a new and useful reading.”70
In my summations of Spivak’s critiques of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, I
realize that I have merely scratched the surface of these complex and rich
critiques leveled against three of the great thinkers in Western philosophy. While
the outcome of these critiques is fascinating and valuable, I have not to attempted
to recount the nuanced particulars of each of Spivak’s critiques, but rather have
focused on the strategies used to mount them. My aim here is to connect this type
of thinking and tactical critique back to the thought produced with/in the third
space of the Indian collective imagination. By utilizing this place-produced
thought, Spivak has been able to deploy inventive equivalence and negotiation of
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difference as a critical method of re-visioning – of producing a “something else
besides” – not only for the Subaltern subject of the native informant but also for
the legacy of thought cast by Kant, Hegel, and Marx on the history of Western
metaphysics.

SPEAKING TO THE SUBALTERN
A recurring concern in these examinations of place-produced thought has been the
ontological shift that occurs for both thinker and place in the process of
developing place-produced thought. In the case of Spivak and the third space of
the Indian collective imagination, an argument can be made for a similar type of
transformation. While we have already addressed the bearing of the third space
upon Spivak’s development of thought and mode of being, we have yet to
consider the ontological shift in the third space itself that has been precipitated by
her place-produced thought. One means of gauging this transformation might be
to study one of Spivak’s most celebrated lines of inquiry: Can the Subaltern
Speak? Spivak has revealed the complexity of the answer—much more than a
straightforward “yes” or “no”—through her work in post-colonial and Subaltern
studies.
Through writings such as Other Asias, In Other Worlds: Essays In
Cultural Politics, Outside in the Teaching Machine, and A Critique of
Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present, Spivak has
shown how the Subaltern subject and native informant have been foreclosed upon
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and shut out of the processes or logic within traditional Western hegemonic
discourses. Calling for a re-visioning of the Subaltern subject(s) by “wrenching
them out of their assigned functions,” Spivak has helped to remap the territory of
its consciousness. She has also influenced the third space of the Indian collective
imagination to continue and expand its negotiation of collective identity, the
nation-state, and Subaltern subjectivity.71 Through the continuous negotiation
within the third space, some conceptualizations of Indian nationalism have begun
to move away from the solidarity of the nation-state toward a mutating collective
of critical regionalisms. Within this non-essentializing view of nationality, there is
a deconstruction of the cohesive nation-state (Indian or any other). As Spivak
argues, national consciousness has realized that “we can’t make a clear-cut
distinction between self-determination and nationalism, regionalism and
nationalism. There must be a persistent critique that operates during and beyond
the rational arrangements.”72
One of the best indicators of the impact that Spivak’s place-produced
thought has had on India may have come in early 2013 when she was awarded the
Padma Bushan. The award is given annually by the government of India to honor
notable service to the Republic of India. The award is the third highest award
given to a civilian by Republic of India. However, beyond questions of Indian
nationalism and collective consciousness, perhaps Spivak’s place-produced
thought has been most valuable in initiating greater interest in the formation and
ontology of the Subaltern subject. Without resorting to strict authenticity politics,
Spivak has raised a challenge—channeled through the influences of Derridean
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deconstruction and the powers of the third space of the Indian collective
imagination—to produce radical analyses and newly imagined possibilities for the
Subaltern subject.
Perhaps this challenge is best illustrated by the growth of Subaltern
Studies as an important field of study. As David E. Ludden claims, “In the 1990s,
Subaltern Studies became a hot topic in academic circles on several continents; a
weapon, magnet, target, lightning rod, hitching post, icon, gold mine, and fortress
for scholars ranging across disciplines from history to political science,
anthropology, sociology, literary criticism, and cultural studies.”73 One of the
outcomes of these studies has been the re-visioning of the Subaltern. Yet, rather
than trying to speak for the Subaltern, most of this new discourse attempted to
speak to them, and to assist in vitalizing the “integrity of indigenous histories that
appear naturally in non-linear, oral, symbolic, vernacular, and dramatic forms.”74
There is evidence that this increased re-visioning and shift in ontological
status continues. In 2012, the international edition of the New York Times
published an article on the increased number of publications produced in India.
Kanishka Gupta, the founder and managing director of Writer’s Side, claimed in
2012 that there is a “new breed of writers who wanted to write books that
connected to the average Indian reader… Publishing houses committed to
publishing such books sprang up all over the country and big multinationals had
to shed their elitism and enter this space.”75 While Gupta is specifically referring
to the “watershed moment” of the publication of Chetan Bhagat’s novel Five
Point Someone, the resonance that Spivak’s (and others) thought has had on these
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type of developments within India can’t be underestimated. The negotiation of
the Indian subject continues as an ongoing discourse in the third space of the
Indian collective imagination, due in large part to Spivak’s place-produced
thought. Several recent publications, such as New Subjects and New Governance
in India by Ranabițra Samațddațra and Suhit Sen, Appropriately Indian:
Gender and Culture in a New Transnational Class by Smitha Radhakrishnan, and
The New India: Citizenship, Subjectivity, and Economic Liberalization by
Kanishka Chowdhury, demonstrate the continued negotiation and investigation of
the formation of the Subaltern subject. Each of these recent critiques is marked
with the epistemic and ontological trace of Spivak’s place-produced thought.

RADICAL RECALCITRANCE
With all the talk of the agency of place at the beginning of this chapter, there is
one aspect of Spivak’s place-produced thought that we have so far failed to
consider: how place has pushed back against the thinker. Perhaps, we have made
too much of the transformations that Spivak’s place-produced thought has had on
her think place – the Indian collective imagination. Indeed, it seems that some
scholars have questioned this very relationship in their criticisms of Spivak’s
writing. In the swirling storm of controversy set off by Terry Eagleton’s caustic
review of Spivak’s A Critique of Postcolonial Reason for the London Review of
Books, some scholars sided with Eagleton and wondered “Can Gayatri Spivak's
'pretentiously opaque' writing make a difference in the real world?”76 The debate
about efficacy and real world application of Spivak’s writing is nothing new for
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philosophy, but was specifically heightened by some of Eagleton’s comments in
his review such as: “Post-colonial theorists are often to be found agonising about
the gap between their own intellectual discourse and the natives of whom they
speak; but the gap might look rather less awesome if they did not speak a
discourse which most intellectuals, too, find unintelligible. You do not need to
hail from a shanty town to find a Spivakian metaphorical muddle like ‘many of us
are trying to carve out positive negotiations with the epistemic graphing of
imperialism’ pretentiously opaque.”77 In this particular excerpt, Eagleton also
tacitly questions whether Spivak has been able to bridge the gap between her
writing and the Subaltern subject. Part of his assault seems to ridicule a
disconnect between one of the topics of Spivak’s writing, the Subaltern subject,
and the Subaltern themselves.
Yet, it is interesting to wonder whether Eagleton’s assertion really runs
contrary to the notion that Spivak’s place-produced thought has prompted an
ontological transformation to the place of its production – the Indian collective
imagination? Our answer depends on how we interpret Eagleton’s critique. There
have certainly been a number of other critics (many of them part of the Indian
collective imagination), which have disputed or interrogated the influence of
Spivak’s thought. Most of these critiques are based upon two distinct types of
dispute: either with her method of analysis or the inauthenticity/appropriation of
Indianality of her voice. For example, some critics have examined Spivak’s heavy
use of poststructuralism and deconstructionism and “reject her reading practices
as aiming at an accommodation of the realities of imperialism to purely textual
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matters.”78 Some of these critics (among them—Arif Dirlik, Aijaz Ahmed, Ella
Shohat) believe that “her privileging a theory [deconstruction]… foregrounds a
hegemonic discourse while muting native voices.”79 Another such critic, Benita
Parry, argues that Spivak’s methodology constructs a story of colonialism that
“freezes the native into a limbo of speechlessness and inarticulation,” and that she
“glosses over the documents and histories that tell the stories of the colonized
people’s struggle.”80
An example of criticism that focuses Spivak inauthenticity/appropriation
of Indianality comes from individuals such as Dipesh Chakrabarty and Harish
Trivedi. In a 1997 interview with Tina Chen and S.X. Goudie of UC Berkeley,
Bharati Mukherjee has the following exchange with her interviewers:
• Mukherjee: …These critics, on the other hand, though they
locate themselves in North America and participate in the North
American competitive, materialist economy, invent or appropriate
the positions of populous, Asia-based communities, and worse,
they reduce the diversity of those communities' positions into one
that fits most neatly into their favored theory. The Indian graduate
students and junior faculty members I have talked to on western
Indian campuses in the last two years have expressed growing
resentment of such usurpation. The theorist they most often named
was Spivak, perhaps because she is the best-known of the IndoAmerican group.
Some recent publications by serious Indian literary critics
based in India, for instance by Professors Aijaz Ahmad and Harish
Trivedi of the University of Delhi, indicate an emerging
resentment of the appropriation of Indianality and postcoloniality
by scholars of Indian origin (or of non-European origin) who have
opted for U.S. citizenship and/or permanent residence in North
America… Professor Trivedi, who lectured here at Berkeley a few
months ago on the Eurocentric implications of the term
"postcolonial," was more direct in his attack on the right of Spivak,
a U.S. citizen and long-term U.S. resident, to speak for the
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"periphery."
• Chen and Goudie: Spivak has cautioned against reading her as
someone who claims to "give voice" to those she represents; she
has said in The Postcolonial Critic --and I'm paraphrasing--that to
read her as speaking for "the periphery" is to read her, wrongly, as
a "Third World informant."
• Mukherjee: But then she goes on to, at the same time, trounce
others for providing versions, portraits that don't coincide with hers
so that she, I'm not going to say that she's lying, but there's this
problematic position . . .81

Some of these cries of inauthenticity are perhaps due to Spivak’s physical
distance from the heart of the Indian collective imagination in India. “I feel fine
that I'm not at home either in India or in the US,” claims Spivak.82 Criticism
grounded upon Spivak’s geographical distance from India hardly seems fair.
Firstly, we have already discussed how the lack of physical contact or a visceral
material encounter does not mean that Spivak’s thought is not intimately linked
with the third space of the Indian collective imagination. Secondly, because, as
we have realized with other instances of place-produced thought, the thinker can
have a lingering effect on the being of a place without remaining in physical
contact with said place. Consider for instance, the lasting repercussions many
thinkers continue to have on their think place even after they have deceased.
Thirdly, due to the previously mentioned lack of topographical specificity for the
Indian collective imagination, it is conceivable for Spivak to think with/in it from
virtually anywhere.
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Therefore, are we to understand these criticisms lobbied at Spivak as
merely examples of intellectual academic sparring? Or could there be something
more to it? I argue that we can, perhaps, read these critiques as an illustration of
the place pushing back. Even though Spivak does well to “speak to,” rather than
“speak for” the Subaltern subject and the Indian collective imagination, perhaps it
does not always want to listen. Many of the criticisms against Spivak are
unwarranted and misinformed, but some of them may be part of the agency of
place asserting itself. Even though they may be disparaging toward Spivak, we
need to consider these voices as part of the place of the third space of the Indian
collective imagination, and therefore comprise the recalcitrance of place. These
voices are part of the negotiation and interstice of conflicting views that comprise
Spivak’s think place and may partially represent the place itself, resisting and
challenging the thinking developed with/in its margins. Places often push back in
uncomfortable ways, and as a place that is a collective of disparate ideologies and
agendas, there is bound to be some resistance by place to the impact that Spivak
has on the Indian collective imagination.
Most scholars agree that Spivak has been a significant contributor to postcolonial and Subaltern studies – even Eagleton states that “The political good
which Spivak has done far outweighs the fact that she leads a well-heeled life in
the States.”83 There also seems to be general consensus that Spivak’s work has
gone a long way in helping to re-vision the ontological makeup of the Subaltern
subject, whether it is in Western philosophical discourse or the Indian collective
imagination.
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6

AFTERWORD

The power of place will be a remarkable one.
- Aristotle, Physics

In an increasingly globalized and technological world, the intersection of unique
placeness and the production of thought will likely continue to transform in
surprising and creative ways. As we move into the future, the potential efficacy
and risk of such entwinement needs to be considered. The five instances of placeproduced thought examined in the previous chapters do not comprise a complete
or exhaustive list of the sorts of thinking with/in place being done. Rather, these
projects were chosen for the heterogeneity of their place-produced thought.
Through their differences, we are able to discern the variety of thought that can be
manifested by thinking with/in place, as well as realize the distinct modes of
engagement that a thinker may have with place. These instances were also chosen
because they are engaged with very different types of places. This multiplicity
helps illustrate the complex and changing nature of what can be considered a
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think place in the various occurrences of place-produced thought. The method in
which a locus of thought is delineated can also widely fluctuate; some of them are
more ideological than geological (as it was for Spivak), and some of them are
more ambiguously defined than a measured and demarcated plot on a map (as for
Thoreau or Heidegger). In addition, the projects of these thinkers demonstrate the
agency of place in distinctive means—place pushed back against all of these
thinkers, but did so in varied ways.
Just as the thinkers, places, and projects from the previous chapters are
heterogeneous, so too have been the approaches I have employed to examine
them. By analyzing these instances of place-produced thought while thinking
through more than one methodological approach, my hope has been to remain
open to the dynamic complexity of place and to the nuanced ways that a thinker
may interact with a place beyond only its significations, or outside of cultural
inscriptions, or more thoroughly than a material encounter with its topography
might provide.
That said, much of this discussion has emphasized the critical function of
materiality in place-produced thought. As we have witnessed in the development
of place-produced thought, each thinker was confronted with a certain materiality
of place. This engagement with phenomena did not constitute a purely
phenomenological encounter, but did often prompt a tangibility of place that
created a rupture or shift in the thinkers pre-existing beliefs, desires, and
assumptions. Despite their diversity, these instances collectively reveal how
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thinking with/in/of/through/about place can produce localized epistemologies, and
are just as much of a product of the place as they are of the thinker.

MOVING BEYOND THE LOCUS OF THOUGHT
In the instances of place-produced thought examined here, the thoughts produced
with/in places have generated far-reaching implications, which extend beyond any
regional or spatial confinement. Place-produced thought is simply contextually
specific in its application, limited by what the French call terroir (the highly
unique mixture of a specific climate, geology, and topography), it can be
modified, grafted, and applied to a variety of other frameworks. Moreover,
because place-produced thought has tremendous ontological weight, I have
argued that it can transform the being of both place and thinker. The trace of the
place-produced thought inscribed upon each entity forms an unretractable
impression that transcends the idiosyncratic encounters with/in place. In this
sense, I have maintained that place-produced thought, by its very nature, can’t be
contained by the margins of its locus. Further, as we have explored here, the
development of an ethos or politics of place is a corollary of thinking with/in
place. These ethical and political positions do not remain locked or fixed within
place; they infiltrate the rest of the world. In fact, the foray of place-produced
thought into other contexts may prove to be one of its most valuable qualities.
Applied in a new framework, place-produced thought can often be the root of
great innovation, resistance, or change.
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Perhaps as a reaction to the increasing reaches of globalization, in the last
thirty years there has been a renewed interest in localized knowledge as a means
to ameliorate the impact and banalization of globalization.1 Since the late 1980s,
entire fields of social and cultural theory have undergone what has been dubbed a
“spatial turn,” initiated by some key texts such as Postmodern Geographies: The
Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory by Edward W. Soja from 1989,
The Practice of Everyday Life by Michel de Certeau from 1980 (1984 in English),
and Michel Foucault’s Des Espaces Autres (written in 1967 but not published
until 1984). As one portion of this reinvigorated interest in the relationship
between space, knowledge, power, the global and the local, place-produced
thought can be understood as sharing many of the same concerns and sensibilities
that are evident in other investigations into the reciprocations between thinking
and place.2

LEARNING FROM LOCALES
I would like end with some questions to keep thinking about in terms of the future
of place-produced thought, and some thoughts about the places of these thinking
projects. One of the first questions to consider is what happens to these places
once they have been recognized as a site of powerful thought generation (like
Walden Pond), especially when these places gain certain fame – attracting
multitudes of people with various motives? Many of these people are curious to
see if the place will prompt or elicit some type of similar powerful or spiritual
experience resulting in a creative epiphany. What effect does it have on place
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when there is an accumulation of people looking for something to happen? Does
this mean something is more likely to happen? Can another thinker engage a
place that has already successfully generated place-produced thought?
One of the problems that any one of us will run into when visiting a place
that has already been used to develop place-produced thought is the difference of
relations that will emerge in our own encounter. Because place is always
relational and in flux, it continues to change even as we are in the midst of an
encounter. Therefore, the relations of one person’s encounter may be drastically
different than another person’s with the very same place. My point is that we can
never experience the same Walden Pond that Thoreau did, and we can never have
the same experience of Heidegger’s landscape near Todtnauberg as he did – I
discovered this first hand. Part of the reason for this is the different relations we
will have with the place, but also because we all experience the materiality of a
place and its phenomena differently. No physical encounter can be exactly
duplicated. Even subtle changes to a place can resonate greatly in our overall
interaction with, and impression of, that place. We can try to recreate the
connection with a place that some other person might have had, but it does not
mean that a connection will happen, or that it will produce the same results.
This does not mean, however, that a place that was part of a past instance
of place-produced thought is lost to the rest of us for creative purposes. It simply
means that we will likely not have the same encounter with that place. Exchanges
with places can be productive in so many different ways that a singular place
might yield panoply of diverse thinking projects. Even if we never create our own
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place-produced thought, learning about the special relationships that others have
had with particular places in the development of thought can still be quite
powerful and enlightening. Studying place-produced thought also helps to remind
us of the agency of place and of its power. These projects reveal that places, like
things, “change in defiance of their material stability.”3 Places are not blank slates
waiting for us to give them meaning, and in fact, places sometimes resist or refute
the meaning and ideas ascribed to them. I believe that projects of thinking with/in
place help us to reduce our anthropocentrism and recognize places as
“participants in the reshaping of the world,” – to borrow Bill Brown’s description
of things.4
Discovering the intimate relation that some thinkers have had with place
emphasizes the deep interconnectivity that all of us can have with place,
reminding us that our very being is related to place, as in Heidegger’s da-sein.
Place-produced thought can help to revitalize our consciousness of the meaning
and value of the places we inhabit. It may allow us to see sites that often go
unseen, and reveal new ways of thinking about and experiencing the landscapes
that we occupy.
Throughout this discussion, I have tried to demonstrate some of the core
aspects of place-produced thought so that we can begin to understand it as a
distinct method of engaging place. I have tried to illustrate how, in certain
instances of thinking with/in place, the place itself clearly asserts its agency and
influence in the actual production of thought. And I have tried to elucidate how
this connection is much different than other historical or intrinsic means of
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maintaining a relationship with ones surroundings. Finally, I have tried to
accentuate the innovative and irruptive possibilities of place-produced thought—
important sources for identities, thoughts, boundaries, and modes of being—while
also recognizing its potential to be used to justify racism, exclusion, and bigotry.
As we increasingly recognize the agency of place and non-human entities, the
function of place in contemporary culture will truly become, as Aristotle once
claimed, “a remarkable one.”
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